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Abstract 
Choosing a home loan is the biggest financial decision most Australians will 
make, with poor consumer loan choices flowing on to affect sector competitiveness 
and the national economy. Research indicates poor loan choice by an average 
Australian borrower will see them making extra annual repayments of $4,000, 
amounting to $120,000 over the life of the loan. Governments have consistently 
sought to help home borrowers make better decisions as this can increase an 
individual’s discretionary spending and raise competitive pressures on loan 
providers. Taken over the population, both of these ‘flow-on’ effects have significant 
implications for the national economy. 
The National Consumer Credit Protection Amendment (Home Loans and 
Credit Cards) Act 2011 is one such intervention and was introduced to assist home 
loan borrowers by establishing a new disclosure instrument, the Key Facts Sheet 
(KFS). A KFS is a one-page document providing key pricing information in a 
standardised and comparable format. The Act mandates that a KFS must be provided 
to any prospective borrowers who request one from an Australian Credit Licensed 
lender. The provision of a KFS aims to address difficulties borrowers face when 
comparing home loans presented in varied and complex forms.  
Previous research indicates that targeted pre-contractual disclosure documents 
assist home loan borrowers. Bounded rationality posits that people have limited 
computing power, and often make mistakes when dealing with complex information. 
Home loans are clearly complex; even seemingly simple dimensions such as cost 
depend on a multitude of charges such as interest rates, application or establishment 
fees, ongoing fees, break fees, discharge fees and service fees. Bounded rationality 
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suggests that, when faced with this complexity, borrowers will revert to decision 
heuristics (e.g. the lexicographic heuristic, which posits that people focus on a small 
number of salient cues in order to make their decision) to make their choice. While 
heuristics reduce the time and effort required to make a decision, they often do so at 
the expense of accuracy. KFS are aimed at reducing the inaccuracy of cost heuristics 
by increasing a borrower’s accessibility to relevant and directly comparable cost 
information.  
This thesis extends previous works on effective pre-contractual home loan 
disclosure by testing the design and disclosure requirements of the Australian 
Government’s home loan KFS as set out in the National Consumer Credit Protection 
Act Amendment (Home Loans and Credit Cards) 2011. To do so, the research aims 
to identify whether (i) the presentation and format of KFS successfully enhance 
borrowers’ ability to compare loan costs, (ii) KFS do in fact influence home loan 
choice, and (iii) the disclosure requirements under the Act effectively ensure 
borrowers who may benefit from KFS content receive them at a time when they are 
most useful to their decision.  
A three-stage mixed method approach is used to answer the research question. 
In the first stage, experimental data show that the current KFS design effectively 
enhances users’ ability to identify the cheapest loan package from among several 
alternatives. Thus, KFS appear to communicate the key costs and total loan value to 
users effectively. In the second stage, semi-structured interviews with purposefully 
sampled borrowers revealed that few borrowers in the market were even aware of the 
existence of KFS. This lack of awareness did not appear related to a borrower’s 
search activity nor the sources of information they considered. KFS did not play a 
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role in actual borrower decision-making for the interviewees who had taken out a 
home loan since the legislation’s enactment, because none of them were aware of 
KFS. Interviews also revealed that other criteria such as established banking 
relationships and third party advice often played a significant role in loan choice. 
Since Stage 2 revealed that borrowers had limited exposure to KFS, Stage 3 focused 
on field studies of lenders’ in-branch disclosure practices and an analysis of online 
KFS generators. Results show that borrowers who do not request KFS specifically 
by name are unlikely to obtain one, even when they request information for the same 
purpose. Further, general enquiry staff often appeared to be unaware of KFS or how 
to produce them. Online, limited information exists to lead borrowers to KFS 
generators or to inform them of the purpose and benefits of using KFS. 
Overall, the research finds that despite KFS being effective in improving 
borrower decision-making (Study 1), they have had limited impact in the market 
(Study 2), likely due to the requirement that a borrower must make a direct request to 
have access to one (Study 3).  
The findings highlight the need for a holistic approach to disclosure design and 
distribution based on an understanding of the target audience’s purchase decision 
process. Further, they highlight the importance of understanding the obstacles, both 
environmental and behavioural, that may prevent borrowers from encountering and 
using the disclosure. In this respect, the findings suggest that enhancing borrower 
decision behaviour may require an understanding of several different yet interrelated 
decision behaviours and the values which motivate each. In particular, the research 
highlights the need to ensure that borrowers who value certain information will 
encounter it with minimal effort and without prior knowledge of its availability. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
“Tis against some men’s principle to pay interest, and seems against others’ 
interest to pay the principle.”    –    Benjamin Franklin 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to assess whether legislation introducing Key 
Facts Sheets (KFS) into the Australian home lending market has had an impact on 
home loan borrowers’ decision-making. The legislation surrounding KFS requires 
lenders to provide designated information in prescribed formats to all prospective 
borrowers. The KFS has been designed to allow home borrowers to directly compare 
the cost of the different home loans they are offered and so to make better informed 
mortgage choices. KFS were enacted under the National Consumer Credit 
Protection Amendment (Home Loans and Credit Cards) Act 2011 (NCCP 2011) to 
support the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (NCCP 2009)1 with a 
stated legislative aim of ‘building the capacity of all Australians to make better 
decisions about managing their money and through that, enhancing their financial 
wellbeing’ (Australian Government, 2011a). These legislative changes mean that all 
authorised mortgage lenders are now required to produce a standardised pre-
contractual disclosure document when a customer requests one.2 
The disclosure documents are intended to improve transparency in mortgage 
contract terms. This improved transparency allows borrowers to make better 
decisions and so will ultimately foster greater market competition between lenders. 
KFS form part of a suite of legislative changes that are aimed at improving borrower 
                                                            
1 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 133. Section 133 works in conjunction with 
the amendments made through the National Consumer Credit Protection Amendment 
Regulations 2011 (No. 5) (Amendment Regulations) which introduce regs 28LA and 28LB to the 
National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010. 
2 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 s 133AA(1). Lenders who do not hold an Australian 
Credit Licence are excluded from KFS requirements. 
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outcomes and which include a ban on early termination or ‘exit’ fees. 3  The 
overarching purpose of this legislative reform bundle is to make it easier and cheaper 
for current borrowers to identify the best market home loans available and then to 
switch to the more competitive loans as they become available (Australian 
Government, 2010).  
Australian mortgage contracting is rooted in the principles of ‘freedom of 
contract’ and ‘caveat emptor’ (let the buyer beware), which lie at the heart of the 
Anglo–US–Australian legal and market systems. The amendments to the NCCP 
2009 (and its Regulations introducing the prescribed contract for home loan lending) 
represent a significant departure from these principles. Although the legislation 
departs from tradition, it reflects a broader trend in common-law countries to 
establish legislative standards in consumer protection, including around disclosure 
documentation, to address perceived market weaknesses or failures that undermine 
market efficiency.4  
The Australian Government introduced this latest legislative intervention to 
support the stability and efficiency of the financial sector. In the last two decades 
alone, the government has conducted a series of extensive inquiries into the health 
and performance of the sector (Economic Reference Committee, 2011; Murray 
Committee, 2014a; Wallis Committee, 1997). In the most recent review (Murray 
Committee, 2014), the Australian Government received and considered over 6,500 
submissions for potential reforms designed to further optimise the financial system 
(Murray Committee, 2014a, p.285). This number of submissions reflects the 
importance of the home loan mortgage market to Australia’s economy. Home loans 
                                                            
3 National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth) reg 79A. 
4 The history of consumer protection regulation for consumer credit contracts and the underlying 
principles upon which these rest are discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
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account for $1.38 trillion of the $1.84 trillion household lending (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2014b) and repayments take up an estimated 25% of the average 
Australian household’s weekly earnings (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2014). Given 
the importance of the home loan market, this thesis aims to assess whether (a) the 
legislation’s theoretical intent has been operationalised in an effective statutory 
regime, and (b) whether the introduction of KFS in domestic mortgage selection 
successfully enhances consumer decision-making. Thus, the overarching research 
question is:  
Do the Australian Government’s home loan Key Facts Sheets enhance their 
users’ ability to make better loan choices and, if so, do they effectively improve 
borrowers’ decision-making in practice? 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 The importance of the home loan sector 
Purchasing a dwelling is one of the biggest decisions an individual or 
household will make. A dwelling is commonly a household’s main asset (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics [ABS], 2011; Ellis, Lawson, & Roberts-Thomas, 2003) and the 
associated mortgage is the largest financial obligation they will ever incur (Ashton & 
Ramsay, 2010; Building Action Review Group, 2008). Over the last decade, monthly 
mortgage repayments consumed over 25% of the average Australian borrower’s 
disposable income (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2014). 
At the macro-economic level, the efficiency of the home loan market has 
significant implications for the economy. Household expenditure on non-mortgage 
goods and services is constrained by the size of home loan payments; thus, the home 
mortgage sector is a key determinant of Australia’s economic performance. Data 
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from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) shows residential home loans 
comprise over three-quarters of the $1.84 trillion lent to households and directly 
affect 40% of Australian households (ABS, 2014a, 2014b).5 Thus, the mortgage 
market has a direct impact on a substantial segment of individual expenditure 
patterns. Combined with the sheer size of Australia’s mortgage market, this means 
that the aggregated impact on the Australian economy is substantial. Healthy 
competition in the home loan market is, therefore, important for two key reasons: 
first, it directly affects the personal wealth/debt strategy of a major segment of the 
Australian population; and second, it affects all Australians more broadly as a key 
economic driver of national economic wellbeing. 
1.1.2 Individual decision-making within the market 
Choosing a home loan is a complex decision involving elements of financial 
literacy and consumer behaviour. The overarching commentary on home loans 
focused on the interest paid by the borrower, but there are myriad variables that 
influence the actual loan decision. For example: Do the borrowing limits vary by 
lender? Are there additional fees and charges for actions? And does the consumer 
have other products through an existing relationship with the lender? These factors 
not only make the borrowing decision complex, but also allow lenders to present 
their offers in drastically different formats that emphasise different aspects of a loan 
and its pricing elements.  
Research into complex decision-making, such as that required for home loans, 
reveals there is potential for sub-optimal decision-making (Gabaix & Laibson, 2006; 
Huck & Zhou, 2011; O'Shea, 2010). Decision-makers who attempt to make informed 
                                                            
5 This was equivalent to $79,000 per person in Australia at the time. 
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decisions around multiple variables that address different criteria often do so 
inaccurately (Eppler & Mengis, 2004; Miller, 1956; Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 
1967), mainly because people’s cognitive processing power have limitations (Simon, 
1955). Research around mortgage decision-making has identified a series of 
shortfalls in human cognitive reasoning including myopia, hyperbolic discounting 
and lexicographic search behaviour (Eisenberg, 1995; R. A. Epstein, 2006; 
Korobkin, 2003; O'Shea, 2010). That is, despite the importance of home loans to 
individuals and the economy, borrowers often irrationally focus on the short term or 
the most obvious target variables – such as upfront fees and the advertised interest 
rate – while underemphasising costs or benefits that arise further into the future or 
from less obvious aspects of the transaction (Kilborn, 2005; Sunstein, 1997). The 
consequences of this, as shown by the Australian Consumer Finance Report May 
2015, compiled by finance platform Monetise (2015), are that poor loan choice costs 
Australian borrowers an average of $4,000 per annum on their mortgage repayments. 
This translates to $120,000 over the life of a 30-year loan product. 
To cope with complex decisions, people tend to adopt mental processes that 
reduce effort and provide quick, crude judgements (Simon, 1990). These shortcuts, 
termed heuristics, often trade rigorous evaluations for intuitive judgements and focus 
on a satisfactory option rather than the optimal choice (Simon, 1955, 1972). 
Heuristics limit the decision process and so they enable individuals to efficiently 
arrive at accurate judgements (Dawes, 1979; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) but at 
the risk of systematic errors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The accuracy of specific 
heuristics largely depends on the structure of the decision task and the accessibility 
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of the information available to the decision-maker (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; 
Kerstholt, 1992; Söllner, Bröder, & Hilbig, 2013; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012).6  
Given that the home loan decision is complex and that heuristics have an 
impact on this decision, understanding the decision-making environment and the 
information available for home loan decisions is vital to effectively regulating 
decision-making behaviour. Home loan borrowers face a range of complex 
comparisons when selecting a suitable loan product (Lacko & Pappalardo, 2007). 
They often make decisions against a matrix of borrowing constraints ranging from 
obvious variables (such as loan-to-value ratios, interest rate variables, loan durations 
and transaction fees) to less directly related dynamics (such as time pressures, lender 
proximity/access and tax implications) (Basciano, Jackson, & Grayson, 2008; J. Y. 
Campbell & Cocco, 2003; Follain, 1990). 
Further, lenders often add to the complex nature of mortgage products. They 
often separate costs out into complex fee structures and present, or frame, product 
attributes in different formats (Chioveanu & Zhou, 2013; Piccione & Spiegler, 
2012). For instance, lenders usually express ongoing and upfront fees in dollar 
amounts whereas they usually express interest charges as a percentage of the loan. 
Other features that affect price may include the type of rate, introductory offers, and 
applicable fees under certain contingencies. These practices increase consumer 
difficulties in understanding and comparing the costs of a product (Chioveanu & 
Zhou, 2013; Ellison & Ellison, 2009; Piccione & Spiegler, 2012). 
Finding and comparing the required information often adds further difficulties 
to the decision process. Home loan decisions are made in a market where complex, 
                                                            
6 This is discussed in detail in Section 3.1.3. 
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standard form contract documentation has long been the norm (Johnston, 2006; 
Slawson, 1971). Standard form contracts are also known as ‘contracts of adhesion’ 
or, more colloquially, ‘boilerplate contracts’. They are dedicated documents drafted 
on a one-off basis usually by the supplier (or its agent) for particular transactions and 
are generally offered on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis with little or no room for 
individual negotiation. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, the use of standard form 
contracts in the finance industry reduce customers’ awareness of and comprehension 
of their obligations (Eisenberg, 1995; Rakoff, 1982). Details on this dynamic are 
outlined in the Economic Reference Committee’s report: Competition within the 
Australian banking sector (Economic Reference Committee, 2011, pp. 123-130). 
Consumers’ problems with standard form contracts are exacerbated when lenders use 
varied terminology, poorly focused content, and formatting which potentially makes 
the information difficult to read, such as small print or hard-to-read coloured fonts. 
Furthermore, this complex set of documentation is often provided to borrowers 
without sufficient time for revision given the time constraints often present in a 
home purchase (Ciobo, 2011; Hayes, 2011; Leigh, 2011; Livermore, 2011; Melham, 
2011; Prentice, 2011; Swan, 2011). Taken together, the mix of factors present in this 
type of contract makes it exceptionally difficult to effectively compare individual 
features and price against other such contracts. 
Research (Lacko & Pappalardo, 2007; O'Shea, 2010; O’Shea & Finn, 2005) 
and stakeholder concerns (Economic Reference Committee, 2011, p. 109) both 
support the conclusion that pre-contractual disclosures prejudice home borrower 
decision-making. Increased complexity in home loans (Broady, 2011, January, p. 3; 
Canion, 2011, January, pp. 111, 117; Lloyd, 2010, December, p. 33) and the lack of 
transparency in the transaction (Consumer Action Law Centre, 2011, p. 13; 
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Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs, 1999; Murphy, 2010, December, p. 33) 
hamper the consumer’s ability to compare home loan alternatives. Perhaps just as 
significantly, information available to borrowers in the research window before they 
select a loan frequently proves to be ineffective in helping borrowers understand and 
accurately compare the cost of home loan alternatives (Australian Government, 
2013; O'Shea, 2010; O’Shea & Finn, 2005). 
The weakness in pre-contractual disclosure has significant implications for 
competition between lenders (Australian Government, 2010, p. 10; Economic 
Reference Committee, 2011, p. 117). The complexities in product comparison and 
the use of decision heuristics increase the level of borrower choice error (Newell, 
Rakow, Weston, & Shanks, 2004; Payne, 1976; Simon, 1990; Weenig & Maarleveld, 
2002). These errors lead borrowers to select more expensive loans and this eases 
competitive pressure on lenders (Carlin, 2009; Korobkin, 2003; Wilson, 2010).  
KFS stand to address the problems that heuristics introduce into the home loan 
decision in at least one respect: KFS reduce the various costs associated with the 
loan into a single, easily comparable figure – ‘estimated total cost’. Using the 
prescribed template set out under the National Consumer Credit Protection 
Amendment (Home Loan and Credit Cards) Act 2011 (Cth), this thesis looks at the 
extent to which KFS effectively improve borrowers’ loan decisions. 
1.2 Industry competition 
Effective banking competition underpins efficient financial markets and has 
been the focus of the numerous recommendations provided by the recent inquiries 
into the financial sector (Economic Reference Committee, 2011, p.39; Murray 
Committee, 2014a). Many factors affect the level of competition in a market; those 
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flagged as having an impact on the level of competition in Australia’s financial 
sector include the structure of the market, barriers to switching between products, 
and inaccuracies in consumer decision-making. (Economic Reference Committee, 
2011; Murray Committee, 2014a). 
Australia’s home loan market is dominated by the country’s major banks. 
More than 80% of all home loans are held by four financial institutions (see Table 
1.1).  
Table 1.1 
Residential Market Shares of the Four Major Australian Banks as at 30 June 2014 
Big Four lender Market share Cumulative total 
ANZ 15.3% 15.3% 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 27.2% 45.5% 
National Australia Bank 16.8% 62.3% 
Westpac 25.0% 87.3% 
Source: Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority Monthly Banking Statistics October 2014 
 
Further, this market concentration is not clear to consumers because many 
larger lenders operate subsidiary ownerships and interests under different brands (see 
Figure 1.1). A survey of borrowers conducted for the Consumer Owned Banking 
Association found that the use of multiple brands hindered many consumers from 
becoming aware that certain lenders were not independently owned (Customer 
Owned Banking Association, 2014). This lack of awareness may curtail the 
effectiveness of moves by borrowers who attempt to ‘vote with their feet’ and 
consequently may reduce competitive pressures on lenders within the market. 
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Figure 1.1. Australian mortgage lending landscape. Market share in parenthesis.  
Source: Company reports for 2014. 
 
The Australian mortgage market is also more concentrated than other markets 
such as those of the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Australian 
borrowers have access to 72 registered banks (Australian Prudential Regulatory 
Authority, 2014), US borrowers have access to approximately 5,700 (Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2014) and UK borrowers can select from 270 (Bank 
of England Prudential Regulatory Authority, 2014). Table 1.2 provides a brief cross-
country comparison of the available lenders. 
Table 1.2 
Cross-Country Comparison of Market Share 
Country Banks Outstanding 
mortgage debt 
(AUD)7 
Mortgage debt per 
bank 
(AUD) 
Australia 72 1.34 trillion  18.61 billion  
United States of 
America 
5,700 14.24 trillion  2.49 billion  
United Kingdom 270 2.23 trillion  8.25 billion  
Source: Financial Reserve Board, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Bank of England, World Bank Global 
Financial Development Database Data 
A highly concentrated market, however, does not necessarily mean a market 
will be uncompetitive (Davis, 2007). The 2014 Financial Systems Inquiry notes that 
‘[w]hile competition is generally adequate in the financial system at present, the high 
concentration and steadily increasing vertical integration in some sectors has the 
potential to limit the benefits of competition in the future’ (Murray Committee, 
                                                            
7 These figures are based on the exchange provided by the Australian Taxation Office for December 
2013. See: https://www.ato.gov.au/Tax-professionals/TP/1-July-2013---30-June-2014/ 
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2014a, p. 255). Therefore, reducing borrowers’ search costs and empowering them to 
make better loan decisions is important to incentivise competition in the market and 
to increase the benefits borrowers receive from the current levels of competition 
(Fraser, 2011, p. 1). This can help prevent the high levels of concentration in the 
market from inhibiting competition and can result in greater stability for the home 
loan market. For this reason, well designed KFS may present borrowers with simple 
and comparable information which they can use to help them compare loans and 
identify competitively priced loans.  
1.3 The Key Facts Sheet  
Recent parliamentary efforts to improve the home loan decision process are 
aimed primarily at achieving better outcomes for borrowers and a more efficient 
home loan market. Therefore, KFS are a regulatory intervention designed to address 
specific barriers to effective home loan competition (see further discussion in 
Section 2.4). The NCCP 2009, s 133AD, requires all licensed lenders, when 
requested by a borrower, to provide specified variables such as the relevant interest 
rate, fees, and total estimated amount repayable in a standardised format (See e.g. 
Beatty & A. Smith, 2014, p. 784-785). This is further supported by requirements that 
lenders generate a single-page document setting out loan costs in a transparent and 
readable way to maximise the reader’s comprehension of these costs. Providing this 
information in a standardised format allows borrowers to readily compare all 
potential loans and their payment terms. The content and format of KFS are 
prescribed under Schedule 5, Regulation 28LB National Consumer Credit Protection 
Regulations 2010 (NCCP Regulations). 
12 Chapter 1: Introduction 
As of January 2012, NCCP 2009, s 133AA(2) requires that KFS be available 
for home loans of lenders who hold an Australian Credit Licence.8 Electronic access 
to KFS generators on all lenders’ websites is also required. This thesis assesses the 
impact these KFS are likely to have on consumer decision-making more broadly by 
using simulated consumer studies designed to test an individual’s capacity to make 
decisions that reach optimal outcomes with and without the forms. The thesis further 
seeks to determine the penetration of KFS into the market and, by extension, their 
effect on actual home loan decision-making. Consequently, it examines the overall 
effectiveness of this legislation in shaping market decisions around loan 
procurements and offers recommendations for potential improvement of the 
regulatory regime.  
1.4 Research questions 
In summary, selecting a home loan is one of the most important financial 
decisions many Australians will ever make. The choice of loan product has 
substantial short- and long-term effects on a household’s financial obligations 
(Reserve Bank of Australia, 2014). Despite the importance of loan selection, the 
lenders’ pre-contractual disclosure inhibits accurate loan choice comparisons 
(O'Shea, 2010; O’Shea & Finn, 2005). KFS are designed to provide borrowers with 
effective, timely information so they can easily and accurately compare loan offers. 
In so doing, KFS are expected to improve home loan decision quality, thereby 
stimulating competition between lenders in the home loan market (Australian 
Government, 2010, 2011b; Galvin, 2011). Thus, the overarching research question, 
as outlined in Section 1.1, is: 
                                                            
8 See National Credit Consumer Protection Act 2009 (Cth) pt 2.2 for the requirements surrounding 
Australian Credit Licences. 
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Do the Australian Government’s home loan Key Facts Sheets enhance their 
users’ ability to make better loan choices and, if so, do they effectively improve 
borrowers’ decision-making in practice? 
The research investigates the effects of the legislation at three different levels. 
At the individual level, KFS are examined to determine whether they successfully 
improve the borrower’s decision quality in an ideal environment. Given that people 
often use heuristics in order to compare complex products such as home loans 
(Malbon, 1999; O'Shea, 2010), the content, complexity, format and timeliness of the 
information available to the decision-maker should affect the decision quality 
(Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999). The first stage of this research is therefore aimed at 
determining whether the principles applied by the design of KFS successfully 
improve borrowers’ judgements of mortgage costs, thus empowering them to select 
the most competitive loan. More formally:  
RQ1: Do KFS help people identify the most cost-effective loan from among a 
number of alternatives? 
Having examined the impact of the KFS document on individual decision 
making, the research then investigates how KFS operate within the process of home 
loan borrowing. This is important because even if KFS successfully address biases in 
price comparisons, other complexities in borrower decision-making behaviour may 
still prevent KFS from having an impact on market competition, or may limit their 
impact. Thus, this step in the research identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the 
legislation as implemented. In doing so, the research aims to address two research 
questions: 
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RQ2: What role, if any, do KFS play in borrowers’ loan decisions? 
RQ3: What factors, if any, limit the effectiveness of KFS in practice?  
Finally, the research examines the lenders’ disclosure practices under the 
obligations imposed on them by the regulation. Specifically, the investigation 
focuses around the requirement for a borrower to request a KFS before a lender must 
provide them with one and the provision of KFS generators on lenders’ websites. 
This is important because prior studies have highlighted that lenders benefit from 
low levels of information clarity, even where their products are competitive (Carlin, 
2009; Ellison & Ellison, 2009; Wilson, 2010). By researching the lenders’ disclosure 
practices, and the extent to which this features KFS, the research seeks to answer a 
fourth research question: 
RQ4: How do the disclosure requirements for KFS impact the likelihood that 
borrowers will receive one? 
1.5 Research methodology 
Good research requires a methodology matched to the question (Creswell & Clark, 
2007). Because the study is examining the impact of KFS on multiple levels and in 
multiple contexts, a mixed methods approach is adopted. Accordingly the research is 
divided into three stages, each aimed at addressing the research questions applicable 
to the relevant level of analysis. Specifically, studies using experimental design 
(individual level); semi-structured interviews (borrowers’ decision processes in 
practice); and field studies, content analysis and case studies (lenders’ disclosure 
practices) are undertaken. Each stage of the research evaluates the effectiveness of 
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KFS in a particular context and therefore each stage uses a different sample. An 
overview of the three-stage research design is provided in Figure 1.2:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Overview of research. 
First, experimental design was used to establish whether KFS empower people 
to identify the rational loan choice from among a number of alternatives. 
Experimental design was chosen for this stage of the research as it allows the 
Study 1 (RQ1) 
Research Question: Do 
KFS help people 
identify the most cost 
effective loan from 
among a number of 
alternatives? 
 
Aim: To determine if 
KFS help individuals 
make more rational loan 
choices within a 
simplified environment. 
 
Method: Experimental 
design. 
 
Sample: Convenience 
sample of QUT students 
(N=110). 
 
Analysis: Chi-Squared 
test of homogeneity and 
the Student’s t-test are 
used to determine if any 
change to decision 
accuracy between the 
two samples is likely to 
be due to KFS. 
 
The McNeamr test and 
repeat measure 
ANOVA’s are also used 
to determine changes 
across treatment 
conditions in a within 
subject analysis. 
 
Study 2 (RQ2 & RQ3) 
Research Questions: 
RQ2: What role, if any, 
do KFS play in 
borrowers’ loan 
decisions? 
 
RQ3: What factors, if 
any, limit the 
effectiveness of KFS in 
practice? 
 
Aim: To examine the 
decision in context and 
identify reasons why 
KFS effectiveness in 
practice may deviate 
from those observed in 
the laboratory. 
 
Method: Semi-
Structured Interviews. 
 
Sample: Purposive 
sample of recent home 
loan borrowers (N=12). 
 
Analysis: A three stage 
approach to coding is 
adopted. First, 
information is analysed 
at the individual level. 
Second axial coding is 
used to group these into 
categories. In the final 
stage these categories 
are grouped again into 
higher order themes. 
Study 3 (RQ4) 
Research Question:  
How do the disclosure 
requirements for KFS 
impact the likelihood 
borrowers will receive 
one?  
 
Aim: To determine how 
lenders’ disclosure 
practices under s. 133 of 
the NCCP 2009 effect 
the likelihood borrowers 
will obtain KFS. 
 
Method: Field studies, 
content analysis and case 
studies. 
 
Sample: For document 
analysis data is collected 
from 19 home loan 
lenders in the Brisbane 
CBD. 
 
For the online analysis 
data from 27 lenders 
websites is considered. 
 
Analysis: The 
availability, ease of 
access to and 
information surrounding 
KFS in practice is 
examined and patterns 
drawn. Items are 
connected to show how 
they may influence the 
phenomena and interact 
with one another. 
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researcher to control the extraneous variables in a complex event and therefore to 
isolate the effect one variable has on another (Webster & Sell, 2007). This provides 
direct, causal evidence of any relationship between KFS and decision quality. 
Second, borrowers were interviewed to gauge their adoption of and experience 
with KFS in practice. Following Gioia et al. (2012) a three-stage approach to coding 
was adopted: (1) information was analysed at face level with little attempt made to 
categorise the data; (2) the similarities and differences among the responses were 
given labels or descriptions in a manner similar to axial coding (Corbin & Strauss, 
1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and grouped into second-order categories; and (3) 
these second-order categories were grouped again into broader, ‘aggregate 
dimensions’. 
Finally, field studies, or site visits to lender branches and content analysis and 
case studies of lenders’ websites were used to determine lenders’ disclosure practices 
and the extent to which they guide borrowers towards KFS. This stage was designed 
to identify potential obstacles that may prevent borrowers from becoming aware of, 
and receiving, KFS in practice. Information was requested from lenders’ branches 
under two conditions: (1) as an unaware borrower who requested information they 
might use to compare loans costs across lenders while intentionally avoiding terms 
such as ‘key facts’ or ‘fact sheet’; and (2) as a borrower who explicitly sought a 
home loan KFS. Similarly, lenders’ websites were analysed to determine the 
presence of, placement of, and information surrounding the KFS generators and any 
potential barriers to accessing them. 
The aims, motivations and methodology for each stage of the research are 
detailed in chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively. 
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1.6 Motivation and expected contributions  
The motivation of this study is to assess whether the regulation, through KFS, 
has successfully fulfilled its stated purpose of improving home loan decision-making 
and, through this, incentivising price competition between lenders. In short, for KFS 
to successfully promote better decision-making, this thesis seeks to verify that: 
 Policy makers correctly identified a core issue.  
 KFS successfully help borrowers evaluate loan options. 
 KFS are being received and utilised by borrowers as intended.  
In doing so, the research makes several contributions to theory and practice. 
1.6.1 Contributions to theory 
This research contributes to the literature by providing the first study to 
examine the effectiveness of KFS both in the laboratory and in the context of the 
home loan market. In doing so, it supports the behavioural approach to regulation for 
Australian home loans. Study 1 reinforces and advances some of the main 
foundational research motivating the use of prescribed pre-contractual disclosure 
documentation to improve borrowers’ capability of comprehending home loan costs 
(Lacko & Pappalardo, 2007; Macro International, 2007; O’Shea & Finn, 2005). In 
particular, research by O’Shea (2010) is built upon and extended by testing whether 
KFS provide improvements to comprehension similar to O’Shea’s recommended 
disclosure model. The research also examines whether any increase in 
comprehension empowers borrowers to better identify, and therefore to choose, the 
lowest cost loan option from a number of alternatives. Further, unlike prior studies, 
the experiments utilise real-world, lender-designed disclosure documents that are 
available to borrowers before they apply for a home loan.  
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The research further contributes to this literature by examining how prescribed 
disclosure interacts with borrowers’ search behaviour, given that lenders are not 
required to provide a KFS unless a borrower asks for one. The research findings 
therefore identify potential weaknesses in the legislative design, which in practice 
may undermine an otherwise effective disclosure document. This advances 
understanding of how best to prescribe disclosure documents such as KFS in order to 
maximise their use and impact in the market where borrowers are unable to search 
for and process all the available information. 
The research is focused on the decision-making process, enabling investigation 
into whether previous findings about decision bias are applicable to home loan 
decision-making. Previous studies of heuristics and bias have often focused on less 
complex contexts, such as simple probability or gambles, or less impactful decisions, 
such as purchasing grocery items. These studies have found that decision-makers 
indiscriminately suffer from biases in judgement and decision-making (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011; Simon, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), but that these biases 
are not completely universal and may not apply, or may apply differently, in certain 
contexts (Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999; Kenrick et 
al., 2009). Thus, this study contributes to literature by examining the decision-
making process, the information considered and the accuracy of the decisions made 
by people with and without KFS, in the laboratory. Borrowers’ decision-making 
processes are then examined to investigate the use of heuristics, and their outcomes, 
providing valuable insight into borrower decision-making not available through 
parallel studies or laboratory studies (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Johnson & 
Weber, 2009; Simon, 1990). Again, the outcomes from this research inform how best 
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to regulate the disclosure available to borrowers so as to empower them to make 
more accurate loan decisions.  
1.6.2 Contributions to practice 
As noted above, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the KFS document and 
its disclosure methods should hold multiple benefits including insight into whether: 
 this format and content of key loan term disclosure helps Australian 
borrowers make better loan decisions in practice  
 behavioural or other obstacles prevent the scheme’s effectiveness and, if 
so, potential options for correcting this in future contexts 
 future policymakers considering regimens to improve decision-making 
regimes should replicate, amend or abandon this type of approach.  
The results of the study allow policymakers to observe the impact of the 
regulation in practice, and inform them about the successes and weaknesses of the 
legislation. Through the insight gained into the behavioural and environmental 
obstacles that may limit the effectiveness of KFS, action may be taken not only to 
improve the current regulation, but also to avoid similar issues from interfering with 
future regulation. 
The research also improves lenders’ understanding of how borrowers choose 
their loans, allowing the lenders to better cater to borrowers’ needs. In particular, the 
research reinforces the importance of the borrower–lender relationship and 
highlights potential compliance issues with the regulation in practice. Further, 
addressing inefficiencies in legislation can reduce or eliminate potentially 
unnecessary costs for lenders and ensure that KFS, where useful, are being received 
by borrowers who value them. 
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1.7 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is as follows:  
The following two chapters set out the legislation and cover the relevant 
literature surrounding the key aspects of the thesis. Chapter 2 discusses the KFS in 
context. This chapter provides an introduction to the legal background surrounding 
the thesis. It briefly covers the legal landscape in which the legislation operates, sets 
out the legislation in detail and describes how it operates within this landscape. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature relating to judgement and decision-making in 
complex decisions. In particular, it focuses on the importance of the information 
environment, research into home loan decision-making and the literature surrounding 
lenders’ incentives towards providing effective disclosure. 
The next three chapters set out the three studies conducted during the research. 
Chapter 4 details Stage 1 of the study, the experimental design. It then presents the 
specific hypotheses used in Stage 1, details of the method, and the results and 
analysis. It also discusses the implications of the results for the experimental 
findings, thus motivating Stage 2. Chapter 5 then discusses the methods, sample and 
analysis used in the interviews. Similarly to Chapter 4, this chapter sets out the aims 
and methods, including the data sources used to conduct the analysis. The results are 
then presented and analysed, and the implications for the thesis discussed. Chapter 6 
then discusses the methods, sample and analysis used to examine the lenders’ 
disclosure practices and the extent to which these feature KFS. The analysis is 
presented, then the research findings are interpreted and related back to the research 
conducted in the previous stages. 
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Finally, Chapter 7 sets out the conclusions and recommendations of the thesis. 
It provides a summary of the research findings, including the broad conclusions 
reached when assessing the studies taken together. In this chapter, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the approach adopted are reviewed and recommendations are 
provided for both theory and practice based on the findings from the four studies. 
Limitations of the research are then discussed, concluding with recommendations for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2: The Key Facts Sheet in context: 
Disclosure of home loan 
contracting terms 
The 2012 introduction of Key Facts Sheets (KFS) into Australia’s home 
mortgage market marks an important step in the contexts of both consumer 
protection, generally, and the regulation of credit lending, specifically. The use of a 
standardised disclosure document to enhance transparency around loan terms 
represents a significant departure from Australia’s common-law contracting 
approach of ‘caveat emptor’ – let the buyer beware. Accordingly, this chapter will 
examine why and how Australia’s parliament has reached what is effectively a 
regulatory watershed in this field, including the structure and content of the 
legislation as promulgated. 
KFS derive their authority in law through the National Consumer Credit 
Protection Amendment (Home Loans and Credit Cards) Act 2011 (NCCP 2011) 
which amends and supports the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 
(NCCP 2009). The NCCP 2009 was designed to ‘build the capacity of all Australians 
to make better decisions about managing their money and through that, enhancing 
their financial wellbeing’ (Australian Government, 2011a). In this context, 
parliament twinned KFS with a formal ban of all early termination, ‘switching’ or 
‘exit’ fees9  in home loan contracts, thereby underscoring its stated objective of 
making it easier and cheaper for borrowers to identify and switch to a better home 
loan deal (Australian Government, 2010, p. 3). 
                                                            
9 National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth) s 79A. 
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KFS regulations, which appear as s 133 of the NCCP 2009, work in 
conjunction with amendments made through the National Consumer Credit 
Protection Amendment Regulations 2011 (No. 5) (Amendment Regulations). This 
framework introduces ss 28LA and 28LB into the National Consumer Credit 
Protection Regulations 2010. Taken as a whole, the impact of these provisions – and 
the introduction of a prescribed contract around home loan lending – represents a 
significant departure from the many hundreds of years of ‘freedom of contract’ and 
‘caveat emptor’ principles upon which the Anglo–US–Australian free market is 
based.  
KFS therefore sit at the intersection of consumer protection reforms dating 
from the 1970s and over 30 years of growing legislative governance arrangements 
around consumer credit and home loan industries, as discussed in Section 2.3. They 
are a response to concerns around (1) problems consumers have in understanding the 
complex standard form contracts that powerful merchants, such as banks, employ; 
and (2) credit lending dynamics in the banking sector. KFS, as prescribed 
documents, are effectively the most focused consumer protection tool regulators can 
use to reconfigure market behaviour in contexts where an information imbalance 
exists between the contracting parties. They have evolved from broader waves of 
consumer protection reform around the use of standard form contracts generally, 
such as those seen in the insurance, superannuation and telecommunication 
industries (Section 2.1.3) and those adopted in other common-law countries (Section 
2.1.4). As discussed in Section 2.1.2, the emergence of prescribed disclosure 
documents reflects the deeper concern over the impact of standard form contracts on 
free market contracting and competition dynamics (Kessler, 1943; Rakoff, 1982; 
Trebilcock, 1976).  
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KFS represent, however, a shift away from the way regulation of standard 
form contracts in the banking industry has historically been enforced by the courts 
and parliament. This chapter therefore is designed to assess (a) whether the level of 
intervention now in place advances collective parliamentary efforts to address 
problems of transparency and information asymmetry in this industry; and (b) if 
KFS, as currently structured, are likely to enhance borrowers’ capacity to procure the 
most cost-effective home loan products. Towards this end, the chapter first discusses 
the traditional sanctity of ‘freedom of contract’ and how modern developments in 
supplier-consumer relationships and the increasing popularity of standard form 
contracts have given rise to legislation specifically designed to protect consumers’ 
rights. Second, the legislative history in the Australian home loan market is 
examined and the regulations leading to the introduction of KFS are set out. Third, 
the chapter builds on this, showing how KFS and relevant legislation fit within the 
regulatory framework and how they are designed to address issues inherent in the 
previous legislation. The chapter then provides an analysis of the Australian 
regulatory approach, drawing from comparisons with the regulatory approaches 
adopted in the US and UK prior to concluding. 
2.1 Consumer protection and the standard form contract: 
Freedom of contract revisited 
Consumer protection through regulatory intervention has evolved substantially 
over the last five decades. The passage of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
marked a watershed in this country’s history. The Act was a response to inequitable 
communication practices involving consumers. Lionel Murphy (then attorney-
general and subsequently High Court judge) introduced this legislation (now largely 
subsumed into the Competition and Consumer Act 2010) by detailing these concerns: 
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Restrictive trade practices have long been rife in Australia. Most of them are 
undesirable and have served the interests of the parties engaged in them, 
irrespective of whether those interests coincide with the interests of 
Australians generally. These practices cause prices to be maintained at 
artificially high levels. They enable particular enterprises or groups of 
enterprises to attain positions of economic dominance which are then 
susceptible to abuse; they interfere with the interplay of competitive forces 
which are the foundation of any market economy; they allow discriminatory 
action against small businesses, exploitation of consumers and feather 
bedding of industries… The consumer needs protection by law and this Bill 
will provide such protection. (Murphy, 1973, pp. 1013-1014) 
Mandating prescribed documents such as KFS represents a major departure 
from Australia’s historical approach to contract regulation. Legislative intervention 
in the freedom of contract foundations of Australia’s jurisprudence remains the 
exception rather than the rule. However, as discussed further in Section 2.1.3, 
judicial and parliamentary intervention in the areas of credit and loan transactions 
has significantly altered the home mortgage landscape. The KFS regulations 
represent the intersection of two related streams of consumer protection reforms: (a) 
it mandates disclosure requirements in the face of caveat emptor principles; and (b) it 
dictates the content, the format in which this information can be presented, and even 
its physical appearance. 
2.1.1 Freedom of contract: Historical evolution 
Like other common-law countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
United States (US), contract formation and performance in Australia is founded on 
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the principle of freedom of contract. This approach underpins the free enterprise 
system: it promotes individual autonomy and market equilibrium by allowing parties 
to determine which contracts they enter into, and on which terms they agree to be 
bound (Atiyah, 1979; Brownsword, 2000; Farnsworth, 1969; Hillman, 2010; 
Mulcahy, 2012; Williston, 1920). Judicial intervention into selective enforcement of 
discrete terms was deemed unnecessary, based on the premise that a sound 
contracting process involves voluntary entry from both parties. To interfere in the 
market would, therefore, be inappropriate and would undermine the ‘invisible hand’ 
(Kessler, 1943; Kronman, 1983; Rakoff, 1982). Using this approach, society’s 
economic interests align with those of individuals: given equal bargaining power, 
two parties who enter into fair negotiations will reach an agreement that maximises 
the utility of a given set of resources (Atiyah, 1979; Farnsworth, 1969; Rakoff, 2005; 
Williston, 1920). By enforcing all contract terms (i.e. not selectively assessing 
individual terms), common-law courts have traditionally focused on maintaining 
market faith (Atiyah, 1979; Hart, Bulloch, & Raz, 1961; Riley, 2000).  
Courts have, therefore, focused on ensuring that agreements struck freely by 
parties will be carried out on the terms established at the outset rather than policing 
the parity and adequacy of content (Atiyah, 1979; E. A. Posner, 1995; Trebilcock, 
1993). If parties genuinely consented to terms in the first place, the court’s role is 
limited to objectively determining if and when a breach occurred and the appropriate 
remedy available for redress (Gilmore, 1974; Pound, 1954; Wigmore, 1940). If the 
process by which the parties achieved ‘a meeting of the minds’ was free from 
behaviour that undermined genuine consent (e.g. fraud, misrepresentation, duress or 
mistake) then the contract was to be held paramount and enforceable (Atiyah, 1979; 
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Hart et al., 1961).10 Judicial intervention beyond enforcement was available only 
when formation of the contract was flawed (Atiyah, 1979; Wigmore, 1940).11 
As a result, consumers were protected by the law only so far as they were 
wronged during the process of establishing a contract. If consumers fairly and 
knowingly entered into a contract, regardless of how unfair or harsh, no relief was 
available under common law and only limited scope existed in the courts of equity 
for addressing unconscionable conduct on a one-off, case-by-case basis (Atiyah, 
1979; Hart et al., 1961; E. A. Posner, 1995; Trebilcock, 1993).12  
2.1.2 Rise of the standard form contract 
This approach worked well for contracts that came about as a result of genuine 
negotiations between parties of roughly equal bargaining strength and/or capacity. 
However, institutions achieved enormous cost efficiencies by using standard form 
contracts so standard form contracts became increasingly common in many market 
transactions. Standard form contracts use non-negotiable terms and conditions which 
the provider pre-drafts (Macaulay, 1963, 1965; Rakoff, 1982) and presents to the 
other party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (Farnsworth, 2004; Kessler, 1943). This is 
quite different from the traditional view of a contract being a meeting of the minds: 
‘two autonomous wills coming together and binding themselves reciprocally in a 
bargain of exchange’ (Radin, 2006). As the process moved away from the traditional 
meeting-of-the-minds touchstone, consumer merchant and legislative sectors became 
                                                            
10 See also Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 per Sir George 
Jessel MR. 
11 See for example Lord Denning in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v Mardon (1976) QB 801; Commercial 
Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 57 ALJR 358; and the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) as set out 
in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), ss 20 (unconscionable conduct) and 
18 (misleading and deceptive conduct). This statue incorporates similar provisions found under the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). 
12 See for example: Commercial Bank of Australia Limited v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Garcia v 
National Australia Bank (1988) 194 CLR 395. 
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concerned that the integrity of the process was diverging significantly from its 
original precept (Kessler, 1943; Leff, 1970; Llewellyn, 1996; Slawson, 1970). The 
growing sophistication of markets, technology, and corporate structures, coupled 
with the supplier–consumer information imbalance, compounded issues around the 
relative bargaining strengths of the parties to certain types of contracts. As a 
consequence, the individual consumer’s bargaining power around terms began to 
wane (Atiyah, 1979; Rakoff, 1982, 2005; Slawson, 1970). 
Eisenberg outlined the difficulty in achieving a meeting of the minds in this 
scenario: 
To make an optimum substantive decision, the form taker would, at a 
minimum, carefully deliberate on the legal attributes of each form contract 
that is coupled with a physical commodity he is considering. Analyzing legal 
attributes in this manner, however, will often be unduly costly. First, a form 
contract often contains a very large number of legal terms. Form insurance 
contracts, for example, typically include thirty, forty, or more terms. 
Moreover, the meaning and effect of the preprinted provisions will very often 
be inaccessible to laypersons. In part, this is because the terms are often 
written in exceedingly technical prose. Even if the terms are written clearly, 
however, the form taker usually will be unable fully to understand their 
effects, because preprinted terms characteristically vary the form taker's 
baseline legal rights, and most consumers do not know their baseline rights. 
(Eisenberg, 1995, p. 241) 
In practical terms, however, standard form contracts are now an inseparable 
part of industries such as banking, insurance, telecommunications, real estate, health 
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care and superannuation. Standard form contracts are not in themselves negative as 
their use carries significant efficiencies for providers of services or products – 
reducing negotiation and approval times, reducing administrative oversights through 
uniformity, and establishing standard protocols and definitions (Crozier, 2009; 
Eisenberg, 1995; Macaulay, 1965; Trebilcock, 1996). To the extent that these 
savings are shared with consumers, it is a win-win arrangement. For instance, 
providers only have to pay drafting costs once (upon settling the document in the 
first instance) and so they can afford to provide lower overall pricing structures. 
Thus, standard form contracts benefit both consumers and lenders through faster 
transactions, enhanced predictability and efficiency, and minimised transaction costs 
(Crozier, 2009; Macaulay, 1963, 1965; Sheldon, 1974).  
Standard form contracts, however, potentially create other problems. Because 
industry contracts of adhesion (such as home mortgage contracts) are usually 
prepared by highly qualified legal and commercial professionals, the terms within 
the contracts generally favour the drafter’s client/supplier (Leff, 1969, 1970; 
Llewellyn, 1931; Rakoff, 1982). Studies have found this remains the case even in 
instances where parties go out of their way to draft ‘fairly’ (Babcock & Loewenstein, 
1997; Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995). Consumers therefore 
are usually disproportionately disadvantaged while sellers are provided with an 
added layer of protection, often described as a strategic balance. For instance, in 
terms of credit contracts Curran (1966) observes: 
The creditor has greater economic resources that permit him to obtain the 
advice of experts; he has, under the present system of marketing consumer 
credit more time to reflect about the specific terms of the exchange prior to 
the time of contract negotiations with the consumer; and he has more 
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knowledge and sophistication, derived from his own experiences and that of 
others, about how to strengthen his own position in consumer-credit 
arrangements. Moreover, although the creditor must make a certain number 
of credit extensions to remain in business, his stake in undertaking any 
particular arrangement is not as great as that of the consumer: other 
potential customers available to the creditor are greater in number than are 
other sources of credit available to the consumer. (p. 435)  
Individual consumers usually lack the level of financial or legal 
expertise required to understand and compare legal contracts. Further, the outlay of 
time and money inherent in trying to acquire the adequate expertise or sufficient 
legal advice is costly (Calabresi, 2008; Kunreuther et al., 1978). Therefore, one 
party, usually the supplier, generally holds more information than the other. These 
information asymmetry issues create the potential for the informed party to abuse the 
market (Eisenberg, 1995; Grether, Schwartz, & Wilde, 1986). Moreover, in order for 
suppliers to maintain these efficiencies, their employees often lack the authority to 
vary the terms of the contract, so the potential benefits of informing oneself and 
attempting to negotiate the terms of the contract are often lost (Slawson, 1970; 
Trebilcock, 1976, 1996).  
Theoretically, borrowers remain able to ‘negotiate’ the most fundamental 
terms of a credit contract by comparison shopping among lenders around key terms 
such as interest rates and repayment schedules. However, this is of potentially 
limited value for two reasons. First, the vast preponderance of all remaining terms 
are supplied within the documentation and are not usually discussed or sighted until 
the final stages of the agreement process (e.g. Australian Government, 2011b, p. 35; 
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Peterson, 2003). Second, many borrowers are unlikely to understand or read the 
information even when it is provided to them (Leff, 1970; Llewellyn, 1996). 13 
Legislative intervention is therefore merited to the extent that barriers to self-
education and refusal to bargain impair genuine negotiations and comparative market 
competition, because this means that the principles underpinning the traditional 
framework of the free-market system no longer genuinely apply (Kessler, 1943; 
Llewellyn, 1996; Rakoff, 2005; Slawson, 1970; Spanogle, 1969). 14  It is in this 
context that a range of banking and credit protection initiatives, discussed in Section 
2.2, have come into being.  
2.1.3 Rational ignorance: The fallout of standard form white noise  
The problems of standard form contracts are exacerbated when businesses rely 
on consumers’ ignorance of standard form documents to their own advantage. 
Understandably, they believe that the terms and conditions are non-negotiable and so 
any costs they incur in reading/processing costs provide no value (Calabresi, 2008; 
Kunreuther et al., 1978). Lenders may then exploit this attitude to deliver unfair 
benefits (Carlin, 2009; Ellison & Wolitzky, 2012; Rakoff, 1982). Put another way, 
standard form contracts create a lack of bargaining power which reduces the benefits 
of reviewing the contract and increases the likelihood that borrowers will choose not 
to educate themselves. This is commonly referred to as rational ignorance and 
occurs where the perceived costs of comparing offers outweigh the perceived 
benefits (e.g. Bayern, 2009; Calabresi, 2008; Downs, 1957; Mackie, 2008).  
                                                            
13 See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 211 cmt. b(1979).  
14 See Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 51AC – allows the courts to refuse to enforce unconscionable 
clauses and contracts, and specifically permits consideration of the bargaining power, willingness to 
negotiate the terms and the party’s ability to understand the documents (this list is not exhaustive); 
Uniform Commercial Code s 2-302, which allows courts to refuse to enforce unconscionable clauses 
and contracts. 
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Standard form contracts are, however, not the only cause of rational ignorance. 
Prior research has found that complex consumer contracts, such as mortgage, 
insurance and telephone contracts, often employ rational ignorance due to the sheer 
difficulties of understanding the terms (Asher, 2010; Bayern, 2009; Mackie, 2008). 
These decision-makers choose not to compare aspects of the alternative deals in the 
marketplace, and instead make their decision based on limited information or at 
random. As a result, they may often make poor decisions. 
Research conducted for the Standing Committee of Officials of Consumer 
Affairs (O’Shea, 2010) found that home loan borrowers faced significant barriers as 
a result of the information available to them. Consumer interviews revealed that the 
length, complexity, design layout and, more generally, the ‘overwhelming’ nature of 
these documents meant that borrowers could not understand the products (O'Shea, 
2010, pp. 89-91). Participants reported that the loan documents were not easy to 
understand and observations of participants corroborated their difficulties in locating 
key information, if they were able to locate the information at all. Consequently, 
participants ignored most of the information they were presented with and instead 
focused on a limited number of variables. 
Experimental testing of pre-2012 disclosures suggests that they were 
ineffective in conveying the true cost of credit to borrowers. Participants in the 
experiment could not comprehend key loan costs (O'Shea, 2010, p. 58). Out of the 
31 participants asked to identify the true cost of the loan using the disclosure 
available before 2012, O’Shea found that: 
... only 2 participants in total were able to answer this correctly. 
Interestingly, no participant who was given the CDM [current disclosure 
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model] was able to understand the true cost of the home loan. Nearly correct 
answers were included in the analysis for this question because of potential 
errors when calculating the amount. (p. 59, parentheses added)  
Research into documentation for pre-contractual home loan disclosure 
therefore shows that lenders are able to control how useful the information is to a 
borrower by managing the complexity of information. Furthermore, lenders can also 
use the complexity of information to influence borrowers’ perceptions of search 
costs and benefits (e.g. Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2014, p. 
90; O'Shea, 2010, pp. 90-91), which in turn affects their willingness to search (e.g 
Bayern, 2009; Carlin, 2009; Klemperer, 1987; Mackie, 2008). This means that 
lenders who can control the information available about their products can influence 
a borrower’s access to timely, comparable information. More tellingly, lenders can 
inhibit borrowers from easily distinguishing between competitive and non-
competitive offers (Chioveanu & Zhou, 2013; Ellison & Ellison, 2009) and so 
sustain uncompetitive products in the market (Hillman & Rachlinski, 2002; 
Meyerson, 1992). 
2.1.4 Australia’s legislative response to information asymmetry in 
standard form contracts  
Although freedom of contract between parties remains the norm in Australian 
commercial contracting, since the 1960s there has been growing concern around 
complex, take-it-or-leave-it contracts. This has generated a range of legislative 
protective mechanisms, most notably the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Its recent 
successor, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), together with 
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parallel state and territory Acts 15  and industry directed regulation, 16  has recast 
relationships between suppliers, retailers, wholesalers and consumers. In particular, 
standard form contracts can exacerbate problems arising from unfair market 
practices, supplier conduct and product offer details. As a result, industries such as 
electricity, telecommunications, insurance and superannuation are all now subject to 
frameworks of regulatory and judicial oversight designed to protect consumers from 
unfair contract terms.17  
Legislation to protect against abuse of unequal bargaining power in contract 
formation has become particularly focused around personal, family or household 
acquisitions (i.e. consumer transactions). Broader laws and regulations focusing on 
misleading and deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct, as seen in ss 18, 21 
and 22 Schedule II, CCA respectively (previously ss 51(AA) and 52 of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974), have been effective in addressing broad issues of commercial 
conduct. More specific legislation offering more targeted relief, such as the 2010 
introduction of the CCA’s Unfair Contracts (ss 22, 23, Schedule II), focus 
specifically on unfair advantage created by unusual terms in standard form consumer 
contracts. These Acts are further supported by the expanded judicial interpretation of 
common-law precedents surrounding freedom of contract principles. Judicial 
decisions such as Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio18 have established 
                                                            
15 Such as Fair Trading Act 1992 (ACT); Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW); Fair Trading Act 1989 
(Qld); Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA); Fair Trading Act 1990 (Tas); Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic); Fair 
Trading Act 1987 (WA). Other examples exist such as the Contract Review Act 1980 (NSW). 
16 Such as the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) and Subdivision BA of the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) which deals with unfair contract term provisions in 
finance contracts. 
17 For example the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth); and the 
Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999 (Cth). 
18 (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
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critical protective frameworks for interpreting unconscionable conduct and 
establishing requirements for minimum information provision that sellers must meet.  
Further industry-specific legislation has also been enacted to address concerns 
about the level and type of disclosure in prescribed contracts. While the 2012 arrival 
of KFS in consumer credit lending and home loans is the most recent example, a 
number of other industry prescribed disclosure regimes pre-date this. Disclosure and 
transparency issues in insurance contracts were the target of the Insurance Contracts 
Act 1984 (Cth), ss 34, 35 and the Insurance Contracts Regulations 1985 (Cth). This 
legislation provides a matrix of standard cover rules to all policies issued in relation 
to home buildings, home content, motor vehicle, personal accident and illness, 
consumer credit and travel insurance. The Regulations as promulgated specify the 
minimum cover such policies must provide; for example, in relation to minimum 
sums insured and the required risks or insured events to be covered. The Insurance 
Contracts Act 1984 further ensures an insurer can only avoid or limit liability to pay 
under a prescribed contract in designated circumstances. As one commentator 
explains, the protective net afforded consumers under prescribed contracts in this 
area is such that: 
The combined effect of the Act and the Insurance Contracts Regulations 1985 
(Cth) is that where an insured makes a claim under a prescribed contract 
(that is, a contract to which the standard cover provisions apply) and that 
claim is in respect of loss arising from an event prescribed in the 
Regulations, the insurer must pay the insured the minimum amount specified 
in the Regulations. The insurer cannot rely on the terms of the contract to 
deny liability or reduce the amount of liability below a certain prescribed 
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minimum [absent compliance with specific legislative requirements]. (Tarr, 
2011, p. 112)  
Overall, commentators have found the creation of prescribed contract 
categories and the designation of uniform, non-waivable rights to be an effective 
change (e.g. Bek, Bugra, Hjalmarsson, & Lista, 2013; Johansson, 2013). Despite 
this, these commentaries note issues surrounding the interpretation of the Act’s 
specific requirements in terms of both timing around the delivery of disclosure 
information and the variation of definitions and concepts (as seen most recently in 
relation to the Queensland floods of 2010), highlighting the need for clear regulatory 
requirements. 
Similar steps have been taken for telecommunication contracts to reduce 
consumer confusion about terms and conditions in mobile phone contracts. The 
Telecommunications Consumer Protections Code, introduced by the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) in September 2012, mandated that 
telecommunications service suppliers provide a prescribed two-page disclosure 
document to each customer buying a new service (ACMA, 2011, p. 6). This 
disclosure document is termed the critical information summary and is designed to 
address the inadequacies and shortcomings of the information available to 
participants before they enter into a contract with a supplier (ACMA, 2011, pp. 2-3). 
Similarly to the mortgage market (see Section 2.1.3.), inadequate disclosure has been 
found to prevent telecommunications consumers from making an informed choice 
that will suit their needs and is one of the key drivers of consumer complaints 
(ACMA, 2011, p. 3). By replicating the approach taken in telecommunications (i.e. 
regulating the systems in place for informing consumers, as well as the information 
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available to them), it is expected that borrowers will make more informed home loan 
decisions and that fewer consumers will face excessive costs.19 
Interviews conducted by the ACMA found that the vast majority (82%) of the 
participants who recalled seeing a critical information summary found it useful 
(ACMA, 2014, pp. 88-89). The interviews highlighted that borrowers found the 
summary style of disclosure helpful in both comparing information and reducing the 
time required for each comparison. The use of simple language, bold fonts for key 
information, and tabular formats were found to help consumers. However, through 
interviews with the disclosure’s users the ACMA identified some deficiencies in the 
form. The key findings as set out by the ACMA are summarised in Figure 2.1: 
                                                            
19 Further revisions aimed at protecting telecommunications consumers are currently being 
investigated. See: Consumer Action Law Centre (2014). Submissions to the Telecommunications 
Consumer Protections Industry Code. From http://consumeraction.org.au/submission-revisions-to-
the-telecommunications-consumer-protections-industry-code/ 
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Figure 2.1. Customer perceptions of the telecommunications critical information summaries. 
Reprinted from Reconnecting the customer – Tracking consumer outcomes by ACMA, 2014. 
Retrieved from http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/Library/researchacma/Research-
reports/consumer-research-into-telco-reforms. 
 
These critical information summaries (CIS) have also been criticised by some 
users for their form. Specific criticisms include using text-based disclosure (as 
opposed to tabular formatting) and overloading the reader with too much 
information, impairing overall effectiveness (see sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). These 
responses show that good disclosure design dictates that all costing information 
should be readily accessible in one location with an appropriate focus on providing 
the optimum quantity of core information necessary for the decision. 
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Superannuation contracts with industry providers attract similar legislative 
requirements for disclosing fees and costs for superannuation products and managed 
investment schemes.20 In an attempt to better inform consumers about the costs they 
face, prescribed contract regimes detail requirements for the content, terminology 
and presentation of information to consumers (Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC), 2014).21 More recently there is a move towards shorter product 
disclosure statements and changes to terminology22 to lessen the information load 
placed on consumers. 
There is an increasing trend towards the use of prescribed contracts in 
Australia, particularly in the last decade. Research and government reviews have 
found that mandated disclosure practices effectively improve transparency and 
reduce information asymmetry in complex contexts; however, there is also room for 
improving consumer take-up (Financial Services Authority, 2006; Illuminas, 2008; 
O'Shea, 2010). The introduction of KFS into the home loan market is, therefore, 
timely and sits logically with other industries already subject to legislative 
intervention. The KFS format and content have been shaped by these collective 
experiences, those in foreign jurisdictions (see sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2), and broader 
dynamics around this country’s consumer credit legislative history, a theme to which 
this thesis turns. 
                                                            
20 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Further MySuper and Transparency Measures) Act 2012 
(Cth). 
21 Schedule 10 to the Corporations Regulations has seen several definitions amended or introduced to 
reflect fee and cost arrangements for superannuation trustees in the Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth). 
22 Pt 7.9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
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2.2 Consumer protection in the home loan industry: 
Legislative history leading to the Key Facts Sheet  
In 1972, South Australia introduced the first Australian pre-contractual 
disclosure requirements for consumers under the Consumer Transactions Act 1972 
(SA). Over the next 15 years, all Australian states and territories introduced similar 
legislation requiring mandated disclosure in standard form credit contracts. 
Differences between specific states’ requirements, however, caused broad difficulties 
in commercial compliance. Consequently, all states and territories agreed in 1993 to 
introduce a standardised template for disclosure (Productivity Commission, 2008, p. 
28). Queensland was the first state to enact the agreed template, which was then 
adopted through enabling legislation across all other states and territories, designed 
to mirror the Queensland legislation. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) 
became the regulatory framework for consumer credit laws and remained as such for 
the next 15 years.  
Despite the states’ and territories’ goal of harmonising requirements across the 
nation, however, differences between the states’ versions of the UCCC remained. 
Credit providers’ legal obligations continued to vary across states – for instance, 
Western Australia passed its own ‘equivalent’ legislation and all states introduced 
further ‘complementary’ legislation around related consumer credit issues, which led 
to a lack of alignment (Australian Government, 2008, p. 6; Malbon, 2013, Beatty & 
A. Smith, 2004, p. xxiii-xxv). Taken in conjunction with increasing house prices and 
the fallout of the global financial crisis, this meant that calls for new consumer credit 
protection regimes became a major parliamentary focus (Ali, McRae, & Ramsay, 
2012, p. 7; Malbon, 2013, p. 241; Pao, 2009, p. 4). 
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Between 2007 and 2008, these pressures for the government to ensure 
adequate protection for credit consumers while minimising regulatory burdens on 
business generated several government inquiries including: 
 The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance 
and Public Administration, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Home 
Loan Lending Practices and Processes, Report (2007) including Chapter 5: 
‘Credit Regulation and Consumer Protection for Borrowers’  
 The Productivity Commission, Inquiry into Home Loan Lending Practices 
and Processes (2007)  
 The Productivity Commission, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework, Inquiry Report No 45 (2008) 
 The Treasury Financial Services and Credit Reform: Improving, 
Simplifying and Standardising Financial Services and Credit Regulation, 
Green Paper (June 2008). 
After reviewing the UCCC, the collective findings of these reviews advocated 
an Australian Government takeover of all consumer credit regulation, including that 
of home mortgage lending.  
Accordingly, in October 2008, the Council of Australian Governments reached 
consensus that responsibility for the regulation of credit should be transferred to the 
Australian Government under a two-phase implementation plan. Following both the 
release of the 2008 Green Paper and the stakeholder consultation process, the NCCP 
2009 was passed as Phase 1. Key reforms in this phase included: (a) a transfer of 
consumer credit regulation from the states to the Commonwealth; (b) the creation of 
a Uniform Consumer Credit Code, including responsible lending requirements; (c) 
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heightened powers for the ASIC around the licensing of credit lenders and the 
introduction of stricter civil and criminal penalties for lenders who breach the Code; 
and (d) the introduction of mortgage hardship threshold factors (illness, 
unemployment or other reasonable case). 
KFS were introduced as part of Phase 2, along with the regulation of credit 
card and home loan lending. Phase 2 followed the government’s release of (and 
response to) a second Green Paper in July 2010. A key element of Phase 2 focused 
on empowering borrowers to switch easily to better loans (Australian Government, 
2010, p. 3).23 For the home loan industry in particular, this included the legislative 
ban of early termination fees from 1 July 2011 and the introduction of the mandatory 
KFS from 1 January 2012. As noted at the outset of this chapter, the introduction of 
the KFS was contained in The National Consumer Credit Protection Amendment 
Regulations 2011 (No. 2) and was informed by the Ministerial Council on Consumer 
Affairs’ 2008 Regulatory Impact Statement on responsible lending practices around 
consumer credit (Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs, 2008). 
These legislative interventions addressed two common stakeholder concerns 
that had been identified as problematic in pre-existing UCCC disclosure 
requirements. First, UCCC ss 14 and 15 pre-contractual disclosure requirements 
were found to be inadequate in helping inform consumers of their rights and 
responsibilities when entering a loan contract; the sections did not help borrowers 
assess the full costs of credit (Australian Government, 2010). Stakeholder 
submissions contended that disclosure occurred too late in the decision-making 
process (Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs, 1999, p. 33), because the UCCC 
                                                            
23 Along with empowering borrowers to switch, the reforms look at empowering smaller lenders to 
compete with big banks and to secure the long-term safety and sustainability of the Australian 
financial system. 
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provisions enabled this pre-contractual information to be disclosed only as part of the 
contract document itself. Many consumers, therefore, only received the disclosure 
after finalising the application process (which often included the payment of a non-
refundable fee). In economic terms, a neutralising information asymmetry remained 
because consumers were required to engage in time-consuming and potentially 
expensive transaction costs so they could understand loan terms and conditions.  
The second concern raised was that pre-contractual disclosures remained too 
complex to be effective (Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs, 1999, p. 28). 
Three commonly cited examples are:  
1) Use of different fee structures and the inclusion of conditions that, if 
triggered, could potentially change costs. The inclusion of a ‘honeymoon 
rate’ was one such issue. This term offered a borrower a low upfront 
interest rate for the early years of the loan which would then revert to the 
standard variable rate at the end of that specified period.24 When these 
products have higher interest rates than variable options in later years, total 
payments may end up being more costly than those of standard loan 
counterparts. While lower upfront costs might potentially help a borrower 
by reducing initial loan costs, low introductory rates can be used to leave 
consumers with a more favourable perception of the loan than the costing 
scheme merits. 
2) Absence of influential variable information around lender–broker 
relationships and costs. Under the Act’s pre-contractual disclosure 
requirements there was a lack of focus on providing consumers with 
                                                            
24 For example, see St George’s introductory rate home loan: 
http://www.stgeorge.com.au/personal/home-loans/our-home-loans/popular/introductory-rate-home-
loan 
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information about the relationship between lenders and brokers, 
particularly the commissions, fees and charges between these parties. 
These fees, while initially paid by the lender, can have significant 
implications for the repayments a borrower must make to the lender. As 
this information affected the total amount a borrower was to pay, absence 
of such information failed to properly provide borrowers with comparable 
information surrounding their alternatives. 
3) Inclusion of terms such as ‘early termination fees’ that only attracted 
additional payment in the event of breach provided additional potential for 
misleading pricing if not factored in to the costs. Recommendations were 
made for summary disclosure documents with set terms and in a prescribed 
format to help address this.25  
Overall the focus was on the need for a simple, concise, consistent and clear 
mechanism that could convey the overall cost of the loan product.  
Recent reform of home loan borrowing disclosure reflects stakeholder and 
parliamentary concerns that consumers seeking credit and loan contracts have access 
to simple, comparable information before contracting and that they can easily move 
between borrowers when more cost-competitive packages become available. The 
NCCP 2011 amendments and Regulations sitting over the NCCP 2009 were 
designed to achieve this. 
                                                            
25 Early terminations fees per se were made entirely illegal for variable home loan contracts s 79A of 
the National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth). 
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2.3 The Key Facts Sheet: Mechanics, legislative intent and the 
NCCP 2011  
All Australian lenders holding an Australian Credit Licence under s 35 of the 
NCCP 2011 are subject to provide a standardised summary document – the KFS – to 
any borrower seeking a standard home loan. The standardised content, terminology 
and layout of this KFS are prescribed under the Amendment Regulations, Schedule 5 
which came into effect on 1 January 2012.26 This appears as Regulation 28LB.  
Currently, supplying a KFS is mandatory only when a prospective borrower 
requests one. In order for a KFS to be generated, the borrower must provide several 
specifics for the loan they are seeking. Once a borrower has requested a KFS from 
each prospective lender, they are in a position to compare the relevant fees, interest 
rates (adjusted for any applicable discounts), estimated monthly repayment amounts 
and the estimated total cost of credit27 before applying for a loan. Licensed lenders 
who have online approval provisions are also required to provide electronic 
generators for KFS on their websites.28 
For purposes of this thesis, the critical section of the KFS template appears in 
Figure 2.2. It is set out in full along with annotated comments in Appendix A. The 
amended Regulations, as embodied in KFS, are designed to foster the provision of 
simple and consistent disclosure, which borrowers can easily use to compare the 
costs of various loan products, before undergoing the application. The transparency 
and holistic focus of KFS stand to help borrowers compare loans that have different 
fee structures and differing loan terms, which would otherwise prove difficult.  
                                                            
26 National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth) reg 28LB. 
27 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 133AB(2)(a) and s133AB(2)(b). 
28 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 133AC. 
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NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION REGULATIONS 2010 - 
SCHEDULE 5 
Key Facts Sheets    (regulation 28LB) 
Part 1 -- Model of Key Facts Sheets 
This Key Facts Sheet is an Australian Government requirement under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 
2009 
KEY FACTS ABOUT THIS HOME LOAN 
Date produced: [date] 
  
[lender logo] 
Australian credit licence number: [lender's ACL 
number] 
THIS IS NOT AN OFFER OF CREDIT. This Key Facts Sheet is provided to help you compare this home loan with the 
home loans of other lenders. 
What you have told us 
Loan Amount: 
Term of the home loan: 
Interest type: 
Lender and product name: 
[loan amount] 
[loan term] 
[fixed or variable]  
[lender and product name] 
HOW DOES THIS HOME LOAN COMPARE? 
Description of this home loan 
Repayment method Principal and interest  
Repayment frequency Monthly (other repayment options are available)  
Interest rate 
5 [variable interest rate] per annum 
[fixed interest rate] per annum fixed for [number] years, then a variable rate 
currently [variable interest rate] per annum 
[variable interest rate] per annum variable for [number] years, then a 
[ * fixed/ * variable/ * discount interest rate] per annum 
*   Delete whichever is not applicable 
[ * fixed/ * variable] [introductory interest rate] per annum for [number] years, 
then a variable rate currently [variable interest rate] per annum 
*   Delete whichever is not applicable 
Personalised comparison rate: 
(interest rate including fees) [Personalised comparison rate] per annum  
 Estimated cost of this home loan 
Total amount to be paid back (including the loan amount and fees) [repaid amount] 
This means you will pay back [amount] for every $1 borrowed  
Establishment fees [establishment fees] 
Ongoing fees [monthly fees] 11 per month 
[annual fees] 12 per year 
 Repayment per month (including ongoing fees) [monthly repayment] 
 Repayment per year (including ongoing fees) [yearly repayment] 
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Repayment per month for first [number] years (including ongoing 
fees) [monthly repayment]  
Repayment per year for first [number] years (including ongoing fees) [yearly repayment] 
Repayment per month after [number] years (including ongoing fees) [monthly repayment] 
Repayment per year after [number] years (including ongoing fees) [yearly repayment] 
  
There may be circumstances in which other fees are payable. Fees applicable for the loan you apply for will be 
shown in the loan contract. You can also obtain a list of fees applicable to this type of loan from our branches or 
through our website at [ lender's website ]. 
Other loan set-up fees, such as valuation fees  and lender's mortgage insurance, and Government charges, such as 
registration fees and stamp duty on property transfer, have not been included. These will be determined after 
application. 
Additional fees may be payable if you choose to repay your fixed rate home loan early.  
  
What happens at the end of the fixed rate period? 
At the end of the fixed rate period you may be able to fix the rate at a new fixed interest rate for a further period. 
If a further fixed rate is not entered into, the rate will convert to the applicable variable interest rate. Under the 
current variable interest rate, if interest rates do not change, your monthly repayment would [increase/decrease] 
by around [change in repayment].  
 At the end of the fixed rate period, the rate will convert to the applicable variable interest rate. Under the current 
variable interest rate, if interest rates do not change, your monthly repayment would [increase/decrease] by 
around [change in repayment].  
  
 What happens if interest rates increase? 
This is a variable rate loan. If your interest rate was to increase by 1% per annum, your monthly repayment 
would increase by around [change in repayment 2] 
This is a fixed rate loan. Your repayments will not change during the fixed rate period. After the fixed rate 
period, if the variable interest rate was to increase by 1% per annum, from the current variable interest rate of 
[variable interest rate], your monthly repayment would increase by around [change in repayment]. 
  
How can I repay my loan faster?
This loan allows you to make additional repayments to pay off your home loan faster. If you increased your 
monthly repayments by $200 a month to[monthly repayment + $200] you would repay the loan in [new loan 
term], instead of [loan term], based on the current variable interest rate stated in this Key Facts Sheet. 
This loan allows you to make additional repayments to pay off your loan faster but such repayments may attract a 
fee. You should ask your lender about the fee before making additional repayments. 
This loan does not allow you to make additional repayments to pay off your home loan faster. 
Altering the frequency of repayments may also help repay the loan faster. 
 How to find the best deal for you
To obtain the best deal for you, it is important to shop around and compare interest rates, fees and features before 
you apply for a home loan. Choosing the best home loan for you may save you money. For more information 
about how to get the best deal on your home loan visit the ASIC consumer website at www.moneysmart.gov.au. 
 
Figure 2.2. Format requirements for KFS. Reprinted from National Consumer Credit Protection 
Regulations 2010, Schedule 5, by Austlii, 2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/nccpr2010486/sch5.html 
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The legislative preface to the Act sets out the threefold legislative objective of 
this overhaul (and the touchstone for the research queries for much of this thesis) as 
(Australian Government, 2011b, p. 43):  
(i) To simplify and standardise terminology and fee structures  
(ii)  To assist borrowers to better understand the cost of their home loan 
and make appropriately tailored selection 
(iii) To enhance product package comparability through improved 
transparency thereby generating lower transaction costs and fostering 
demand side competition resulting in greater competition among 
lenders as to borrower costs and services provided.29 
The legislation specifically identifies six obstacles that borrowers face when 
they are deciding on a home loan, and that it aims to address (Australian 
Government, 2011b, pp. 32-35): 
1) Complexity – opaqueness potentially arising from the number of attributes 
by which loan contracts differ, including features, interest rates and fee 
structures, as well as the complexity of the mathematical calculations 
required to estimate the total cost and monthly repayments 
2) Terminology – reliance on legal and technical terminology including a lack 
of standardised nomenclature may prevent quick and easy comparisons 
between each product’s terms 
3)  Comparability – greater scope for varying rates across borrowing 
thresholds: the pre-amendment comparison rate for loans was calculated 
based on a single loan amount ($150,000), making it difficult to compare 
                                                            
29 A fourth and final objective is to, where possible, minimise compliance and transitional costs for 
the home loan industry. This, however, is beyond the scope of the study. 
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loans of different sizes, especially where different rates existed for 
borrowings over certain thresholds 
4) Transparency – capacity to compare ‘apples and apples’ in the context of 
terms. Common dynamics that can make it difficult to determine the most 
cost-effective loan include non-advertised discounts applied to higher loan 
amounts, lower loan-to-value ratios and professional accreditations status  
5) Format – lack of standardised format along with poor quality formatting 
can present obstacles to a borrower’s ability to identify and understand the 
essential features of a loan and can reduce the comparability of the 
different products  
6) Timing – delivery of material in a timely window before the parties enter 
into a contract and at a point where informing effective decision-making 
about the merits of individual products is viable. 
2.4 Discussion: Analysis of regulatory approach 
The objectives outlined in the Bill for the NCCP 2011 accord with the 
regulators’ intent to foster a broad level of disclosure to counter potential 
information asymmetries. Specifically, the intent is to improve consumers’ self-
education and their comprehension of the contract they are entering. This approach 
accords with the neoliberal theory of free market regulation (Friedman, 2009; Hayek, 
1960) and the principle of freedom of contract, which has been the touchstone of 
UK, US and Australian regulation and governance. Thus, the intervention can be 
viewed as a means of correcting a market failure to uphold the general framework of 
freedom of contract and free market principles. When this corrective step is absent, 
inadequately informed consumers might base their loan selections on price/interest 
rate alone and may actually, through flawed decision-making, drive higher quality 
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loans and contract terms out of the market, to the detriment of all consumers 
(Akerlof, 1970b, pp. 488-500; Ramsay, 2007, p. 43). 
The intervention is based on the assumption that the borrower will use the 
mandated information in the loan disclosure which, over the totality of home loan 
borrowers, will increase market competition in this sector. The legitimacy of this 
approach has attracted a range of scholarship around ‘responsibilisation’ of the 
consumer (Faure & Luth, 2011, p. 343; Hillman & Rachlinski, 2002), or ‘soft 
paternalism’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). When disclosure is positioned as a 
protective mechanism to enhance transparency within market transactions (rather 
than as an intervention to distort market forces), it becomes synonymous with 
preserving the status quo of freedom of contract (Cartwright, 2009, p. 62). Ramsay 
(2007, p. 28) takes this position further by observing that consumers in finance 
markets have to ‘learn the appropriate norms of credit and savings behaviour’ in 
order to become ‘financially literate’ before they are able to make informed choices 
about products in the field (See also Howells, 2005, p.356; Marotta-Wurgler, 2012, 
p.97). 
The goal of assisting consumers to become more financially literate by 
providing them with fast, efficient and accurate comparative bottom lines capable of 
informing their decision-making can be instructed by similar activity in the US and 
UK financial markets. The following section compares the impact this approach has 
had in these jurisdictions. In the US, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), enacted in 
1968, was introduced to foster ‘a meaningful disclosure of credit terms’ to ‘protect 
the consumer against unfair credit billing and credit card practices’ (TILA, s 1601).30 
As O’Shea points out, research conducted in the US context shaped much of the 
                                                            
30 Truth in Lending Act 15 USC § 1601. 
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prior research for KFS development (see Australian Government, 2011b; O'Shea, 
2010). The following section sets out the legislation surrounding pre-contract home 
loan disclosure in the US and draws parallels between the TILA statement and the 
KFS. 
2.4.1 The United States’ Truth in Lending Act 1968  
In the US, the TILA has regulated credit contract disclosure at a federal level 
for several decades. The Act requires a ‘Truth in Lending Statement’ (TILA 
statement) to be disclosed to borrowers before the contract is consummated.31 For 
purchase-money loans, such as home loans, creditors must provide the disclosures 
within three days of receiving a consumer’s written application.32 As discussed in 
Section 2.1 this means that the relevant disclosure data often arrives too late in the 
process (often after the consumer has taken steps to commit themselves to an offer), 
preventing the borrower from effectively using it to evaluate their loan alternatives 
(Galvin, 2011). This is evident in the joint report from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and Department of Housing and Urban Development in 
1998 to the US Congress. The report raised concerns that these requirements meant 
that borrowers were receiving information too late in the decision-making process to 
be useful for comparative shopping (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System & US Deparment of Housing and Urban Developement, 1998) 
The closed-end credit terms regulations (under which home loan credit 
contracts disclosure sits) appear in Part 226 Subpart C of the Code of the Federal 
Regulations (Regulation Z).33 The prescribed content and format for the TILA’s 
mortgage loan statement is reproduced in Appendix B (along with several 
                                                            
31 TILA 1968 Subpart C s 226.17(2)(b), 226.18. 
32 TILA 1968 Subpart C s 226.19(1)(a). 
33 Regulation Z is codified at 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 226. 
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comments), but to allow for a comparison with KFS requirements, the major 
inclusions required are:34 
 annual percentage rate 
 financial charge 
 amount financed 
 total payments 
 payment schedule 
 charges for optional credit insurance 
 any late payment fees 
 an indication of whether a prepayment penalty may apply to the loan. 
Overall, the TILA statement contains the same key variables as the KFS with 
additional requirements relating to security, late charges and the details relating to 
the assumption of a loan. While this information may help borrowers select the most 
suitable loan, the extra information may also distract borrowers or cause problems of 
information overload (Eppler & Mengis, 2004). The TILA statements also differ 
from KFS in format. The TILA statements are set out in multiple sections, contain 
larger volumes of text and are accompanied by tabular data to convey information. 
While KFS and the TILA statements are fairly similar in terms of content and 
design, findings from O’Shea (2010) suggest that the larger amount of text on the 
TILA statement may reduce its effectiveness. The key difference between KFS and 
the TILA statements, however, is the timing of disclosure; KFS are available much 
earlier than the TILA statements. This allows borrowers to use KFS when they 
compare offers before applying for a loan and allows them time to consider each 
offer at their own pace with little or no external pressure. 
                                                            
34 TILA 1968 Subpart C s 226.18. 
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2.4.2 The United Kingdom legislation: Mortgage Conduct of Business 
rules 
The UK has used a KFS equivalent since 2004 when the Financial Services 
Authority’s Mortgage Conduct of Business (MCOB) rules came into effect. The 
legislature’s objectives parallel those of Australia, being ‘to provide consumers with 
the clear information in a consistent format in order to empower consumers to shop 
around and compare different products’ (Financial Services Authority, 2006, p. 15). 
The research therefore reviews the UK’s current approach to provide insight into 
how KFS are likely to operate in practice, including the likely benefits and shortfalls 
of Australia’s legislation.  
The UK disclosure documents, the Key Facts Illustrations (KFI), although 
longer than Australia’s KFS, are concise documents that provide borrowers with a 
summary of specific home loan terms. Both the disclosure design and the timing of 
presentation address several of the problems in the US and previous Australian 
regimes. An example of a KFI is reproduced in Appendix C. 
Like KFS, KFI provide the borrower with a personalised estimate of the total 
cost of the loan. This estimate of the costs is based on information specified by the 
borrower during their request. This includes the initial interest rate, cost, how much 
they will be paying back per pound borrowed and an overall annual comparison 
interest rate. 35  
There are, however, three potentially significant distinctions between the 
regulatory requirements for KFS and KFI. First, a KFI must be provided to a 
consumer before they submit a written application for a regulated mortgage 
                                                            
35 MCOB 5.5.1. 
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contract.36 Consequently, a borrower will encounter a KFI, regardless of whether 
they ask for one, before they are able to apply for a mortgage product. Additionally, 
a brokerage firm (or equivalent) may not take any action that may commit a 
consumer to a loan (such as accepting a fee or commissioning an evaluation), until 
the consumer has had an opportunity to consider a KFI.37 Under Australian law, 
lenders are not required to provide a KFS unless a borrower directly requests one. 
Similarly, there is no requirement for a KFS to be sighted before any home loan is 
formally entered.  
Second, the Australian legislation prescribes the format of the document 
whereas the UK regulations merely require headings,38 typefaces and formatting to 
be consistent throughout the document to avoid drawing attention to one section over 
another.39 While the UK regulations may create consistency within the document, 
they may fail to achieve the same level of consistency between lenders. The 
terminology to be used on a KFI is not specified, but the UK government has 
attempted to standardise terminology on a broader level across all lenders and their 
documentation. For example, all fees payable on early termination of the loan (with 
the exception of break costs) must be termed early repayment charges. This means 
that UK borrowers are likely to experience a broader level of consistency in loan 
terminology compared with Australian borrowers. However, the consistency 
between KFS is likely to be greater than that of the UK’s KFI. This consistency is 
important for both borrower comprehension and comparability of loan terms. 
                                                            
36 MCOB 5.5.1. 
37 MCOB 5.5.4. 
38 For a list of subheadings and the relevant regulation see MCOB 5.6 Section 12. 
39 MCOB 5.6.2 and 5.6.4(2) 
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Third, KFI contain a section for additional features of the loan contract where 
the lender must include details such as credit cards, linked savings accounts, 
incentives and ‘borrow back’ facilities.40 This requirement was proposed in s 2.11 of 
the Bill for Australia’s NCCP 2011 (Australian Government, 2011b, p. 11); 
however, the KFS design now in force does not contain any information about 
additional features of a loan. This potentially limits the usefulness of the KFS as it 
restricts the scope of the document to one dimension of the mortgage: price. Due to 
the diverse nature of mortgage products some loans may have higher costs, but may 
also contain features that allow the borrower to ultimately save thousands of dollars 
across several products or that grant them greater financial security and flexibility.  
KFI also provide the borrower with broader information related to the costs 
and risks associated with the loan product. KFI provide a section which outlines the 
costs of fees and charges arising from the use of third-party services (e.g. 
commissions charged by mortgage intermediaries).41 There are also a number of 
warnings regarding the risks of the loan and consequences of default. This 
information contained on KFI provides consumers with a more complete picture of 
the risks associated with home loan products; however, the extra information 
generally does not help differentiate between loan alternatives. 
A possible downside of the extra information contained in the KFI, however, is 
that it may overload the user with information (Miller, 1956). The biases caused by 
information processing flaws (e.g. the use of heuristic decision-making processes 
(Fishburn, 1967, 1974; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008)) are the subject of Chapter 3. 
While KFI present the borrower with more information, more disclosure is not 
                                                            
40 MCOB 5.6.92. 
41 This is required under the label ‘Other Fees’ MCOB 5.6.70 and 5.6.71. 
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always more effective. The importance of concise focused disclosure and how it is 
applied to KFS is detailed in Section 3.1.5. 
A review of KFI legislation has found mixed results regarding the success of 
KFI. A post-implementation review of KFI found that 37% of the consumers 
surveyed used them to decide on the right mortgage (Financial Services Authority, 
2006, p. 4), leading the Financial Services Authority to conclude that KFI do indeed 
help home loan borrowers in the UK to better understand the features and risks of a 
potential mortgage when making a home loan decision. By contrast, later research 
conducted by Illuminas for the Financial Services Authority reported that KFI 
improved borrowers’ understanding of loan costs, but their decision practices, 
particularly the use of external advice, often meant that KFI were not used during the 
decision process, but rather were considered post-decision (Illuminas, 2008, p. 27). 
This raises concerns about the effectiveness of the KFI, and similar disclosure 
documents such as the KFS, in aiding borrowers with loan price comparisons. 
Table 2.1 summarises the key similarities and differences between the different 
countries’ regulations: 
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Table 2.1  
Comparison of Australian, UK and US Legislation 
Issue Australia United Kingdom United States of 
America 
Timing of 
Disclosure 
‐ KFS information 
may be requested 
early in the 
decision-making 
process. 
‐ A KFS generator 
must be available 
on the lenders 
website. 
‐ Prior to or after 
application. 
 
‐ A KFI must be 
provided before 
a consumer can 
make an 
application for a 
mortgage. 
‐ Prior to 
application. 
‐ A request may 
be made for a 
tariff of charges. 
‐ The TILA 
statement and 
the GFE must be 
provided within 
three days of 
written notice of 
an application.  
‐ After 
application. 
Content of 
Disclosure 
‐ The KFS contain 
the key 
ascertainable 
pricing variables 
payable to the 
lender. 
‐ Some warnings 
and discussion of 
features are 
provided, but no 
specific 
information 
provided. 
‐ The KFI contain 
the key pricing 
variables 
payable to the 
lender. 
‐ An estimate of 
third-party costs 
is provided to 
the lender. 
‐ All relevant, 
additional 
features of the 
loan are 
provided. 
‐ There are 
multiple 
warnings 
regarding the 
risks of the loan 
and 
consequences of 
default. 
 
‐ Estimated costs 
of establishing 
the loan are 
provided by the 
GFE. 
‐ The TILA 
statement 
provides 
relevant pricing 
and feature 
information for 
the loan. 
 
In summary, research in the UK and the US has revealed similar disclosure 
issues to those in surrounding pre-contractual home loan disclosure in Australia. 
That is, without government intervention, poor timing and complex disclosure 
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documents prevent borrowers from easily comparing the home loan offers available 
to them (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System & US Deparment of 
Housing and Urban Developement, 1998, pp. 37-44; Lacko & Pappalardo, 2007, pp. 
30-37). Further, this research supports the findings of the research conducted for the 
Australian Standing Committee of Consumer Affairs (O'Shea, 2010) in suggesting 
that KFS are theoretically well placed towards improving consumer decision-making 
regarding home loan products. Reviews of similar disclosure documents in the UK, 
however, have raised questions as to the success of the legislation in practice 
(Financial Services Authority, 2006; Illuminas, 2008), suggesting that when 
borrowers are choosing between home loans, they either may not use KFS or may 
not use them in the indeed manner. Research has also suggested that differences in 
the volume of content presented within the disclosure documents may significantly 
influence their use and effectiveness (Illuminas, 2008). The research results suggest 
that borrowers are likely to prefer the more concise design of KFS and to find them 
more useful than their UK counterpart the KFI when comparing financial costs. 
Although KFS are generally well positioned to aid borrowers in comparing 
loan costs, the permissive nature of the legislation may reduce their effectiveness in 
practice. The wording of the legislation means that a lender is only required to 
provide a potential borrower with a KFS where the borrower requests one. Lenders 
are, therefore, not compelled to ensure borrowers have access to a KFS before they 
apply for a home loan. That is, despite regulatory intention (Australian Government, 
2011c, p. 18), there is no particular focus on ensuring borrowers receive KFS in the 
relevant window for decision-making.  
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Additionally, in contrast with the UK, the onus on Australian borrowers to 
request a KFS stands to prevent borrowers who are unaware of KFS from obtaining 
one, unless they received one through a general enquiry for home loan information. 
In this respect, findings from consumer watchdog Choice suggest that unless 
borrowers specifically ask for a KFS, they are unlikely to be presented with one 
(Choice, 2012). 42  In the UK, an attempt has been made to avoid this issue by 
requiring lenders to provide a borrower with a KFI before accepting a written 
application for a home loan. As the UK legislation places the onus upon the lender to 
ensure that a borrower is provided with the disclosure, a lack of knowledge on the 
borrower’s behalf does not prevent them from receiving a KFI before they have 
committed to a particular loan offer. This is particularly important as both the KFI 
and KFS are intended to help borrowers compare loan costs in an environment where 
the complexity of the loan products and inconsistent disclosure across lenders makes 
identifying and accessing the relevant information difficult. 
2.5 Conclusions 
In summary, legislation now provides for simplified and standardised 
information to be made available at earlier stages in the mortgage selection process. 
These changes come in response to longstanding concerns that the information 
available to borrowers at the time of shopping was ineffective both in helping 
borrowers compare the offers available to them and in promoting understanding of 
the key features of a loan. Through KFS, information is now available in a 
prescribed format in an attempt to ensure that all licensed home loan lenders provide 
key loan pricing information that is transparent and is set out in understandable, 
consistent language and formatting. By providing clear, consistent information to 
                                                            
42 These concerns are explored in further detail in Chapter 6. 
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home loan borrowers the government aims to increase borrowers’ access to key 
pricing information for home loan products.  
While the use of prescribed disclosure superficially deviates from the 
traditional common-law approach of freedom of contract, the legislation is grounded 
in long-standing concerns around market failure and the need for consumer 
protection. These concerns arise from the inequality of bargaining power between 
suppliers and individuals. It is not uncommon for standard form contracts to give rise 
to information asymmetry problems due to variables such as length of 
documentation, density of legal content and potential complexity of language. 
Through the KFS legislation the government endeavours to empower borrowers to 
overcome these issues by promoting a better understanding of loan contracts and 
enhancing competition among lenders. 
Overall, testing of disclosure using similar principles, both in theory and in the 
context of the UK home loan market, has shown that the design of the KFS (or its 
equivalent) is likely to enhance borrowers’ ability to compare loan information. 
Research from the telecommunications industry supports findings around the use of 
prescribed documents as a means of providing consumers with the data needed for 
meaningful disclosure in decision-making (Australian Communications and Media 
Authority, 2014, p.90). This same research, however, highlights the importance of 
clear, concise information and formatting which draws attention to key variables and 
uses minimal text. O’Shea used these same design principles when designing the 
recommended disclosure model presented to the Standing Committee of Officials of 
Consumer Affairs, and found that the recommended disclosure model substantially 
improved borrowers’ abilities to identify the true cost of credit (O’Shea, 2010, pp. 
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59, 91). The clear, single-page design of the KFS, which uses tabular formatting to 
separate out the key costs of the loan and uses minimal text, greatly improves users’ 
comprehension of the key costs of the home loan and empowers them to compare 
loans more accurately and more easily.  
Put another way, provided the KFS has been designed correctly around 
relevant essential data disclosure and is structured correctly for easy comprehension, 
Australian home loan borrowers should be far better placed to make ‘correct’ 
decisions within this complex market. In doing so, both their own interests and the 
broader macro-economic interests of the country as a whole should be more easily 
advanced. These premises will be tested in several sections of this thesis and, with 
the passage of time since the legislations inception in 2012, the uptake and impact of 
KFS should become more apparent in market trends in consumer decision-making. 
The reforms outlined above – and their resultant statutes and regulations – 
remain, however, tied to the efficacy of the philosophical framework from which 
they arise. That is, regulators emphasise blanket disclosure as the appropriate method 
of legislating for consumer protection, both in relation to KFS and more generally in 
laws passed over the last five decades, based on the assumption that consumers who 
are given sufficient information will make informed and rational financial choices. 
Accordingly, under rational consumer orthodoxy around the impact of disclosure on 
borrower decision-making, success of such disclosure presupposes that consumers 
are rational to the extent that if given the necessary data they will self-educate for 
their own benefit in relation to decision-making; that is, that people are perfect 
rational maximisers of their personal utility (Atiyah, 1979; Savage, 1954; A. Smith, 
1776; Stigler, 1987). In practice, as will be explored in the studies in this paper, this 
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means that when home buyers are deciding on a home loan, they will seek out and 
compare all relevant information available to them, weigh up these alternatives, and 
select the product that most benefits them (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).  
A major limitation of the disclosure approach, however, is that no amount of 
information, regardless of its effectiveness, can improve the decision of borrowers 
who do not use it, or do not base their decision on the information it contains. Even 
where price is important, and a decision-maker reads the disclosures, disclosure 
cannot force ‘economic rationality’ into a decision-maker (Rohner, 1996). 
Ultimately, this means that KFS may only stand to benefit a very particular subset of 
borrowers. Unless a borrower compares homes loans, and more specifically 
compares home loans on price, and attempts to educate themselves through the use 
of disclosure, KFS are unlikely to enhance their decision.  
As noted throughout this chapter, it is possible that KFS may not only facilitate 
more effective loan price evaluations but may also, through lower opportunity cost in 
gaining this information, entice more borrowers to participate in the exercise of 
comparing loan prices. Behavioural biases will be discussed further in sections 3.1.3 
to 3.1.5. However, if behavioural biases remain unaddressed, as will be examined in 
more detail below (see chapters 5 and 6) and discussed in the conclusions, then 
despite parliamentary intent the impact of these recent changes may actually be 
limited. 
Overall, while research such as O'Shea (2010) shows that KFS may improve 
borrower decision-making in theory, stakeholders such as the consumer advocacy 
agency Choice have raised several concerns about whether these benefits will exist 
in practice. The thesis is aimed at considering the effectiveness of the legislation and 
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determining whether the KFS attains the objective of improving home loan decision-
making in the Australian home loan market. In particular, the research considers the 
effectiveness of the disclosure process and whether the regulatory approach 
optimises the intended outcomes.  
The next chapter considers the literature pertaining to decision-making in the 
context of home loans, drawing from research which examines complex decision-
making and disclosure in other contexts. 
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The introduction of key fact sheets, as outlined in Chapter 2, recognises that 
borrowers are not the perfect rational maximisers of utility assumed by traditional 
economics. If they were, then they would seek out the necessary information and be 
capable of making economically efficient comparisons between home loans. The 
previous chapter outlines the legislative history, objectives, underpinning regulatory 
approach and general legal structure of the KFS. This chapter builds off that base 
and adds three new layers. 
First, it seeks to link legislative interventions in home loan borrowing with the 
specific potential failure points that may characterise consumer borrowing 
behaviour. To this end, behavioural theory literature surrounding consumer decision-
making is analysed and its inherent assumptions around consumer behaviour and 
biases are established. 
This section predominantly establishes the foundations for the empirical work 
in Chapter 4 which is aimed at extending earlier research into the potential impact of 
simple, targeted, pre-contractual home loan disclosure on borrower decision-making. 
The insight generated provides greater guidance for theory and practice by using 
documentation based on the legislated changes and real-world home loan 
information available to borrowers at the time of shopping. Also, a larger sample 
size is used than for the research guiding KFS design, allowing for greater statistical 
power. 
Second, how borrowers inform themselves in the loan selection process is 
considered and potential barriers and obstacles inherent in this process that may 
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undermine the effectiveness of KFS are identified. This section also examines 
findings from the United Kingdom (UK) on the impact of and barriers in similar 
legislation surrounding home loan selection. This informs the research conducted in 
Chapter 5 which provides the first study of this kind around KFS and the Australian 
home loan market. Based on these collective findings, several critical patterns in the 
current use of KFS are documented; highlighting key areas where reform is needed 
to enhance use. 
Third, literature around lender incentives and disincentives to provide clear and 
concise home loan disclosure documentation is outlined. This supports the study in 
Chapter 6 of lenders’ practices for disclosing KFS and potential barriers borrowers 
may face in accessing them. By examining lenders’ incentives towards providing 
effective disclosure, the third study seeks to contribute to existing research by 
documenting the impact that the requirement for borrowers to seek out KFS has on 
the likelihood they will obtain KFS during their decision-making process. In the 
context of existing research, these findings advance understanding of how prescribed 
contract documents such as the KFS may best be used in the decision-making 
process. It also documents that consumer behaviour in this area is markedly aligned 
with the theory of behavioural economics rather than that of neoclassical economic 
rational maximisation.  
This chapter begins by reviewing the literature around the broader theories on 
which regulatory reform is based: the traditional economic approach of enhancing 
informed consent (Section 3.1); and the approach of behavioural economics (Section 
3.1.1). The complexity of home loan decisions is highlighted in Section 3.1.2 and its 
implications for borrower choice are discussed. Section 3.1.3 introduces heuristics 
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theory, examining research ‘shortcuts’ consumers may adopt to reduce the 
information load in complex decision-making. Negative implications inherent in 
heuristic decision making are developed in Section 3.1.4 and the reasons why KFS 
may mitigate aspects of this are given in Section 3.1.5. 
The second half of the chapter focuses on literature which predicts how KFS 
might function in the home loan market. Research around borrower perspectives in 
financial product choices is explored in Section 3.2; lender motivations to provide 
clear pricing information are then developed in Section 3.3. Finally, how this thesis 
collectively contributes to this body of knowledge is set out in Section 3.4. 
3.1 Behavioural decision theory 
The introduction of KFS was designed to KFS to enhance borrowers’ decision-
making capacities by reducing complexities inherent in loan disclosure 
documentation. Specifically, this legislation was designed to neutralise variables that 
may otherwise influence borrowers to deviate from economically rational decisions 
(Australian Government, 2011b). As outlined in Chapter 2, this approach derives 
from the free-market assumption that consumers are innately rational maximisers 
and that consumer sovereignty in market contexts will deliver superior outcomes for 
both individuals and the market as a whole (A. Smith, 1776; Stigler, 1987). As R. A. 
Posner (1992) and Farnsworth (1990, p. 846) argue, this regulatory perspective 
‘presupposes rational parties that strive to maximize their own welfare’, which, in 
neoclassical economic theory, stimulates effective competition in markets. That is, 
because each party values what they are receiving more than what is being given up, 
such exchanges taken collectively achieve ‘allocative efficiency’ and move resources 
to ‘higher valued users’. Consumers therefore are rational and will compare 
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information available to them to maximise their own subjective utility; in doing so, 
consumers will benefit society (Farnsworth, 1990; Kronman & Posner, 1992, p. 11; 
A. Smith, 1776). Legislative intervention to enhance competition is therefore 
counterproductive and Adam Smith’s directive that a free market is best shaped by 
‘the invisible hand’ is observed (A. Smith, 1776).  
Market intervention such as credit regulation and other consumer protection 
legislation is generally justified as correcting market failures that arise around, for 
example, information asymmetry or misleading and deceptive conduct (Korobkin & 
Ulen, 2000; D. Lowery, 1998). Disclosure based regulation – such as the NCCP 
2009 – therefore rests on the assumption that consumers who are given access to 
adequate information will return to an informed, rational financial decision-making 
model (Ferrell, 2004; Gilson & Kraakman, 1984, pp. 555-556; Waterson, 2003). 
Although disclosure-based regulation typically has not mandated lenders’ provide 
targeted, plain-language information to assist consumers, Capuano and Ramsay 
(2011) argue that vulnerable consumers often display lower levels of financial 
literacy. Thus, regulatory intervention is justified to address difficulties customers 
face in unbundling complex pricing structures such as those found in mortgage 
contracts. Historically, studies around information asymmetry in car sales, insurance 
and mobile phone contracting (e.g. Akerlof, 1970a; Chivers & Flores, 2002; 
Williamson, 1973) have resulted in the introduction of prescribed contracts in those 
fields (Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth); Telecommunications (Consumer 
Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999 (Cth)). Therefore, the efficacy of legal 
intervention – such as the KFS – would, according to Rothenberg (1962, p. 269), be 
judged by the extent to which it preserves ‘consumer sovereignty’ as ‘a criterion for 
evaluating the social desirability of different social situations and, through these, the 
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desirability of the various public policies or institutional structures which give rise to 
them’. 
However, recent legal and economic studies around the effectiveness of 
disclosure based regulatory schemes in consumer credit contexts challenge the 
validity of this premise. Behavioural economists are positioned at the intersection 
between psychology and economics, and they question the assumption that 
consumers who are provided with sufficient information will, indeed, make 
informed, rational financial choices (Camerer, 2004). Accordingly, behavioural 
scholars call into question the empirical foundations of neoliberalism’s claims and 
responses to market failure; instead, behavioural biases that consumers may exhibit 
that do not align with ‘rational consumer’ behaviour are highlighted (Allais & 
Hagen, 1979; Ellsberg, 1961; Simon, 1957). 
3.1.1 Behavioural economics applied 
KFS, used properly, have the potential to empower borrowers to make accurate 
decisions despite several noted departures from the predicted behaviour of neoliberal 
economic theory. BDT focuses on observing, rather than predicting, how consumers 
use information and create preferences (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). As Scott 
notes, cognitive psychology ‘specifically examines internal processes, mental 
limitations, and the way in which the process of individual judgments is shaped by 
these limitations’ (1985, pp. 333-334). Behavioural decision theorists in consumer 
contracting contexts, such as the home mortgage market, therefore explore the 
impact that individuals’ limited cognitive capacity has on their abilities to gather and 
process information.  
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To combat information overload in complex decision-making, decision-makers 
tend to introduce ‘mental shortcuts’ or heuristics to facilitate choice. This is 
documented along with the associated decision-making biases that often flow from 
these shortcuts (Eisenberg, 1995; Hillman, 1999; Scott, 1985). The widespread 
presence of heuristics in decision-making is then used to explain how sub-optimal 
decision-making outcomes – that is, those decisions that do not advance wealth 
maximisation outcomes – eventuate in the context of the rational decision-making 
models. Indeed, as Lee concludes, ‘the approach to rationality taken by heuristics 
and biases literature [arguably suggests] human beings are not particularly good at 
thinking rationally’ (1998, p. 81). 
From a behavioural perspective, decision-makers face three key limitations 
which may cause them to depart from traditional economic predictions: bounded 
self-interest, willpower, and rationality (Camerer, 2004, p. 2; Jolls, Sunstein, & 
Thaler, 1998; Thaler, 1996):  
 Bounded self-interest means that people care, or act as if they care, about 
others’ interests, wishing to be treated fairly and doing the same to others 
even at the expense of economic gain.  
 Bounded willpower refers to the fact that human beings often take actions 
they know to be in conflict with their long-term interests and goals because 
they lack perfect self-control. Cooling-off periods are an example of a 
bounded willpower approach to protecting a decision-maker’s best interests 
(Jolls et al., 1998, p. 1479).  
 Bounded rationality posits that people have finite cognitive processing 
power and often make mistakes when dealing with complex information 
(Simon, 1956, 1972). To attempt to compensate for these limitations, 
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decision-makers often use techniques that result in biased judgements, 
which in turn can lead to poor decision-making (Jolls et al., 1998).  
Irrational and non-rational behaviour are, however, distinguishable: any 
departure from rationality that occurs due to one of these three bounds is considered 
non-rational but not irrational behaviour. That is, so long as the behaviour can be 
considered rational when accounting for the limits the decision-maker faces, such as 
limited access to information, the decision-maker’s actions are not considered to be 
irrational (Gigerenzer, 1997). 
The third limitation – that of bounded rationality – is the principal focus of this 
thesis. In the context of the home mortgage industry, the multitude of variables that 
make up loan packages stand to overwhelm the borrower’s ability to gather and 
analyse information, given that their mental capacity and time are both limited. In 
this context, scholars have readily argue that the introduction of heuristic shortcuts is 
non-rational but not irrational (e.g. Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer, 
Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999; Simon, 1990). This thesis argues that KFS are 
one potential means of mitigating this non-rational aspect, enhancing the overall 
effectiveness of borrowers’ decision-making.  
3.1.2 Bounded rationality and home loans 
Credit transactions, beyond home loan contexts, have commonly been shown 
to involve issues of bounded rationality. Duggan (2010) identifies two particular 
biases in credit transactions that cause consumers to underestimate repayment needs 
and, therefore, their capacity to afford credit (see also Bar-Gill, 2004). Duggan 
argues that the optimism bias, in which decision-makers tend to be overoptimistic 
about risks and future outcomes (see also Van den Steen, 2004), and imperfect self-
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control (bounded willpower) lead to hyperbolic discounting or ‘the discrepancy 
between a consumer’s initial estimates and intention and the reality of future 
borrowing and transacting’ (Ali et al., 2012, p. 128; Cvjetanovic, 2013). This 
difference occurs irrespective of the level of disclosure. Ali et al. describe the 
disconnect between the neoclassical approach to disclosure-based regulation and 
BDT findings as: ‘[d]isclosure based regulation is insufficient to address these biases 
in part because providing information that is untargeted, complex and disseminated 
at the wrong time does not help vulnerable consumers’ (2012, p. 5).  
How detailed disclosure of home loan information intersects with consumers’ 
limited cognitive processing powers sits at the core of this thesis. Information 
disclosure for rational decision-making purposes can only be effective to the extent 
that it (a) is read/considered/understood and (b) modifies loan selection behaviour 
accordingly (Howells, 2005). Scholars have long highlighted that individuals have 
‘limited intelligence’ (e.g. Adams, 1886, p. 103), ‘incomplete rationality’ (e.g. 
Oakeley, 1922, p. 435), or ‘limited rationality’ (e.g. Almond, 1945, p. 224; Simon, 
1947, pp. 39-41, 80-84). The modern formulation of this problem as bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1955) is an extension of this recognition. It rests on the precept 
that a decision-maker often lacks some combination of (a) information, (b) sufficient 
time or (c) sufficient cognitive power to assess the alternatives available to them and 
the consequences of their decision (March, 1978; Simon, 1972). This is more likely 
to occur when a task is complex.  
Additionally, Howells argues that for consumers to even ‘stand a chance at 
making an optimal decision’ they would first need to ‘learn the appropriate norms of 
credit and savings behaviour’ to become ‘financially literate’ (Howells, 2005, p. 356; 
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see also Marotta-Wurgler, 2012). Data around Australia’s standard numeracy levels 
indicates that many potential lenders may not have the requisite skills. In its 2006 
Adult Literacy Survey, the Australian Bureau of Statistics described numeracy levels 
as relatively low, with approximately 53% of Australians assessed at Level 1 or 2 on 
a 5-point scale of literacy proficiency (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006). Level 5 
is the highest level of literacy with Level 3 described by survey developers as the 
‘minimum level of financial literacy individuals require to meet the complex 
demands of everyday life and work in the emerging knowledge-based economy’ 
(ABS, 2006, p. 2). In this context, the importance of ensuring that borrowers have 
ready access to data that is pre-calculated and accurate in its comparative content is 
evident. The KFS constitutes one such equalising tool. 
In the context of a home loan, the sheer volume of product attributes contained 
in mortgage contracts often overwhelms a decision-maker’s limited cognitive powers 
to process the associated information (Chioveanu & Zhou, 2013; Eppler & Mengis, 
2004; O'Shea, 2010). The number of home loan alternatives on offer further 
compounds this. Therefore, limitations on individual cognition mean that collecting 
and processing the complex, financial information required to arrive at an optimal 
home loan decision is a very high-cost activity (Bettman & Park, 1980; Eisenberg, 
1995; Payne et al., 1993) and may exceed the cognitive capacity of borrowers. 
3.1.3 Complexity in the home loan market 
Prior literature has highlighted the complexities of home loan decision-making 
and the challenges this poses for borrowers (Lacko & Pappalardo, 2007; Malbon, 
1999; O'Shea, 2010; O’Shea & Finn, 2005). In order to judge the suitability of a 
home loan, a borrower must consider the multiple dimensions that comprise the 
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product. These include, but are not limited to, the price of the credit, flexibility of 
repayment options and the availability of finance. Further, because a home loan is 
not a one-off purchase, but requires a borrower to enter into a long-term relationship 
with the lender, the borrower must also consider the characteristics of the lender and 
the borrower’s relationship with them (Devlin, 2002; Ford & Jones, 2001). 
A large component of home loan complexity stems from the fact that each of 
these dimensions comprises multiple attributes, all of which can have significant 
implications for the suitability of the home loan product and the borrowing 
experience. For instance, the cost of a home loan, which is the focus of this 
legislation and therefore this thesis, is only one dimension of the borrowing decision 
but even this single dimension involves a number of attributes, such as interest rates, 
application or establishment fees, ongoing fees, break fees for fixed loans (which 
vary depending on the fixed term remaining), discharge fees and a number of small 
service fees that may be charged (multiple times) based on the borrower’s use of 
specified services (Chioveanu & Zhou, 2013). 
This problem grows more complex the further the decision is explored. Interest 
rates, which make up the majority of loan costs, have many subtle (or not-so-subtle) 
differences across different loan options. Interest rates can be fixed or variable. 
Sometimes multiple interest rates apply to the same loan, such as a honeymoon rate 
which offers a discounted interest rate for the first few years of the loan or where a 
borrower chooses to split the loan between fixed and variable rates. Some loans have 
discount rates for high loan values, or charge higher rates on higher loan-to-value 
ratios, which may not be obvious in certain disclosures or advertisements. Further, 
the loan term and repayment frequencies may vary, each having substantial effects 
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on the short- and long-term costs to the borrower. And so on. Clearly a home loan 
contract has sufficient information complexity to produce problems of bounded 
rationality in the decision-maker. 
A borrower, therefore, is required to consider multiple variables and important 
trade-offs between long- and short-term outcomes even when assessing just the 
single dimension of loan cost. Given the value of most mortgage contracts, even 
seemingly trivial differences in these dimensions can have significant effects on the 
borrower’s financial outcome. For instance, a simple 0.1% difference in interest rate 
on a loan of $300,000 amounts to an additional $7,084.80 over a 30-year loan term. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, this complexity was often combined with lengthy 
pre-contractual home loan disclosure prior to January 2012. Thus, bounded 
rationality borrowers faced significant informational barriers to making an informed 
decision about their home loan options. Not only is it unlikely that a borrower would 
consider and compare all the information available to them, but scholars argued that 
it was also unreasonable to expect them to attempt to do so (Eisenberg, 1995). 
3.1.4 Heuristics and biases 
Given the complexity of home loan decisions and the pre-2012 disclosure 
regime, borrowers would likely need to find alternatives to the rational decision 
model to make complex loan decisions. Research has long documented how 
decision-makers use heuristics to manage the amount of information they are 
required to process when making complex decisions. In these cases the decision-
maker chooses to rely on a quick, crude judgement, often based upon a combination 
of prior knowledge, experience and patterns in the decision environment (Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2012). This stands in stark contrast to the effortful calculations and 
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assessments required in rational decision-making (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; Payne 
et al., 1993; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Employing heuristics reduces the time and 
effort required to make the decision, freeing the decision maker to make complex 
decisions despite the bounds on their computing speed and power. This is 
accomplished, however, at the risk of sacrificing decision accuracy (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008; Simon, 1990) and of causing biases in the decision process, 
which can lead to predictable, systematic errors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
In most cases, heuristics require a trade-off between accuracy and efficiency; 
they are neither inherently positive nor negative. Therefore, where the decision-
maker uses heuristics, they often seek an option which satisfies a minimum set of 
criteria rather than attempting to search for the optimal solution (Simon, 1956). 
However, researchers have recently stressed that heuristics may also be intentionally 
employed as a decision-making strategy which, in the right environment, may 
provide more accurate judgements than more complex measures of choice 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). In many contexts, where the number of alternative 
attributes or strategies is quite large, such as chess (Simon, 1972), research indicates 
that heuristic based judgements can match or beat those based on complex 
algorithms and models. In such contexts heuristics can arrive at better or similar 
decisions more quickly and with less effort from the decision-maker (Camerer & 
Loewenstein, 2004; Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999; Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996). However, even in these contexts, decision heuristics can still lead 
to predictable and systematic errors and biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
In this sense, the first stage of this research aims to extend this literature by 
examining the effect of decision heuristics in the context of home loan decision-
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making. This is important because heuristics and their resulting biases often apply 
differently in different contexts (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Kenrick et al., 
2009). Even when the comparison of home loan offers is simplified solely to price, 
home loan decisions require borrowers to consider an unusually complex set of 
information. As discussed in Chapter 2, the standard form contracts used for loan 
transactions are often too long and detailed for borrowers to readily comprehend and 
compare them (Eisenberg, 1995; Rakoff, 1982; Trebilcock, 1997). Consequently, 
researchers often argue that heuristics are vital for borrowers to manage complex 
decisions, such as home loans, while facing their own cognitive limitations (see 
Marewski & Schooler, 2011) because heuristics allow borrowers to ignore the 
overwhelming amount of relevant loan information when making a decision 
(Fishburn, 1967, 1974; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999; Paredes, 2003; Tversky, 
1972).  
Given that borrowers face cognitive limitations, heuristics may be particularly 
beneficial in helping them make the home loan decision from the overwhelming 
amount of information available. A wealth of psychological research demonstrates 
that as the complexity of a decision increases, an individual’s decision accuracy 
decreases (Eppler & Mengis, 2004; Miller, 1956; Schroder et al., 1967). For 
instance, research has shown that, at the upper limit, a decision-maker can handle 
around 10 items of information at any one time (Malhotra, 1982; Schroder et al., 
1967; Streufert, 1970; Streufert & Driver, 1965; Streufert, Suedfeld, & Driver, 
1965). 43  Beyond this limit decision-makers suffer from information overload 
whereby the information becomes too complex or is provided too quickly for the 
user to comprehend and incorporate into the decision (Case, 2012, pp. 103-108; 
                                                            
43 Other studies have produced more conservative results which suggest the limit may lie closer to 
seven (plus or minus two) items of information (Keller & Staelin, 1987; Miller, 1956). 
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Eppler & Mengis, 2004; Landers & Rohner, 1978).44 Consequently, the complexity 
of the home loan decision task means that it is not feasible for borrowers to 
efficiently employ comprehensive strategies for search and comparison (Eisenberg, 
1995; Marewski & Schooler, 2011; e.g. the weighted additive model proposed by 
Payne et al., 1993). In these circumstances, untargeted disclosure is unlikely to alter 
a borrower’s purchasing habits irrespective of the information contained in the 
disclosure. Untargeted disclosure is therefore ineffective (Kofele-Kale, 1984). 
Consequently, it is vital to understand if, and how, the information contained by the 
KFS interacts with borrowers’ heuristic judgements of loan cost when designing 
legislation aimed at improving borrowers’ loan choice. 
3.1.5 Dual process theories of decision-making 
Many models propose that heuristics are used in tandem with other calculating 
forms of decision-making, whereby people use dual processing systems when they 
form judgements (e.g. Chaiken & Trope, 1999; S. Epstein, 1994). In these models, 
cognitive processes can be separated into two main systems:  
1) An intuitive system which is responsible for an individual’s initial 
judgement. This system relies on the direct use of heuristics to economise 
on effort but is susceptible to releasing biased judgements (Cacioppo, 
Petty, & Kao, 1984; Chaiken & Trope, 1999) 
2) A rule-based system thought to be a conscious and deliberate attempt to 
correct for errors in intuitive judgements. These judgements require effort 
and take much longer, following a set of rules to arrive at accurate 
                                                            
44 In a supermarket context, Jacoby, Speller, and Berning (1974) found signs of information overload 
in shopper behavior when around 12 items of information were contained on product labels. At this 
point they found that borrowers began ignoring some of the information presented to them. 
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decisions (S. Epstein, 1994; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996).  
However, biases resulting from the heuristics used by the intuitive system can 
persist even when decision-makers use rule-based systems to make a decision 
(Gilbert, McNulty, Giuliano, & Benson, 1992). Researchers have provided several 
explanations for the inability of the rule-based system to completely remove bias 
from the initial, intuitive judgement. These include: 
 overconfidence in the judgement, which may arise because it comes to 
mind effortlessly (Simmons & Nelson, 2006)  
 laziness (Cacioppo et al., 1984; Petty & Wegener, 1999)  
 cognitive limitations (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988) 
 stopping at the first plausible answer (Epley & Gilovich, 2004, 2006; 
Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Therefore it is insufficient to argue that biases will not occur simply because of 
the importance of home loan decisions or because borrowers deliberately try 
compare the available alternatives. Rather, the importance of the decision only 
increases the necessity of reducing or preventing these biases from occurring in the 
first place – either through combating the use of the heuristics that lead to these 
biases, or by minimising the resulting biases as much as possible. KFS stand to 
improve decision-making through the latter. KFS do not attempt to empower 
borrowers to digest all the terms and conditions of the contract. Rather, KFS, where 
successful, draw the decision-maker’s attention to key variables that empower 
heuristics judgement processes, so they can more accurately evaluate price without 
increasing cognitive load. 
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Finally, the use of heuristics, while often done intuitively, may also be adopted 
as a deliberate decision-making strategy. Payne et al. (1993) argue that decision-
makers may consciously choose between intuitive and comprehensive search 
strategies by consciously weighing up trade-offs between efficiency and accuracy 
before selecting the most desirable strategy (see also Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011). Subsequent research, however, has demonstrated that the decision-making 
strategy adopted is dependent on the task environment and, more specifically, the 
ease with which information may be acquired (Platzer & Bröder, 2012; Söllner et al., 
2013). Therefore, by understanding the environment surrounding home loan 
decisions, vital insight can be gained into the decision strategies available to 
borrowers and how KFS are likely to affect the outcome of these strategies. 
In summary of the work so far, in order to deal with cognitive limitations, 
decision-makers often use mental heuristics to economise on time and effort when 
making decisions. The complexity of the home loan market is also likely to force 
borrowers to rely on these heuristic processes to make efficient decisions, given the 
overwhelming volume of information and time considerations. In ignoring 
information, however, these heuristic judgements often lead to systematic biases 
which result in borrowers choosing a sub-optimal loan. The following section builds 
on this by examining how borrowers select the information on which they base their 
comparisons. In doing so it aims to provide insight into the specific obstacles that 
may undermine the effectiveness of KFS in improving borrower decision-making. 
3.1.6 Information accessibility and disclosure design 
Research into decision heuristics has found that people’s judgements are often 
influenced by the amount and intensity of the information accessed in the course of a 
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particular task (Kahneman, 2003; Koriat, 1993; Kusev & Van Schaik, 2011; Tulving 
& Pearlstone, 1966). How easily a cue may be retrieved or calculated (its 
accessibility) therefore determines, at least in part, how heavily decision-makers 
weight it when forming a judgement (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). This has two 
key implications for prescribed disclosure. First, when considering a disclosure 
document, decision-makers are more likely to focus on familiar information, or 
information which draws their attention, over more valid information. Where this 
occurs, the bias is referred to as ‘availability bias’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 
1974). This forms the focus of the first stage of this thesis which investigates how 
the design of KFS affects the information borrowers consider when presented with 
home loan disclosure (Hoek, Gendall, Rapson, & Louviere, 2011; Söllner et al., 
2013). How availability bias affects which information a decision-maker considers 
when examining a disclosure document is discussed below. More broadly, when 
searching for information, decision-makers often rely on more accessible 
information sources even where they are aware of and have access to more reliable 
information (Menzel & Katz, 1955; O'Reilly, 1982). This is considered in the second 
stage of the research and discussed in Section 3.2. 
As heuristics form judgements based on limited information, the accuracy of 
their judgements depends largely on the information borrowers choose to consider. 
Prior research shows that the information borrowers focus on is largely affected by 
the decision-making task and environment (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012). Research has 
found that heuristics often provide better decisions (in terms of a trade-off between 
time and effort and accuracy) than more complex decision processes when there is 
(a) a moderate-to-high level of uncertainty surrounding the attributes of an 
alternative (including how they will evolve in the future (Hogarth & Karelaia, 
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2007)), and (b) a moderate-to-high correlation between attributes (Dieckmann & 
Rieskamp, 2007; Naylor & Schenck, 1968). In particular, positive correlation 
between attributes means that the comparison of these attributes will lead to the same 
or similar indication of an alternative’s quality. Such correlation may coexist 
between multiple attributes, or one attribute in particular may share correlation with 
several others (which do not necessarily have to correlate with one another).  
Considering attributes which share strong positive correlations with others 
allows decision-makers to indirectly incorporate the effect (or part of the effect) the 
correlated attributes have on the quality of an alternative without increasing their 
cognitive load. This is termed cue redundancy, and occurs where multiple attributes 
provide overlapping indications about an alternative’s quality, thus reducing or 
eliminating the benefit of (and need for) comparing each item individually (Naylor & 
Dickinson, 1969). Cue redundancy increases the quality of judgements based on 
incomplete information (Bröder, Newell, & Platzer, 2010; Newell & Lee, 2011; 
Söllner et al., 2013). The greater the overlap in attributes, the greater the redundancy 
in comparing additional correlated attributes. Thus, a product with many highly 
correlated attributes (or one attribute that correlates with many others) may be easier 
to compare than a product with fewer attributes that do not overlap if the decision-
maker concentrates on the key correlated attribute(s). 
Therefore, providing targeted information in a cleaner format significantly 
helps borrowers identify and comprehend loan costs (Furletti, 2005, June; Keller & 
Staelin, 1987; Lacko & Pappalardo, 2007; Macro International, 2007; O'Shea, 2010) 
and improves users’ understanding of the loan agreement (Day & Brandt, 1974; 
O’Shea & Finn, 2005). Research has found that certain formatting techniques, such 
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as using dot points or tables as opposed to text (Hoek et al., 2011; Söllner et al., 
2013), or framing information in a particular way can influence a decision-maker’s 
perception of the importance of information, costs or risks (e.g. Bettman, Payne, & 
Staelin, 1986; Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Hutton & 
Wilkie, 1980). Where applied correctly, formatting can therefore be used to draw 
users’ attention to attributes which better represent the overall quality of the 
alternative. This, in turn, increases consideration, retention and comprehension of 
key information, enhancing decision accuracy without increasing cognitive costs 
(Hoek et al., 2011; Malbon, 1999; O'Shea, 2010; Söllner et al., 2013). Careless use 
of formatting, however, by making poor quality or decision-irrelevant information 
more prominent, may reduce decision accuracy, because decision-makers do not 
ignore prominent information even where it forms a poor base for a particular 
decision (Platzer & Bröder, 2012). 
Studies of Australian consumers clearly demonstrate the impact information 
formatting has on the attention they pay to certain attributes. Studies in the health 
industry have shown that headlining or outlining structures around key information 
is of critical importance because a substantial majority of prescribed drug users were 
found to ignore – or, at best, skim read – warning labels (Aiken, Swasy, & Braman, 
2004). In finance, excessive or lengthy information, high-level language and poor 
formatting of credit disclosure lead to poor understanding of its content (D. G. 
Wood, 2006).  
Credit cards and home loans industries similarly reflect these results. After 
interviewing both lenders and borrowers, (Malbon, 1999) concluded that borrowers 
focus primarily on the headlining information in disclosures but often fail to 
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comprehend key costs and features of a loan. Rather than estimating total costs, 
borrowers truncate their calculations by basing forecast costs on individual pricing 
variables, such as interest rates (Ewing, 2006). O’Shea (2010), who conducted the 
formative study for the Commonwealth Treasury White Paper from which the 
National Consumer Credit Protection Amendment (Home Loans and Credit Cards) 
Bill 2011 is largely derived, similarly noted that several respondents, in the absence 
of total cost estimates, gravitated to an offer which emphasised no upfront fees 
although it carried higher costs overall.  
O’Shea’s study (2010) further emphasised the importance of reframing 
disparate loan costs as a single figure for a loan. When the tested disclosure 
combined the multiple fees, charges and interest repayments into a single figure, 
borrowers were more likely to understand the loan’s cost and avoid bias. Even when 
the additional disclosure did not provide the decision-makers with any information 
that was not already available to them, its presence enhanced decision-making under 
the experimental conditions. 
Notably however, O’Shea examines the information which is produced after 
the application of the home loan. As noted by the Australian Government, this 
information is aimed at helping borrowers to assess their rights and obligations under 
the credit contract, not to compare individual loan offers (Australian Government, 
2010). Consequently the primary focus of O’Shea’s research, and prior research into 
home loan decision-making (e.g. Malbon, 1999; O’Shea & Finn, 2005), has been the 
comprehension of the loan costs and other obligations a borrower will face under the 
contract. The first stage of the research covered in Chapter 4 extends the study 
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conducted by O’Shea (2010) by examining the quality of information available to 
borrowers during the window when they are comparing loans.  
The use of information available prior to a formal application for a loan has 
two key benefits, in particular. First, it tests the quality of borrowers’ decision-
making based on the information available to borrowers at the time they are 
comparing loan offers as opposed to the information available post-application. Here 
there is a difference in both the purpose and quality of the information. Therefore, it 
is possible that even where borrowers have the same or even lower-quality 
information, they may still be able to accurately compare the cost of different home 
loan products (e.g. by comparing interest rates). At the same time, however, the pre-
contractual disclosure provided post-application is subject to heavier regulation than 
that provided to borrowers during the shopping process. As such, the information 
available to borrowers for comparing loans is often more inconsistent in terms of 
format, content and terminology, which also stands to reduce borrowers’ ability to 
accurately access loan information and select the most cost-effective loan.  
Second, the experimental design in Stage 1 adds to the literature by examining 
whether the increased comprehension discovered in previous studies applies to KFS. 
In doing so, the research looks to determine whether the key principles in effective 
disclosure literature have been correctly applied to KFS. This is important because 
even slight differences in format and content, such as the inclusion of an irrelevant 
photo (Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zinman, 2010), can significantly 
influence borrowers’ reactions to a disclosure document. 
The above literature has informed the research conducted in Chapter 4 which 
focuses on the effectiveness of KFS documents as a mechanism to improve the 
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accuracy of borrowers’ decisions. In doing so it has built primarily towards 
informing the first research question: 
RQ1: Do KFS help people identify the most cost-effective loan from among a 
number of alternatives? 
The following sections now turn to the literature surrounding home loan 
borrowers’ decision processes to determine the use and role of KFS in practice. In 
the process the following section shifts the focus towards understanding the broader 
effectiveness of the regulatory approach adopted to enhance borrower decision-
making. 
3.2 Home loan decision processes 
Much of the research discussed above assumes that borrowers collect and 
compare information when evaluating their options. This literature also assumes that 
other aspects of the loan are fungible. However, research into borrowers’ behaviour 
shows that borrowers often have differing loan criteria and conduct varying amounts 
of search, considering and ignoring different sources of information. As the practical 
effectiveness of KFS relies on their use, this research now examines the how 
borrowers collect information and the type of information they value when 
comparing loan alternatives and explores the implications this is has for KFS use. 
As noted above in Section 3.1.3, the level of complexity of a home loan 
product may significantly alter consumer decision-making processes (Devlin & 
Ennew, 1997; Harrison, 2000; McKechnie, 1992; Weenig & Maarleveld, 2002). 
While the previous sections have covered the effect this has on the information 
borrowers’ focus when comparing alternatives, it also has significant implications 
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for their choice criteria and search processes. Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) argue that 
where a product’s intrinsic cues are difficult to assess, such as with home loan 
pricing schemes, consumers often turn to extrinsic cues such as brand name 
(Bharadwaj, Varadarajan, & Fahy, 1993), advertising (Zeithaml, 1988), and the 
strength of the customer/supplier relationship (Nayyar, 1990). Where this occurs in 
Australia, and borrowers base their decisions on non-loan information, their decision 
criteria may prevent the effective use of KFS.  
UK studies support the findings that bottom line pricing is often non-
determinative of home loan choice. In 2002, a study of 4,200 home loan borrowers 
Devlin (2002) found that more than half of respondents’ decisions were made 
primarily on the basis of professional advice (16.8%), the fact the borrower had prior 
experience with a lender (15.4%), or the loan term (9.42%). This is consistent with 
research conducted by Ford and Jones (2001), which found that 24% of borrowers 
took out a loan with a lender they had dealt with previously, and a further 10% chose 
not to shop around at all. Similarly, research conducted by Illuminas for the 
Financial Services Authority in 2008 found that borrowers continued to rely heavily 
on third-party advice after the release of the UK’s ‘Key Facts Illustrations’ (KFI). 
This research showed that third-party advice largely limited borrowers’ use of and 
reliance on KFI information (Illuminas, 2008, p. 27). Notably, the research showed 
that the borrowers whose search processes were most likely to yield KFI were also 
those most likely to use them. Where borrowers base their decision on criteria other 
than price, the potential benefits of KFS are reduced and may even be irrelevant.  
Behavioural economists, as noted in Section 3.1.3, explain this by referring to 
heuristics’ reliance on immediately accessible, though potentially less valid, data 
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(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008; Simon, 1990). A key 
variable in this respect is interpersonal communication; that is, reliance on third-
party advice, on prior relationships and/or on particular formats of communication. 
In Greece, Mylonakis (2007) surveyed 182 mortgage borrowers as to the source – or 
sources – of information they used during their home loan decisions. The vast 
majority of borrowers (84%) reported visiting their current bank to request 
information and advice. Only a quarter (26%), however, reported willingness to 
consider information from brochures or the internet. A marked preference for ‘live’ 
or personalised advice also resulted in higher levels of reliance on advice from 
friends or family (64%) or on an associate who worked for a bank (53%). Reliance 
on a professional adviser was reported to be much lower at only 18.6%. Although 
this figure is supported by Devlin (2002), it contrasted with several other studies 
which put this figure higher at around 30–50% (Council of Mortgage Lenders, 1999; 
Financial Services Consumer Panel, 1999a; Ford & Jones, 2001, p. 20). Only 15.3% 
of the borrowers who sought further information based on advertising. Consumers’ 
preference for personal contact, as opposed to using written or electronic material, in 
complex financial services situations was further affirmed by Kalbaugh (2002).  
For KFS use, if borrowers rely heavily on third-party advice as the preferred 
means of information gathering and decision-making, then collecting or considering 
KFS may be a significantly less desirable option. In the context of online access to 
KFS, such heavy reliance on information provided ‘in person’ would be expected to 
rule out, to a significant extent, the usefulness of the electronic calculator provisions. 
It is particularly telling that, in the UK, similar results were found both in markets 
with KFI available and in markets lacking this documentation (Financial Services 
Consumer Panel, 1999b; Ford & Jones, 2001; Illuminas, 2008). Logically, borrowers 
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taking non-price oriented routes to their final product selection, as seen in these 
studies, may not only forego using KFS data but also are unlikely to even become 
aware of their existence. At best, the legislative impact of KFS may therefore be, in 
practical terms, a minimal enhancement in borrower utility. 
The second stage of the research, contained in Chapter 5, extends the literature 
surrounding home loan choice. It examines if, and how, the release of a targeted 
disclosure document, in particular the KFS, can influence the home loan comparison 
processes and decision criteria of Australian borrowers. By undertaking studies in 
context, factors which may undermine the effectiveness of prescribed disclosure 
instruments generally, and KFS specifically, in the home loan market are 
documented for the first time, extending the original O'Shea (2010)laboratory study. 
This informs research questions 2 and 3: 
RQ2: What role, if any, do KFS play in borrowers’ loan decisions? 
RQ3: What factors, if any, limit the effectiveness of KFS in practice? 
This contributes to research into heuristics and biases by adding a tangible 
field application of heuristic success/failure which, as Simon (1990, p. 7), points out 
is critical because theory alone cannot gauge actual results. Experimental research 
designs, while fundamental, necessarily produce results subject to a range of 
assumptions which, in turn, may produce flawed outcomes (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011). This thesis contributes both theoretical and concrete studies 
around the impact of KFS on borrower decision-making in the home loan market. It 
documents borrower, lender and market experience over the three-year window since 
KFS were introduced, providing a unique snapshot to Johnson and Weber’s concerns 
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as to how an environment with perfect information translates in a world with less 
than perfect information (Johnson & Weber, 2009). 
3.3 Lender disincentives towards clear price disclosure 
The final body of literature reviewed in this chapter informs the research 
conducted in the third stage of the thesis. Consequently, the focus now shifts to the 
literature surrounding lenders’ incentives and disincentives for disclosing KFS. 
As noted in Section 2.4.2, requirements of the NCCP 2009 significantly differ 
from the UK regulations under the Mortgage Conduct of Business (MCOB) rules 
given that Australian borrowers are required to request a KFS from a lender in order 
to be provided with one. For borrowers to successfully request a KFS from a lender, 
or locate one online, they must be aware of KFS exist. Failing widespread 
foreknowledge of KFS, lenders’ KFS disclosure practices become critical to the 
success of the legislation. Understanding lenders’ incentives to provide this 
information can provide insight into the implications these requirements have for 
legislative effectiveness. 
From the lender’s point of view, effective decision-making is undesirable as it 
reduces support for uncompetitive loans, thereby increasing the competitive 
pressures lenders face (Carlin, 2009; Korobkin, 2003). Lenders in markets with 
complex products therefore have an incentive, as a whole, to promote confusion 
among customers instead of competing to attract them (Carlin, 2009; Scitovsky, 
1950). One way competitors may do this is through creating intentionally complex 
price structures for products to make it more difficult for borrowers to identifying the 
most cost-effective product (Ellison & Ellison, 2009).  
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This reduces the likelihood that a customer will search for cheaper loan offers 
and may even prevent them from understanding what constitutes a competitive 
product (Asher, 2010; Bayern, 2009; Mackie, 2008). In this way, firms are able to 
prevent their customers from making meaningful and accurate comparisons between 
their products and those of their competitors. This has been found to be the case even 
where firms are competitive because some level of obfuscation in the market 
prevents fierce competition from eroding their profits (Carlin, 2009). 
Consequently, the introduction of KFS, the government intends to simplify 
price comparisons, runs contrary to lenders’ best interests. This is a serious concern 
for KFS effectiveness because lender disclosure practices are potentially critical to 
the provision of KFS. In this vein, research conducted by consumer watchdog 
Choice (2012) found that lenders’ disclosure practices did not result in the provision 
of KFS to borrowers who made general enquiries for pricing information. Choice 
(2012) found that only one of the 18 instances in which their mystery shoppers 
requested rate and fee information from a lender (without any reference to a ‘fact 
sheet’) resulted in a KFS, and only after the shopper had asked four times. These 
results were similar to findings in the UK which showed that lenders often either 
failed to provide KFI when required to do so, or did so at the incorrect time 
(Financial Services Authority, 2006). This raises a key question regarding the 
effectiveness of the legislation: 
RQ4: How do the disclosure requirements for KFS impact the likelihood that 
borrowers will receive one? 
By addressing this question, the research conducted in Chapter 6 further 
investigates the permissive nature of the legislation and the potential barriers that this 
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may create in a world where borrowers do not seek out every available source of 
information. In doing so it seeks to determine any disclosure practices that may 
prevent borrowers from receiving KFS. Specifically, it examines how lenders 
respond to requests for costing information using varying levels of reference to KFS. 
Further, it examines potential barriers to the way KFS generators are being hosted 
and promoted on lenders’ websites.  
3.4 Summary of contributions to research 
Building upon this literature, this thesis tracks the effectiveness of KFS and the 
implementation of regulation surrounding their provision on patterns of consumer 
decision-making behaviour in the home loan mortgage market since commencement 
in 2012. In this respect, it constitutes the first such study in this field. The results 
contribute to discussions of the relevancy of the two schools of regulatory reform, 
and how, in practical terms, KFS are used by borrowers. 
First, Chapter 4 uses experimental design to extend the research into pre-
contractual home loan decision-making. This is done by testing the effectiveness of 
KFS in improving borrowers’ comparisons of loan options. This extends the 
literature by examining whether disclosure aimed at improving borrower 
comprehension of loan costs can successfully empower borrowers to compare the 
cost of loan offers more accurately than when they use the information offered by 
lenders at the time borrowers are comparing loans. It also examines the relationship 
between the accessibility of key attributes and the number of borrowers who 
consider them, as well as how consideration of the different variables correlates with 
the accuracy of the users’ judgements of loan cost.  
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Chapters 5 and 6 then use semi-structured interviews with recent borrowers 
and direct observation of lenders’ KFS disclosure behaviour to investigate the impact 
of the potential barriers to KFS effectiveness in practice. This research contributes to 
the literature by advancing comprehension of how prescribed disclosure may best be 
used to enhance borrower decision-making behaviour. Further, the research builds on 
the research conducted in Chapter 4 to examine how heuristic decision-making 
processes affect borrower decision criteria and search processes in practice, as well 
as the impact KFS have on these variables. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The complex nature of mortgage contracts means that most borrowers suffer 
cognitive limitations which inhibiting them from accurately judging home loan costs. 
In order to cope with these cognitive limitations, many borrowers are likely to use 
heuristic decision processes to reduce the number of attributes that they consider 
when comparing home loan alternatives. The accessibility of these attributes is likely 
to be a prime factor in determining which features they include in their comparisons. 
Therefore, by increasing the accessibility of important information KFS should 
redirect the borrower’s focus onto key pricing attributes and help them select the 
most cost effective loan.  
In particular, the thesis argues that KFS bring consumers’ attention to key 
pricing variables by making an estimated total cost figure available to the borrowers 
in a simple format. When borrowers base a decision on the estimated total cost figure 
they are likely to arrive at a better decision because these estimates rely on the 
current values (or best estimates) of all the factors which affect loan price, including 
the application of the correct discounts and penalties to the interest rate and the loan-
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to-value ratio for the desired loan details supplied by the borrower. Thus, where 
borrowers choose to focus on these estimates they indirectly consider the effects that 
all these variables have on price and, through this, the final quality of the loan 
alternative. 
In practice, however, numerous factors may influence the success of the 
legislation. A borrower’s knowledge of KFS and the process through which they 
collect and compare information (and whether they do this at all) will greatly affect 
whether or not they will directly benefit from KFS. Further, prior research suggests 
that the requirement for borrowers to seek KFS may undermine the effectiveness of 
KFS in practice.  
The following chapters seek to extend this literature through studies designed 
to investigate the impact KFS have on the home loan comparison process. Chapter 4 
begins this process by examining the ability of KFS to improve borrowers’ 
judgements of loan price. This then serves as a base for evaluating KFS as a 
legislative solution to the information asymmetry issues faced by home loan 
borrowers.  
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Chapter 4: Effectiveness of Key Facts Sheets 
Chapters 2 and 3 have highlighted the legislative environment in which home 
loan decisions are made and the effects of human cognition on optimal loan choice, 
respectively. This chapter documents a study to provide a causal claim around the 
impact of KFS on the quality of home loan decisions. Experimental design is used to 
tightly control the context to see if the theoretical principles underpinning KFS 
successfully improve people’s ability to identify the most cost-effective loan from 
among several alternatives. Therefore, the aim of the first study of the thesis is to 
investigate whether the purported transparency and simplicity of KFS successfully 
help borrowers identify the most cost-effective home loan when KFS are used as 
intended (see Chapter 2 for a review of the legislative intent). 
The results from the experiment show that KFS statistically and practically 
improve users’ comprehension of the costs involved in loan products and, 
theoretically, stand to aid borrowers in selecting the most cost-effective loan. These 
results hold for within- and between-subjects analyses and are not affected by the 
order in which the test and control conditions were administered or by differences in 
the scenarios. The results, however, provide no evidence that KFS improve borrower 
decision time. This chapter demonstrates that KFS successfully improve the users’ 
decision-making in the laboratory, forming the base for the research into their impact 
on borrower decision-making in practice, which is conducted in Chapter 5. 
This chapter set outs the methodology used for the experiment, commencing 
with a brief review of the relevant literature to develop the hypotheses. It then sets 
out the design of the experiment including the materials, procedures and participants 
used, before presenting the results and findings. The implications of these findings 
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are then discussed, along with the limitations of the research. The findings in this 
chapter form a basis for the evaluation of the regulatory approach adopted under the 
National Consumer Credit Protection Amendment (Home Loans and Credit Cards) 
Act 2011 (NCCP 2011). This evaluation is then expanded upon by research 
conducted in the following chapters. 
4.1 Methodology 
4.1.1 Hypotheses development 
As detailed in Chapter 3, when borrowers face complex decisions comprising a 
large number of attributes, they are likely to use heuristics to reduce the amount of 
information they need to consider when forming judgements and making 
comparisons (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 2011; Gigerenzer et al., 1999). 
Research into decision-making has found that borrowers’ focus on salient 
information leads to a tendency for decision-makers to favour information that is 
more readily accessible over information which results in a more accurate decision 
(Menzel & Katz, 1955; Platzer & Bröder, 2012; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012). 
Therefore, where borrowers do not consider all the information available to them, 
disclosure can be formatted so that key attributes are easily retrievable to increase 
the likelihood that borrowers will use these attributes and make better quality 
judgements (see also: D. J. Campbell, 1988; Hoek et al., 2011; Kusev, van Schaik, & 
Aldrovandi, 2012; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; R. E. Wood, 1986). These improved 
judgements can then better inform the borrower’s choice of home loan.  
In particular, KFS present an estimate of the total cost of the loan as a dollar 
value which, while simple to understand and compare, is highly correlated to 
numerous variables which influence loan quality. By considering this estimate, 
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borrowers can indirectly incorporate the impact of these correlated variables on 
overall loan quality. This stands to increase the accuracy of judgements provided by 
heuristics which ignore information (Iselin, 1989; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; Todd 
& Gigerenzer, 2012). This is important because prior research has shown that when 
borrowers are presented with the individual costs, they often use these variables in 
their comparisons instead of attempting to estimate the costs themselves (Ewing, 
2006). Based on this logic, access to KFS should assist borrowers to identify the 
most cost-effective loan from a range of alternatives. Stated formally, the first 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Participants provided with KFS will be more likely to identify 
the most cost-effective home loan than those not provided with KFS. 
If KFS do help make pricing information more accessible, then they should 
also make decision-making faster because KFS use standardised terminology and 
formatting and a condensed form (see Chapter 2 for details). Normally, a borrower 
comparing loans can be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of terms contained in a 
home loan, leaving them unable to process the information relevant to the decision 
(Bettman & Park, 1980; Eppler & Mengis, 2004). Individuals facing complex 
cognitive tasks can be led to focus on more salient information cues by tailoring the 
information so that the most valid information is the most prominent. This is because 
decision-makers can more easily focus on relevant, accessible cues (Ewing, 2006; 
Malbon, 1999; Menzel & Katz, 1955; O'Reilly, 1982). Since KFS provide the total 
estimated cost for a loan, it is expected that borrowers with access to KFS will be 
able to compare loans more quickly, reducing the time it takes them to make a 
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decision because they do not need calculations or weighting to arrive at this figure. 
This leads to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Participants provided with KFS will take less time to select a 
home loan from several options compared with participants not supplied with KFS.  
4.1.2 Design 
Given the legislative intent of improving home loan decision quality in 
ordinary Australians (see Chapter 2), a first step in assessing the efficacy of the 
intervention is to examine whether the intervention is capable of producing the 
planned outcome. The most convincing claim is a causal one; that is, the proof that 
providing someone with KFS does in fact improve their home loan cost 
comparisons.  
Causal claims are generally accepted as requiring an experimental design 
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 3). Although experimental findings from a 
laboratory may lack the generalisability of field experiments (Carpenter, Harrison, & 
List, 2005, pp. 1-2), they provide the conditions for controlling confounds and 
extraneous variables that might hinder the causal claim in other research methods. 
Therefore, this study uses an experimental design to see if KFS do in fact alter 
decision quality. Since the legislation was designed to improve the performance of 
naïve borrowers, participants unfamiliar with loans and home borrowing provide an 
ideal theoretical population frame (Webster & Sell, 2007, pp. 66-67). Problems 
caused by a lack of knowledge and skill around home loans are likely to be 
exacerbated in this group; thus, any positive impact from KFS should be more easily 
detected in this group.  
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The hypotheses were tested using a within- and between-subjects single-blind 
experimental design. Put simply, each participant in the study was asked to rank 
order a series of four home loans twice over the course of the experiment (once each 
for two different sets of loans). Each individual was provided with KFS for one 
decision and KFS were withheld for the other decision (see Table 4.1 for more detail 
on the allocation and full design). This allowed comparison of each individual’s 
decision-making in two different loan scenarios (the within-subject design). Results 
for those individuals provided with KFS were directly compared with results for 
those who did not have access to KFS for each scenario (the between-subjects 
design).  
Each participant worked individually to compare and rank four loans in order 
of cost from 1 (lowest cost) to 4 (highest cost). To prevent gaming of results and to 
encourage quality decision-making, participants were rewarded for the accuracy of 
their answers. This provides a similar mechanism to the real world where individuals 
are rewarded more for choosing the least expensive home loan (all other loan 
attributes being equal).  
The scenarios were based on real-world loan details to which two key changes 
were made. First, each item of stimulus was reformatted to remove the impact of the 
financial institution’s branding and marketing. This was necessary to prevent brand 
choice and brand bias from affecting participants’ decisions (Esch, Schmitt, Redler, 
& Langner, 2009).Second, the exact interest rate and loan details of several loans 
were altered to ensure that there was a clear order in terms of loan cost. Each loan 
varied from the others in terms of interest rate, amount and type and there were also 
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varying fee structures. This was to replicate the complexity borrowers face when 
making a decision in practice (see Section 4.1.4. for more details on the materials). 
A key challenge in experimental design is reducing the impact of extraneous 
factors on the experiment’s outcome. Participants were randomly assigned into four 
groups to control for instrument effects and maturation effects. Instrument effects 
occur in experimental methodology where there is a change in the measurement, 
instrument, or stimulus between different conditions. Where these changes in 
conditions have a significant influence on the participants’ responses, they can 
influence the internal validity of the research (Christensen, 2007, p. 337). This was 
controlled by keeping the conditions for each experiment as similar as possible (e.g. 
the instructions, task and loan types across each scenario). A control variable was 
also included to allow for a post-hoc analysis of the influence that the differences in 
scenario had on the dependent variables.  
Control variables were included to account for maturation effects and 
differences in the task stimulus for each group. Maturation effects occur as a result 
of any systematic biological or psychological change over time and can include 
participants becoming more fatigued, bored, experienced or familiar with the 
experiment’s content over the course of the experiment (Kirk, 2004). This effect was 
controlled by using the between-subjects design and the inclusion of a dummy 
variable in the with-in subject-design which was coded 0 if the participant received 
Scenario A first and 1 if the participant received Scenario B first. The sample was 
first divided into two groups and each group received a different scenario. Then the 
groups were divided in two again and the treatment condition was varied. This 
allowed for an evaluation of the difference the treatment document made for 
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participants who received Scenario 1 first, as well as the results from participants 
who received Scenario 2 with the same treatment conditions. A dummy variable was 
also included for the treatment/control nature of the group, resulting in a 2 x 2 
design. 
As a result of these controls, there were four key variations in the 
administration of the experiment, based on three variables which are presented in 
Table 4.1. First, there were two conditions related to the variable of interest, namely 
presence or absence of KFS. The presence of KFS is represented by an ‘X’ (the 
traditional symbol for the treatment condition) and the absence of KFS is represented 
by an ‘O’ (or observation, the traditional symbol for the control condition). Second, 
the scenarios were presented to two groups, each in a different order. The two 
scenarios are represented by a subscript a (Scenario A) and b (Scenario B). Thus, Xa 
represents a group receiving KFS and making a decision on Scenario A, while Ob 
would represent a group not receiving KFS and making a decision on Scenario B. 
This allowed for the measurement of both control and treatment outcomes for the 
different scenarios. Finally, the order in which the KFS condition was presented was 
varied for both scenarios. This allowed for analysis for possible maturation effects 
such as the effects of learning or mental fatigue. Thus, Table 4.1 has two columns 
documenting the order in which each group received each stimulus package.  
Table 4.1 
Experiment Design: Groups and Treatment Conditions 
Group First observation Second observation 
1 Xa Ob 
2 Oa Xb 
3 Xb Oa 
4 Ob Xa 
Note. X denotes a treatment condition, O denotes a control condition and the subscript pertains to the scenario. 
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All other conditions, including the scenarios, the task and the stimulus (or 
materials) were kept as similar as possible. The final design resulted in eight 
observations (two for each group). Random assignment was used to assign 
participants into the groups. This is the gold standard approach to control for 
unknown variables (Shaver, 1993; Webster & Sell, 2007). 
The dependent variables ‘decision accuracy’ and ‘decision time’ were used to 
act as a proxy for decision quality (Jacoby, Speller, & Berning, 1974; Jacoby, 
Speller, & Kohn, 1974; Malhotra, 1982). Decision accuracy measured whether the 
participants were able to correctly identify the most cost-effective loan and decision 
time measured the time in minutes the participants took to perform the task. Those 
who correctly identified the most cost-effective home loan or those with the same 
accuracy but who arrived at the same answer sooner were judged to be making better 
decisions. 
4.1.2.1 Pilot testing 
The materials, scenarios, instructions, and later the computer interface, were all 
pre-tested independently before commencing the experiment. They were presented to 
a smaller group of eight university students to allow for adjustments in the 
experiment’s design, reducing sources of possible error and poor responses 
(Rashotte, 2007). Each tester reviewed the materials or undertook the experiment 
individually. They were interviewed briefly afterwards to discuss any potential 
issues or difficulties they experienced when interacting with the material. Once each 
of the potential issues was addressed, three pilot tests were conducted to test for 
issues that arose throughout identical operations of the experiments. The experiments 
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only commenced after it was clear that the participants understood what they had to 
do and had no further questions, and the materials were found to have no issues.  
4.1.3 Participants 
Participants were recruited from a database of student volunteers within the 
Queensland University of Technology, via email to other student groups, and by 
placing flyers on the Business School student noticeboards. Based on power 
calculations derived from pilot testing prior results in the literature (O’Shea, 2010), 
the target sample size was set at 112, or some 28 participants per group. An initial 
email invitation was sent to 894 students in the database (see Appendix D for 
details). Some 105 students responded to the initial email. A small number of 
students were recruited via flyers and additional emails. Given that several students 
who responded to the invitation online failed to attend the experiment, a total of 110 
students participated. Based on balanced random assignment, groups 1 and 3 
contained 28 participants while groups 2 and 4 contained 27 participants.  
While university students may not be representative of home loan borrowers, 
the use of heuristic decision-making is a generalised trait thought to exist in all 
people. Since the study’s aim is to test the theoretical principles underpinning KFS 
design, naïve participants are appropriate as the issues that KFS are targeting are 
similar across all borrowers (Kardes, 1996). Put simply, if KFS could not assist naïve 
students to make better decisions with practical significance, there would appear to 
be little need for further investigations based on the heuristics of interest. Thus, 
detection in this sample provides analytic (theoretical) generalisability that KFS 
affect the accuracy of home loan price comparisons. The research is therefore not 
concerned with generalising the statistical results of the experiment to the general 
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population of borrowers, but rather with testing whether the underlying principles 
used to design the disclosure have successfully been applied to the KFS design 
(Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1981, p. 197). The research conducted here then acts as 
a base for the research conducted in Chapter 5 which examines the role KFS play in 
borrower decision-making and seeks out borrowers’ opinions of the design and 
usefulness of KFS. 
Further, because the research is focused on determining the effectiveness of 
KFS, the use of a homogenous sample is desirable as it reduces the likelihood that 
extraneous variables will affect the research results (Calder et al., 1981, p. 200). Put 
simply, statistical generalisation of the findings is not the goal of the research.  
Participants were offered monetary compensation of a minimum of $5 for 
turning up to the experiment (including reserves) and were compensated further 
according to their ability to rank the loans in order from lowest to highest cost. This 
was done to align the participants’ goals with those of the researcher and to 
incentivise realistic performance by creating a reward for the more cost-effective 
decisions (V. L. Smith, 1976). Providing an incentive for quality decisions, rather 
than simply for participating, reduced the risk that participants would try to ‘game’ 
the experiment by attempting to receive the maximum compensation with the least 
effort and time (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Diamond & Hausman, 1994). This 
compensation was calculated via the computer program used to collect responses 
from participants. Where a participant correctly identified that a loan was more 
expensive than another they were compensated an additional $2.50. As a result, a 
participant could earn a maximum compensation of $20 for ranking all the loans 
correctly across both scenarios (see Appendix E for more details). 
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4.1.4 Materials 
The stimulus that participants received was reconstructed from real 
information contained in brochures and on lenders’ websites, with all identifying 
information removed avoiding the inclusion of logos, slogans and colour schemes 
and renaming some of the loans to remove hints as to the lender, which may bias 
borrower choice. Each loan was based on a different lender’s format to replicate the 
inconsistency of information in the market. Most loan information was unaltered, but 
for two of the eight loans the interest rate or fees were adjusted to ensure no single 
loan was obviously better or worse than another. Each brochure was accompanied by 
an interest rate sheet formatted in the style of the corresponding lender. This 
mimicked the type of information that was generally provided in store or available 
online prior to 1 January 2012, but removed the chance that brand bias would 
interfere with the results. After pilot testing, one notable change was made to the 
disclosure: the rate sheets were modified to include information for only the loan in 
question.45 Tables were still used because some lenders offered multiple interest 
rates for the same loans based on different conditions (up to six) and the way these 
discounts were presented varied across lenders.46 
For the treatment conditions, participants were also provided with KFS for the 
respective loan. As Adelaide bank releases its KFS through an Excel spreadsheet this 
was used as a template to ensure that the formatting and content of KFS were as 
                                                            
45 The tables contained on each rate sheet were reduced to include only those lines which related to 
the loan in question. This information was removed in order to ensure that where borrowers made a 
mistake it was due to poor calculations rather than comparing the incorrect loans from different 
lenders. This resulted in a large reduction in the amount of information provided to the participant. 
This excess information created a chance for the participant to choose to compare the wrong loan 
from a particular lender’s product range. Where this occurred, the participant could perform all the 
price comparisons correctly but still arrive at the incorrect answer. As this was not within the scope of 
the experiment, information pertaining to the irrelevant loans was removed to prevent the participants 
from comparing the wrong loan on each sheet and therefore biasing the results.  
46 While some lenders included separate rows in their interest rate tables for each set of conditions, 
others used footnotes, or stated that discounts applied for certain borrowed amounts. 
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consistent with regulations as possible. The only changes made were the removal of 
identifying information and changes to the loan details. As the stimulus was based on 
real loans (with the exception of one loan where the application fee was increased by 
$100 to differentiate the price of two loans which, after applying the discount rate for 
the amount in question, would have had had the same total estimated cost), for most 
loans recreating each KFS involved copying the figures from the loan’s KFS into the 
respective cells in the spreadsheet. This eliminated the need to perform calculations 
and thus minimised the chance for error. 
The post-test questionnaire, provided after the participant had ranked the loans, 
collected information about the factors that influenced the participants’ decisions 
(see Appendix F). A post-hoc analysis aimed to investigate three key constructs and 
their association, if any, with the increase in decision accuracy. The first construct, 
comprehension, used a similar measure to O’Shea (2010). Participants were asked to 
identify the following loan details: 
 the interest rate of the loan 
 the type of interest rate (variable or fixed) 
 the loan term (number of years) 
 the monthly repayment amount 
 the interest charged over the life of the loan (excluding the repayments of 
the original amount borrowed). 
In order to correctly report these figures, participants were required to 
understand the question, identify the information and perform any necessary 
calculations. Participants’ answers were marked as either correct or incorrect. The 
second construct, perceived accessibility, was measured by asking participants to 
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rank on a 5-point Likert-type scale how easily they were able to identify or calculate 
the above variables using the information provided. Perceived accessibility was 
measured because decision-makers’ perceptions of costs and benefits play a key role 
in determining how much time and energy they are willing to expend in gathering 
more information47 This measurement is similar to the self-reports regarding the 
participant’s subjective experience which are commonly used when investigating 
internal cues (e.g. Stocké, 2003; Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995). The 
final construct, reliance, used a self-reported measure of how heavily a participant 
relied on a particular cue when making their decision. Likert-type scales were used 
to determine how important the following variables were to the decision: 
 interest rate 
 fees and charges 
 loan features 
 comparison rate 
 loan type (fixed or variable) 
 total estimated amount repayable on the loan 
 the name of the loan. 
Together, these three constructs provide information about the key elements of 
the decision-making process in question: whether participants could easily identify 
and compare the information KFS were designed to present, how this affected the 
information they considered and their understanding of the loan options as a result. 
A separate demographic questionnaire was provided at the end of the 
experiment. This collected self-reports of the participant’s age, gender, education, 
                                                            
47 See the discussion in Section 2.1.3. regarding rational ignorance. 
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financial literacy, home loan experience and previous credit experience, modified 
from (O'Shea, 2010). The demographic questionnaire is presented in Appendix G. 
4.1.4.1 Software 
The software design program CORAL (Schaffner, 2013) was used to design an 
electronic interface for the experiment. This interface was used to present the 
scenarios and collect responses from participants. This ensured each participant was 
provided with exactly the same instructions when they were ready (i.e. under exactly 
the same conditions). Participants were provided with the information and 
instructions for the first scenario, and were then instructed to open an envelope 
containing the stimulus for the first scenario. As decision time was a key variable, 
this screen automatically proceeded after 20 seconds. This allowed the participant 
enough time to open the envelope, but limited the amount of information they could 
read before proceeding to the decision screen and starting the automatic timer. This 
timing was based on the pilot testing. After the experiment, participants were asked 
to complete the post-test questionnaire outlined above. Upon doing so, participants 
were moved into the remaining scenario and the process was repeated, using the 
different scenario and the alternate treatment conditions. An outline of the design, 
including screenshots, is included in Appendix H. 
To avoid potentially biasing the participants’ performance, no time limit was 
imposed on participants for completing the study (Kerstholt, 1992; Wright, 1974; 
Wright & Kriewall, 1980). However, because it was important to record decision 
time (Jacoby, Speller, & Berning, 1974), the software was used to measure the time 
it took a participant to rank the loans in order of cost. Using the software created a 
practical and precise method of timing multiple participants without drawing 
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attention to the fact that participants were being timed. This was considered vital to 
prevent participants from setting mental time constraints on each task, and to avoid 
promoting rushed decision-making procedures.  
4.1.5 Analysis 
Analysis proceeded in two stages. In the first stage, the analysis focused on 
assessing the impact of KFS and any possible biases that might have influenced 
participants. Because the type of data collected was different for each independent 
variable, two different tests were necessary. For the within-subject analysis the 
McNemar test was used to determine the differences between the accuracy of the 
participants’ decisions under the different treatment conditions (McNemar, 1947; 
Pallant, 2013). The McNemar test was used for decision accuracy as it is suitable for 
dichotomous variables and controls for the correlation between the proportions that 
arose as a result of using the same sample (J. T. Lowery et al., 2014; Pallant, 2013). 
Similarly a paired samples t-test was used to compare the decision times for each 
group across the different treatment conditions (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 
2010). A repeated samples t-test was used because of its ability to partition out 
variability due to individual differences that arise from using the same sample across 
multiple sets of conditions (Howell, 2012; Pallant, 2013).48 Different statistical tests 
were used because of the differences in the nature of the data (categorical vs 
continuous): decision time is a continuous variable and accuracy ranked data is a 
categorical variable.  
The tests were conducted again using a between-samples design, splitting the 
total data into several independent samples and running tests on these results 
                                                            
48 It is noted that a repeated measures one-way ANOVA could also be suitable, but as there are only 
two samples it was not deemed necessary. 
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individually. In doing so, the samples eliminated the effects of order, scenario, or 
both order and scenario. As the data no longer used paired samples, different tests 
were required to test for differences in the results. For decision accuracy the analysis 
was conducted using a chi-square test for homogeneity (or Pearson’s chi-square) in 
order to determine if the differences between the results are statistically significant 
(Franke, Ho, & Christie, 2012). Here, the chi-square test for homogeneity was used 
instead of the t-test because decision quality data are ordinal data. A binary variable 
was used, coded 1 for correct and 0 for incorrect. Decision times are interval data, so 
an independent samples t-test was used rather than the chi-square test for 
homogeneity (Hair et al., 2010, p. 442).49 Following standard procedure, a cut-off of 
p < 0.05 was used to determine whether the results were statistically significant.  
Using these respective measures the participants’ responses were compared 
both across conditions and between groups, to determine the effect KFS had had on 
the quality of the judgement. At the most basic level, the analysis was focused on 
comparing the quality of the responses with KFS with the quality of those responses 
where KFS were not provided. Since participants were separated into four groups 
(see Table 4.1), it also allowed for testing for potential biases in the research design. 
A post-hoc analysis was then conducted to consider the participant’s ability to 
identify key loan costs (comprehension), their perceptions on the accessibility of the 
information (perceived accessibility), and the weight they gave to each cue when 
making their decision (reliance). Following O’Shea (2010), the participant’s ability 
to accurately identify and present key pricing variables was used as a proxy for the 
participant’s understanding of the different loan contracts. The participant’s ability to 
                                                            
49 Both tests were conducted to determine whether the likelihood that any differences in the means 
were due to random chance, and not the independent variable (the KFS), fell below an acceptable 
level. 
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correctly identify these variables, along with the most cost-effective loan, was then 
compared to the participant’s reports of how difficult they found it to identify certain 
information, and how heavily these attributes affected their decision. Self-reported 
measures were used for the perceived accessibility and weighting because these were 
subjective to the participant. 
4.2 Results and findings 
Table 4.2 shows that there were almost equal numbers of male and female 
participants. The majority of participants were conducting their undergraduate 
degrees. Only a quarter of the participants were studying a higher level degree, 
which reflects the recruitment method used. This means that the participants will 
have a higher level of education than the general population, and may perform better 
at the task overall than a randomly drawn sample of home borrowers, if general 
intelligence is a factor. 
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Table 4.2 
Experiment Participant Demographics and Prior Credit Experience 
Demographic Category Percent 
Gender Male 
Female 
48.2% 
51.8% 
Primary language English 
Other 
33.6% 
76.4% 
Education status Undergraduates 72.7% 
 Postgraduates 25.5% 
 Unspecified 1.8% 
Previous credit experience Car loan 5.5% 
 Credit card 42.7% 
 Home loan 5.5%50 
 Mobile phone contract 80.0% 
 Other credit experience 20.9% 
Perceived financial literacy Average (on a scale of 1–5)51 3.05 
Course Business 
Finance 
Economics 
Other 
56.4% 
10.9% 
1.8% 
30.9% 
Age Average 24 years 
 
The majority of participants had never entered into a home loan before 
although roughly half of the participants had experience with some form of credit 
through credit cards. Interestingly, some 80% of participants reported experience 
with complex, standard form contracting in the form of mobile phone contracts. 
Almost 70% of the participants were studying business, economics or finance. This 
meant that it was likely the sample had an above-average understanding of basic 
financial concepts. 
                                                            
50 This is not a data entry error – the percentages of people with credit card and home loan experience 
are identical. 
51 With 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest. 
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4.2.1 Within-subject analysis 
The primary measure of the impact KFS had on borrower decision-making was 
conducted using a within-subject analysis of participants’ responses. The same 
subjects were used to perform two independent tasks, and then measures were taken 
from both to ensure that all variables inherent in the sample were controlled for. The 
use of repeated measures, however, does allow participants to mature over the course 
of the experiment, which may in turn bias the results of the tasks occurring later in 
the study. For example, participants may learn how best to perform the task over the 
course of the experiment, enabling them to perform more effectively or efficiently in 
later tasks.52 
Table 4.3 presents the results of decision accuracy as measured by whether the 
participant selected the most cost-effective home loan. Of the 220 attempts (i.e. two 
attempts by 110 participants), in 80 cases (or 36.4% of all answers) the most cost-
effective loan in either scenario 1 or 2 was identified. Participants were nearly five 
times more likely to correctly identify the most cost-effective loan with the KFS than 
without. Some 14 cases of correct identification occurred without KFS, the rest 
occurred in the condition of having KFS. This is compared with 66 of 110 
participants (60%) correctly identifying the correct answer when supplied with KFS.  
Table 4.3 
Identification of the Most Cost-effective Loan 
Correctly identified the 
lowest cost loan 
KFS unavailable KFS available Total 
No 96 (43.64%) 44 (20.00%) 140 (63.6%) 
Yes 14 (6.36%) 66 (30.00%) 80 (36.4%) 
Total (N = 220) 110 (50.00%) 110 (50.00%) 220 (100%) 
                                                            
52 Evidence supporting this can be found in the post-hoc analysis for decision time in section 4.3, with 
participants usually completing the tasks more quickly the second time they were completing it 
regardless of treatment group. It is possible that fatigue or boredom may also have led participants to 
seek to end the experiment more quickly. 
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4.2.1.1 Decision accuracy 
In order to conduct a within-subject analysis, the McNemar test was used to 
determine whether there was a significant change between the two conditions. The 
McNemar test revealed that these results were also statistically significant, p > 0.001 
(2-sided). Additionally, because the order the scenarios were presented in, and which 
set of stimulus contained KFS, was varied across participants the McNemar test was 
conducted across groups to ensure the accuracy of measures. Table 4.4 shows a 
cross-tabulation of the number of correct answers for each group according to the 
different conditions. 
Table 4.4 
Within-subject Analysis: Decision Accuracy Across Conditions and Groups 
 Group  Total 
1 2 3 4 
Correct in Treatment and Incorrect in 
Control Conditions 
16 11 19 12 58 
Correct in Treatment and Control 
Conditions 
3 1 0 2 6 
Incorrect in Treatment and Correct in 
Control Conditions 
7 1 1 4 13 
Incorrect in Control and Treatment 
Conditions 
2 14 8 9 33 
Total 28*** 27** 28*** 27* 110 
* = p < 0.05. ** = p < 0.01. *** = p < 0.001. 
The data in the table suggests that the participants’ decision accuracy may have 
depended on the treatment condition. In all but the second group, the most common 
combination of accurate/inaccurate responses was a correct response in the treatment 
condition and an incorrect response in the control condition. This provides evidence 
that KFS have successfully improved the decision-making behaviour of participants. 
Similar results were found for the second group, the only exception being that 
participants’ judgements were most commonly incorrect in both conditions, with the 
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combination of correct in treatment and incorrect in control being slightly less 
common. 
In order to determine the statistical significance of these results, the McNemar 
test was calculated separately for each group. The data presented in Table 4.4 show 
that all results were significant at the 0.05% significance level. This provides support 
for H1, with the results rejecting the null hypothesis. The results from the experiment 
support findings from the previous literature that simplified and targeted disclosure 
improves the participants’ ability to make more rational decisions (see Section 
3.1.5). 
Participants were compensated for their participation based on their ability to 
rank the loans in order of costs so as to encourage proper participation, but there was 
still a chance that participants might attempt to finish in as short a time as possible 
by entering in random information. To determine if this had significant effects on the 
results, the analysis was re-run excluding cases where participants made their 
decision in less than 1 minute (i.e. to eliminate responses where it appeared the 
participants had not tried). A shorter decision time may also be a sign of KFS’ 
effectiveness as the design of KFS is expected to improve decision speed. So by 
removing all decisions made in less than 1 minute, it is possible that remaining 
results may understate the effectiveness of KFS. This, however, is unlikely, because 
of the amount of information provided to the participant to consider. Overall, 5 
responses of the 220 were removed from the analysis. This, however, made no 
difference to the significance of the findings, p > 0.001 (2-tailed). 
Given the use of a repeated measures design, the results were then tested to see 
whether the use of repeated measures results in maturation or instrument bias across 
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the repeated measures and two different scenarios. In order to do this, Friedman’s 
ranked order ANOVA was conducted to determine whether a difference occurred 
between the different groups, p > 0.01 (2-tailed). As this result was significant, a 
series of Wilcoxon’s signed-ranked tests was conducted to determine whether the 
control variables were responsible for the change. Because running a series of 
individual tests among related groups increases the chance of finding a significant 
result where one does not exist (type 1 error) the significance level was adjusted 
using a Bonferroni adjustment (Abdi, 2007). Therefore the significance level of 0.05 
was adjusted by dividing it by the number of paired sample comparisons resulting in 
a new significance cut-off of p = 0.008.  
Table 4.5 shows that the scenario in which KFS were presented was irrelevant 
to the statistical significance of the effect KFS were found to have on decision 
accuracy. Similar results were found for the order the treatment conditions were 
presented in. These are contained in Table 4.6 which shows that the findings retained 
their statistical significance regardless of the order of the treatment conditions: 
Table 4.5 
Within Subjects: Decision Accuracy Controlled for Scenario 
Condition Z-Score 
Treatment in Scenario A and Treatment in Scenario B -0.707 
Treatment in Scenario A and Control in Scenario A -5.657* 
Treatment in Scenario A and Control in Scenario B -4.243* 
Treatment in Scenario B and Control in Scenario A -4.950* 
Treatment in Scenario B and Control in Scenario A -3.556* 
Control in Scenario A and Control in Scenario B -2.309 
* = p > 0.008 (2-tailed). 
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Table 4.6 
Within Subjects: Decision Accuracy Controlled for Order 
Condition Z-Score 
Treatment at Time 1 and Treatment at Time 2 -1.616 
Treatment at Time 1 and Control at Time 1 -5.048* 
Treatment at Time 1 and Control at Time 2 -5.191* 
Treatment at Time 1 and Control at Time 1 -3.922* 
Treatment at Time 2 and Control at Time 2 -6.385* 
Control at Time 1 and Control at Time 2 -0.905 
* = p > 0.008 (2-tailed). 
Overall the results from the within-subject analysis mean that the null 
hypothesis was rejected, providing support for the alternate hypothesis. Controlling 
for both order and scenario, as well as potential gaming, had no significant effect on 
these results. The data, therefore, suggests that KFS significantly impact decision 
quality. 
4.2.1.2 Decision time 
In order to compare the results across treatment conditions for each group, a 
paired samples t-test was conducted (Hair et al., 2010). There was no significant 
difference in the scores for the control (MD = 6.11, SD = 4.71) and the test (M = 
6.97, SD = 4.94) conditions; t(109) = -1.05, p = n.s. Removing cases with decision 
time under 1 minute did not affect the significance of the results. 
A three-way repeated measures ANOVA was then used in order to control for 
the effects of order and scenario on these results. These results of the three-way 
ANOVA are set out in Table 4.7: 
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Table 4.7 
Within Subjects: Decision Time Controlled for Order and Scenario 
Condition F-Score 
Treatment 0.079 
Order 10.628*** 
Scenario 0.278 
Treatment by Order 4.209* 
Treatment by Scenario 0.819 
Order by Treatment 1.967 
* = p < 0.05. ** = p < 0.01. *** = p < 0.001. 
 
The results show that the participants’ decision time was significantly affected 
by the order in which the observations took place, with participants in the second 
treatment condition completing the task more quickly than those in the first 
condition. These demonstrate that, for decision time, the repeated measures 
significantly influenced the results. This suggests a learning effect found in the 
between-subject design. The finding that the relationship between KFS and order 
was significant shows that KFS may magnify this learning effect to help participants 
complete the task even more quickly when they repeated the comparison task.  
4.2.2 Between-subjects analysis 
The above, within-subject analysis took into account all the data that was 
collected from all available participants. It includes two decisions from each 
participant, one with KFS and one without, requiring the use of two scenarios. As 
discussed in the methodology section, and in the section above, participants were 
placed in one of four groups. Each group had a unique combination of scenarios, 
depending on the scenario the KFS were presented in and whether the test condition 
was first or second. This meant that there were two alternate explanations available 
based on these variables. These were that: 
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1. The observed variance in the decision quality variables (time and accuracy) 
could be influenced by the differences in the scenario materials.  
or 
2. The observed variance in the decision quality variables could be influenced 
by the differences in the order in which the participants received the 
treatment and control conditions. 
While the above analysis controls for these effects, the research design and 
sample size also allow for between-subject analyses which, due their nature, can 
exclude these variables entirely from the results. Therefore, in order to strengthen the 
claims that KFS are responsible for the observed change in the dependent variables, 
the data was split into smaller samples, and tests conducted to confirm the results of 
the within-subject analysis and further control for potential issues of internal validity 
with the study.  
4.2.2.1 Decision accuracy 
In order to perform the between-subjects design, the data needed to be 
examined in a way that avoided comparing paired samples. This meant that, at most, 
only one observation from each participant could be compared with the results from 
other participants at a time, resulting in a maximum sample size of 110 observations, 
one from each participant. Given the research design, this could be achieved by 
either splitting the data across the order of observations conditions or by the results 
for a particular scenario. 
First, the data were divided into two equal groups, according to whether the 
response resulted from the participants’ first or repeated sitting of the experiment 
task. Responses from the initial sitting of the task showed KFS had a large, 
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statistically significant effect on the participants’ decision accuracy (2 = 31.79, [Φ = 
0.54, p < .01]). This was consistent with responses received when participants were 
repeated the task under the different treatment condition (2 = 21.79, [Φ = 0.45, p < 
.01]). Both results are consistent with the findings from the within-subject analysis. 
This process was then repeated by splitting the data by scenario, testing the 
differences between participants’ responses across Scenario A and Scenario B, 
respectively. The differences between treatment conditions in both the first 
observation (2 = 41.71, [Φ = 0.61, p < .01]) and the second observation (2 = 15.41, 
[Φ = -0.37, p < .01]) were both large and statistically significant.  
Further, the design also allows for the comparison of even more specific 
sample groups, that is, comparing the treatment condition in the first observation 
with Scenario A against the control option for the same conditions and so forth. This 
resulted in four combinations of between-subject results with no need to control for 
order or scenario. 
Table 4.8 
Between-Subjects: Decision Accuracy Grouped by Order and Scenario
Condition Chi-square Phi 
Scenario 1 Order 1 21.280 0.622*** 
Scenario 2 Order 1 11.546 0.458*** 
Scenario 1 Order 2 19.961 0.602*** 
Scenario 2 Order 2 4.550 0.288* 
 
With all four groups showing significant difference between the treatment 
conditions, these results provide further support to show that KFS successfully 
increase the accuracy of the participants’ decisions. Similarly, these results confirm 
that the results are robust across all combinations of order and scenario. When taken 
with the results from the within-subject analysis this provides strong evidence for the 
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alternate hypothesis and, thus, the null hypothesis is rejected. It would appear that 
people provided with KFS do assess loans more accurately. 
In order to determine if gaming had a significant effect on the results, the 
analysis was re-run excluding cases where participants made their decision in less 
than 1 minute (i.e. to eliminate responses where it appeared the participants had not 
tried). Excluding these cases made no difference to the overall findings and all the 
results remained statistically significant with similar Phi values. 
4.2.2.2 Decision time 
Similar breakdowns were conducted for decision time using independent 
sample t-tests. First, the data was split using the different scenarios in which the KFS 
stimulus material was provided. The results demonstrated that KFS made no 
difference to the participants’ decision time regardless of scenario. The results for 
both Scenario A (MD 0.53 [CI 95: -1.15, 2.57], p = n.s.) and Scenario B (MD -0.60 
[CI 95: -0.40, 2.78], p = n.s.) provided statistically non-significant results. Even 
when accounting for the effect the differences in scenarios might have on KFS’ 
ability to improve the decision time of participants, H2 remains unsupported by the 
findings. 
Unlike the results for scenario, the order of observations was found to affect 
whether KFS significantly altered the participants’ response times across treatment 
conditions. In the first set of observations the data revealed that KFS had no 
significant impact on the time it took the participant to complete the decision task 
(MD -0.60 [CI 95: -2.82, 1.62], p = n.s.). When repeating the test, however, 
participants’ responses differed significantly between test conditions (MD 2.38 [CI 
95: 120, 3.36] p > 0.01). These results were further confirmed by breaking down the 
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results across the individual treatment conditions to eliminate the effects of both 
scenario and order simultaneously as shown in Table 4.9: 
Table 4.9 
Between-Subjects: Time Controlling for Order and Scenario 
Condition Mean difference T-Score 
Scenario 1 Order 1 -0.77 CI 95 [-4.44, 2.90] -0.421 
Scenario 2 Order 1 -0.43 CI 95[-3.02, 2.16] -0.330 
Scenario 1 Order 2 1.93 CI 95 [0.35, 3.50] 2.452* 
Scenario 2 Order 2 2.83 CI 95 [1.01, 4.65] 3.122** 
 
While not necessarily comparable, these results support the findings from the 
within-subject design which show that a maturation effect occurred during the 
repeated testing, with participants making decisions more quickly the second time 
they completed the task. That decision accuracy did not share this improvement can 
be explained by the experiment design. Because no feedback was provided about the 
accuracy of the participants’ responses to the first task, participants were unable to 
evaluate their decision strategy and adjust it to improve accuracy. Similarly to 
decision accuracy, the removal of cases with decision times under 1 minute made no 
change to the statistical significance of the results.  
4.2.3 Analysis of post-test variables 
The results of the participants’ post-test questionnaire were then considered in 
order to further investigate the effects KFS have on home loan comparisons. In order 
to do this three key constructs were considered. First, the participants’ 
comprehension of loan costs was analysed to determine whether KFS helped 
participants identify and understand the true cost of credit. Second, the ease with 
which the participants felt they could understand the information was analysed and, 
finally, the weighting which participants reported assigning to each variable was 
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considered. Together these provide insights into participants’ perceptions of a 
variables’ usefulness and how such perceptions may be related to the decision-
makers’ use of the information and overall ability to compare loan costs. 
4.2.3.1 Comprehension 
Participants in the test condition (i.e. with KFS) exhibited higher levels of 
comprehension of the individual pricing elements of the loans they reviewed. In 
particular, participants with KFS were able to identify the interest rate, interest 
charged, monthly repayment amounts and the term of the loan. The differences in 
comprehension did not extend to comparisons of the type of interest rate (fixed or 
variable) or loan term, which were not statistically significant. The results from the 
comprehension testing are contained in Table 4.10: 
Table 4.10 
Participants’ Understanding of Loan Variables 
 Correct  Incorrect  Missing  
Variable Control 
group 
Test 
group 
Control 
group 
Test 
group 
Control 
group 
Test 
group 
Phi 
Total interest 
charge 
1 28 97 60 12 22 0.42*** 
Monthly 
repayment 
amount 
4 38 79 21 27 51 0.64*** 
Interest rate 36 51 74 59 0 0 0.14 
Interest type 62 67 48 43 0 0 0.05 
Loan term 54 81 56 29 0 0 0.25 
* = p < 0.05. ** = p < 0.01. *** = p < 0.001. 
 
4.2.3.2 Perceived accessibility 
Participants supplied with KFS also reported that it was easier to identify the 
total cost of the loan. These results are consistent with prior studies which tested 
presenting information to participants in a way that was simple and easy to 
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understand. In particular, O’Shea (2010) showed that participants presented with 
summarised information were better able to identify loan costs; however, even 
simple calculations in the trial disclosure, such as the calculation for total interest 
charged, were found to greatly reduce the participants’ ability to identify the correct 
answer. Perceptions of ability to calculate costs are presented in Table 4.11: 
Table 4.11 
Participants’ Ability to Retrieve Total Estimated Cost 
KFS Difficulty of calculating total estimated repayable 
Very easy Easy Medium Hard Very hard 
No 
Yes 
7 9 25 26 42 
47 21 15 10 11 
 
A bivariate analysis using Spearman’s rank order correlation was conducted to 
determine whether the accessibility of the information was related to borrower 
comprehension. The results indicate that participants who report less difficulty 
accessing the total estimated amount repayable are statistically significantly more 
likely to correctly answer the comprehension questions. For the estimated amount 
repayable and monthly repayments, increased ease of access to information greatly 
increased participants’ comprehension of loan costs. For other variables such as 
interest rate and interest charged no significant association was found. The key 
relationships are set out in Table 4.12: 
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Table 4.12 
Accessibility and Comprehension (Spearman’s Rho) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Difficulty 
accessing 
estimated 
repayment 
1.000 
        
(2) Difficulty 
accessing fees .477*** 1.000        
(3) Difficulty 
accessing 
interest charged 
.535*** .486*** 1.000 
      
(4) Difficulty 
accessing 
month 
repayments 
.719*** .493*** .567*** 1.000 
     
(5) Correctly 
identified 
interest rate 
-.005 .011 .058 -.074 1.000 
    
(6) Correctly 
identified loan 
term (years to 
repay) 
-.204** -.142* -.037 -.190** .164* 1.000 
   
(7) Correctly 
identified 
monthly 
repayments 
-.418** -.157 -0.182* -.375*** .233** .370*** 1.000 
  
(8) Correctly 
identified type 
of rate 
-.120 -.057 -.039 -.054 -.076 -.003 -.021 1.000 
 
(9) Correctly 
identified total 
interest charged 
-.243** -.026 -.029 -.207** .255*** .216** .447*** .168* 1.000 
* = p < 0.05. ** = p < 0.01. *** = p < 0.001. 
 
Reliance 
Participants in the test condition were statistically significantly more likely to 
consider the total estimated amount repayable compared with the control group (i.e. 
group without KFS) (Φ = 0.29, p < 0.001). Further, an independent samples t-test of 
the number of variables considered showed no differences across the number of 
sources considered (MD 0.16 [CI 95: -0.15, 0.48] p = n.s). Participants in both the 
control and test groups used all other sources of information in roughly the same 
proportions. These data are set out in Table 4.13:  
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Table 4.13 
Consideration of Variables When Comparing Loans 
 Considered  Did not consider  
Variable considered Control 
group 
Test 
group 
Control 
group 
Test 
group 
Phi 
Estimated repayable 45 77 65 33 0.29*** 
Monthly repayment 
amount 
66 75 44 35 0.06 
Interest rate 75 64 35 46 -0.10 
Fees 66 72 44 38 0.06 
Interest type 32 29 78 81 -0.03 
Comparison rate 38 31 72 79 -0.07 
Loan name 3 5 107 105 -0.05 
* = p < 0.05. ** = p < 0.01. *** = p < 0.001. 
 
Bivariate association highlighted that an attributes’ accessibility (i.e. reported 
difficulty in accessing the attribute) had a moderate to large association with a 
participant’s reliance on that cue. Both the total estimated repayable and monthly 
repayable variables showed this relationship. Similar statistically significant 
associations were also noted in the case of fees and interest charged. The results of 
the analysis are outlined in Table 4.14: 
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Table 4.14 
Correlations, Reliance by Weighting (Spearman’s Rho) 
 Difficulty 
accessing 
estimated 
repayment 
Estimated 
repayment 
Influence 
Difficulty 
accessing 
fees 
Fee 
influence 
Difficulty 
accessing 
interest 
charged 
Interest 
charged 
influence 
Difficulty 
accessing 
monthly 
repayment 
Monthly 
repayment 
influence 
Difficulty 
accessing 
estimated 
repayment 
1        
Estimated 
repayment 
influence 
-.310*** 1       
Difficulty 
accessing 
fees 
.477*** 0.019 1      
Fee 
influence 
-0.013 .177** 0.006 1     
Difficulty 
accessing 
interest 
charged 
.535*** -0.121 .486** -0.073 1    
Interest 
charged 
influence 
-0.035 .296*** -0.049 .468*** -0.016 1   
Difficulty 
accessing 
monthly 
repayments 
.719*** -.275*** .493** -0.012 .567*** -0.063 1  
Monthly 
repayments 
influence 
-.176* .442*** -0.036 .350*** -.143* .495*** -.179** 1 
* = p < 0.05. ** = p < 0.01. *** = p < 0.001. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
The objective of this study was to determine whether KFS successfully 
improved people’s ability to select the most suitable home loan from among a range 
of alternatives. In order to do this, the experimental design focused on identifying 
whether participants supplied with KFS could evaluate cost differences for different 
loans. The experiment tested the effect of KFS on the accuracy of participants’ 
decisions and participant decision time. These two variables were used as a proxy for 
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decision quality. Under experimental conditions, an improvement in accuracy or 
timeliness associated with the presence of KFS allows us to conclude that the 
improvement was due to KFS.  
The key finding from the experiment was that KFS led participants to be more 
likely to be able to identify the most cost-effective loan from a set of four 
alternatives. These results were both practically and statistically significant, with 
evidence emerging from both the within- and between-subjects analyses. No 
evidence was found to support the hypothesis that KFS improved decision timeliness 
per se. However, KFS appear to improve borrowers’ response time when provided in 
the second scenario, despite neither variable having a statistically significant effect 
on the results individually. This may be explained by prior findings which show that 
laypeople often need to familiarise themselves with all the information available to 
determine what is relevant before making a decision (Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, 
2009). This is also consistent with findings from research into the effect of expertise 
on decisions (Ericsson, Prietula, & Cokely, 2007; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). 
In light of the increase in decision accuracy brought about by KFS (with no 
improvement to decision time) the first research question ‘Do KFS help people 
identify the most cost-effective loan from among a number of alternatives’ is 
answered in the affirmative; KFS empower borrowers to compare loans more 
accurately. Further, findings from the post-test questionnaire indicate that KFS 
improve a user’s ability to understand relevant loan information presented to them, 
and that the user is more likely to employ that information to compare loan costs. 
Presenting information in the form of KFS appears to increase a decision-maker’s 
comprehension of key pricing aspects of the loan due to improved accessibility. This, 
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in turn, was associated with a higher reliance on this information when making the 
decision.  
This research highlights the importance of providing decision-makers with 
easy access to relevant and salient product attributes, even for major decisions. 
While O’Shea (2010) demonstrated that home loan decision-makers may fail to 
make the complex calculations required to determine full loan cost, this research 
provides additional insights in that it indicates that most people rely on accessible 
information cues when comparing loan quality. When cost information was provided 
in a transparent and simple–to-retrieve format (i.e. in the form of a KFS), 
participants reported that they found it substantially easier to identify this 
information. At the same time, the number of participants who reported relying on 
the total estimated cost increased significantly. 
Essentially these findings support the notion of attribute substitution 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). In a home loan, the information accessibility of a 
decision attribute (in this case, price) appears to moderate the relationship between 
the salience of that attribute and the influence of that attribute on the decision 
(Menzel & Katz, 1955; O'Reilly, 1982). Importantly, decision theory that suggests 
heuristic decision processes focus on the most salient variables (e.g. Fishburn, 1967, 
1974; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999) will only hold when these salient cues reach 
minimum levels of accessibility. 
The importance of information accessibility has significant implications for 
policy aimed at improving borrower decision-making. First, it suggests that home 
loan lenders may be able obfuscate key information and therefore channel borrowers 
towards information that might result in poor or high-cost loan choice. The 
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complexity of home loan pricing structures means that estimating the total cost of the 
loan from the information available to borrowers is difficult and may be beyond the 
ability of many borrowers. This would, therefore, make comparison between loans 
impossible. Further, the complexity of home loans is often confounded with the 
provision of other seemingly salient (but perhaps distracting) cues such as 
honeymoon interest rates. The improved accessibility of this information would 
likely play an important role in consumer decision given the reliance on information 
accessibility indicated by these results.  
This research shows that information asymmetry in the home loan market can 
be addressed by the use of KFS. When borrowers use KFS, they are more likely to 
be able to identify a low-cost loan from a range of alternatives. Therefore, KFS 
appear well placed to achieve their intended objectives, at least theoretically. 
4.3.1 Limitations and delimitations 
As with all research, this study has a number of limitations and delimitations. 
While the highly controlled environment of an experimental design allows for causal 
claims, this same level of control has significant implications for generalisability 
(Babble & Huitt, 1989). Thus, the findings of the experiment provide important 
insights into whether KFS help people make better decisions, but in an artificial 
environment. In practice, however, many factors may confound this effect. For 
example, participants in the experiment were provided with all the information 
required to determine which loan is most cost effective. As such, the experiment is 
unable to observe the impact that information search has on the accessibility of 
information. In practice, borrowers are required to retrieve information from one or 
several different sources in order to make their decision. These sources each provide 
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different information and borrowers often require different levels of effort and time 
to search for and access them. Advertised information, such as the advertised interest 
rate and fees, is easily accessible, but other information, such as non-advertised 
interest rates (sometimes represented in the stimulus as interest rate thresholds), is 
often less accessible and requires more time and effort to obtain. This is an important 
limitation when considering accessibility because information that requires effortful 
search is less accessible, and therefore is less likely to be considered by the decision-
maker.53 
Further, the use of a student sample may also limit the external validity of the 
study. In particular, the participants’ levels of education and financial literacy are 
likely to be higher than the general populations of borrowers. Despite this, the results 
clearly show that, in line with prior research and stakeholder concerns, the 
participants still struggled to compare home loan prices without KFS. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, the biases which arise from heuristic judgement are common 
among all types of decision makers.54 Therefore, it is expected that by reducing the 
likelihood that these heuristic processes will result in a biased judgement among a 
student population, at least in terms of price, KFS will similarly empower borrowers 
in practice to make better loan choices in public where all else remains the same.  
Additionally, the use of a within-subject design means that this bias (along 
with other extraneous variables) is consistent across both measures of the dependent 
variables. The use of a student sample is only likely to significantly bias the results 
where the students’ higher levels of education or financial literacy resulted in KFS 
                                                            
53 See Section 3.4. 
54 At worst, it can be expected that the participants performed slightly better overall due to their 
familiarity with tasks of the same nature. It is expected that this would affect both groups equally and 
have less of an effect on the difference between groups. 
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moving the users’ comprehension into a threshold where educated borrowers are 
able to compare loans effectively while uneducated borrowers are less likely to do 
so. Given that the purpose of this research is to determine the ability of the borrower 
to compare the total cost of the loans, this is unlikely as KFS users simply need to 
compare one line, ‘total amount to be repaid’, across loans and identify the lower 
figure. 
Perhaps of greater impact was a possible lack of motivation for the participants 
in the experiment. A home loan decision often involves several hundred thousand 
dollars and so real-world borrowers might be highly motivated to make difficult 
calculations required for loan comparison. While participants were motivated 
through the payment system in the experiment, this might have been insufficient to 
overcome the tendency to just use available cues.  
Finally, a key delimitation of the study is that it rests on three key assumptions: 
(1) that all borrowers collect and compare information when making a home loan 
decision; (2) that borrowers base their decision on information obtainable from 
brochures and websites; and (3) that borrowers consider the difference in price 
salient. While these assumptions appear logical, they may not always be realistic (see 
Section 3.4).  
4.4 Summary 
By showing that the prescribed KFS design successfully improves borrower 
decision-making when used as intended, this study forms a base for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the regulatory approach employed by the NCCP 2011. In order to 
properly evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the regulatory approach, however, 
the effects of KFS must be examined in context to determine if, and how, borrowers 
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use them, and their resulting impact. Therefore, while this stage of research is 
important, it is merely a starting point to determine the effectiveness of the 
mechanism underpinning the success of the legislation. 
The following chapter uses interviews with Australian home loan borrowers to 
determine whether they know about KFS and, if so, how they use them. In doing so 
the thesis aims to identify any barriers which may potentially arise from borrower 
decision-making behaviour as well as the search criteria they use when comparing 
home loans. Further, as borrowers are required to request KFS, the study also aims to 
determine borrowers’ knowledge of KFS, their purpose and their benefits. 
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Chapter 5: Home loan selection decisions: 
Factors affecting the choice of 
borrowers and the relative 
knowledge about and influence of 
KFS 
The previous stage of the research established that Key Facts Sheets (KFS) can 
improve users’ comprehension and comparison of loan costs when used as intended. 
The next stage of the research involved assessing how borrowers actually used KFS 
during home loan decision-making, if they were used at all. The major benefit of 
Chapter 4 lies in the causal claim made possible by the experimental design; it 
provides strong evidence that when decision-makers use KFS, they are better able to 
understand the cost of a home loan and make a more rational economic decision. As 
highlighted in Chapter 2, this was a major objective of the legislative reform. 
However, the tight control required to make a causal claim leads to a major 
limitation. The laboratory setting required an artificial decision context that 
emphasised the economic criterion of cost as the driver of decision-making. Studies 
of similar legislative interventions in the US and UK, however, show that when 
choosing a mortgage provider, borrowers are often motivated by a range of factors 
beyond price. Some borrowers may not compare loans on a price basis while others 
may forego comparing loan offers entirely in the decision process (Devlin, 2002; 
Ford &Jones, 2001). Importantly, how borrowers collect home loan information, and 
what information they have available at the decision point may also vary widely 
(Mylonikis, 2007). Thus, it is entirely possible that some borrowers may terminate 
their search for information without encountering KFS or may even intentionally 
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ignore KFS entirely (Simon, 1957). To date there has been no systematic 
investigation of how and to what extent Australian borrowers incorporate KFS into 
their decision-making processes, leading to a substantial gap in our understanding of 
this important element of the borrowing decision. 
This chapter uses an exploratory study to provide the first Australian evidence 
of how and why borrowers use KFS in the home loan borrowing decision. Data 
drawn from 12 in-depth semi-structured interviews with recent home loan borrowers 
provide evidence that KFS are in fact rarely used in the actual decision process. The 
data show that while participants recognise the usefulness of KFS, the potential 
audience is largely unaware of their existence. Further, borrowers’ inertia and their 
heavy reliance on third-party advice appear to drive the decision process, meaning 
that borrowers are rarely motivated to search for the kind of information KFS may 
actually provide. The legislation’s impact is examined from a holistic perspective 
and the results demonstrate how a useful tool may lead to very limited impact in the 
field. This provides a basis for the investigation into the distribution of KFS, the 
focus of Chapter 6. 
5.1 Understanding borrower decision-making: A holistic 
approach 
KFS were designed to overcome the complexity of information inherent in 
home loan documentation and enhance borrowers’ comparisons of the home loan 
offers available to them. This is based on the premise that making concise, targeted 
disclosure available to borrowers would empower them to make a more accurate 
comparison of loan costs (Australian Government, 2011c). The experimental 
findings from Chapter 4 tested the effectiveness of KFS in facilitating the users’ 
comprehension of loan costs compared with information typically available before 
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borrowers apply for a loan. The findings show that using KFS successfully improve 
borrower decisions.  
Helping borrowers to overcome the complexity in home loan comparisons is 
only one element in borrower decision-making. In addition, borrowers must both 
collect and process information, entailing various costs. These costs increase as the 
information that borrowers seek becomes more abundant, and more complex and 
costly to seek out (Klemperer, 1995; Stigler, 1961). Borrowers choose from a 
number of information sources of varying credibility, content and retrieval costs 
(O'Reilly, 1982). Consequently they are required to continually evaluate whether 
considering each new item of information is worth the cost or whether they are better 
off terminating their search, given the constraints on their time, cognitive power and 
money (Downs, 1957; Eisenberg, 1995; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999).  
Research into consumer choice shows that decision-makers seek to minimise 
their search costs where possible and tend to avoid search unless it is clearly 
necessary (Reitzel, 1958; Saad & Russo, 1996). Thus borrowers tend to gravitate 
towards sources of information that are more easily accessible rather than seeking 
more accurate information where doing so is more onerous (Culnan, 1983; 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Higgins & King, 1981). Further, decision-makers 
often terminate their search once they have found an option they believe is good 
enough, rather than searching to ensure no better options exist (Simon, 1955, 1972, 
1990). 
This has significant implications for information search in complex decision 
contexts such as home loan borrowing (Devlin & Ennew, 1997; Harrison, 2000; 
McKechnie, 1992). Borrowers are unlikely to search out quality pricing information 
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where they believe the cost outweighs the benefit (Downs, 1957). Thus, researchers 
have found that consumers of financial products rely heavily on third-party advice 
(Devlin, 2002; Financial Services Consumer Panel, 1999a; Kalbaugh, 2002) rather 
than making their own comparisons. For instance, around 10% of borrowers in the 
UK avoid search altogether and take the first option available to them (Ford & Jones, 
2001). A similar study of Greek borrowers reported that most would seek 
information from a bank (84%) but only a quarter of the borrowers (26.1%) would 
consider information from brochures or the internet (Mylonakis, 2007). In the UK, 
Key Facts Illustrations (KFI) research indicates that where borrowers are provided 
with KFI during their final consultation, they are often more focused on the 
information provided to them verbally by the sales person (Illuminas, 2008). 
Taken together, this research indicates that providing KFS to improve 
borrower decision-making does not mean that borrowers will necessarily use them. 
Evaluating borrower decision behaviour is therefore important because regardless of 
how effectively KFS improve decisions, where borrowers do not use KFS in their 
comparisons they will have no impact. Consequently, the research aims to 
understand: 
RQ2: What role, if any, do KFS play in borrowers’ decisions? 
Information complexity also affects choice criteria, which in turn may 
influence the sources of information considered. Zeithaml (1988) argues that where a 
product’s intrinsic cues are difficult to assess, such as with home loan product 
schemes (Chioveanu & Zhou, 2013), consumers often turn to extrinsic cues such as 
third-party advice and their relationships with lenders (Nayyar, 1990). This is 
supported by Devlin (2002) who showed that, in a sample of 4,200 borrowers from 
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the UK, around half of the respondents chose their loan on the basis of professional 
advice (16.9%), the availability of finance (9.4%), and the fact they had previous 
dealings with the lender (15.4%). It is likely that Australian borrowers will similarly 
base their decision on non-price variables that may prevent KFS from successfully 
enhancing borrower decisions. Research conducted in for the UK Financial Services 
Authority in 2008, after the release of KFI, showed similar results (Illuminas, 2008). 
In particular, the research found that borrowers continue to rely heavily on third-
party advice when making their decision, which reduces the likelihood that they will 
encounter KFI until after they have decided which home loan to apply for (Illuminas, 
2008, p. 27).  
Finally, borrowers have a tendency to take out a home loan with a lender who 
they have dealt with previously (Ford & Jones, 2001). Here, some borrowers value 
the relationship with their lender and base their decision primarily on this factor 
(Devlin, 2002). Research also shows that borrowers looking to switch between 
lenders face a number of obstacles and that this may also lead to borrower inertia 
(Fraser, 2011; Klemperer, 1995). These obstacles include the lack of portability 
surrounding savings accounts, which can often be packaged with home loan products 
to minimise costs. Where borrowers perceive that the costs of dealing with an 
unfamiliar lender outweigh the potential financial savings, KFS become less 
effective because borrowers require larger financial savings to deal with a new 
lender. Consequently, the research is designed to examine how borrowers’ decision-
making processes, as well as their decision criteria, may form potential barriers to 
KFS legislation. In doing so it seeks to inform the following research question: 
RQ3: What factors, if any, limit the uptake or impact of KFS in practice? 
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5.2 Research method 
As outlined in Section 5.1, no study has yet examined the use of KFS by 
Australian borrowers and the role of KFS in their decision, or has investigated the 
potential barriers that may undermine their effective use in practice. In order to 
address this gap in the literature, the research conducted in this chapter adopts an 
exploratory approach to gain insight into borrower decision-making and the extent to 
which this features KFS. Qualitative research techniques are used because qualitative 
data is well suited to informing research questions that involve describing, 
interpreting and exploring new areas of investigation (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekeran, 
2001, p. 108; Patton, 1980, p. 47). Thus, collecting qualitative data allows the 
researcher to understand the phenomena in everyday situations, to get close to the 
context of the study and to uncover the processes used in the real world (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2010, p. 2). 
Given the purpose of the study, the research method needed to provide data 
that allowed the researcher to go beyond merely observing borrowers’ decision 
processes, to understanding why borrowers chose to collect and compare information 
as they did. Interviews allow the researcher to collect thick data surrounding the 
participants’ experiences during the decision process and the issues surrounding the 
decision (Denzin, 2001; Geertz, 1994; Patton, 1980, p. 437). Semi-structured 
interviews are well suited to investigating peoples’ subjective experiences, so they 
were ideal for uncovering the participants’ motivations (Petitmengin, 2006; Ratner, 
2002, September; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 12). A semi-structured approach to 
conducting interviews enabled the interviewer to take advantage of the flexibility 
inherent in the use of prompts and probing questions (Barriball & While, 1994, p. 
329). The interviewer, therefore, was able to rely on a data protocol to ensure all 
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areas of interest were addressed, while ensuring that questions were answered as 
intended, uncertainties were clarified, and interesting concepts which emerged 
during the interviews were explored more fully (Marshall & Rossman, 2010). This 
enhanced the collection of data surrounding the decision process (Atkinson & 
Hammersley, 1994; Silverman, 1985, 2000), providing a more detailed 
understanding of how the information available influenced borrowers’ decisions 
including their awareness of, access to and use of KFS. 
5.2.1 Participant selection 
Naturally, the research method needed to draw from the experience of people 
who had made borrowing decisions in the Australian home loan market since the 
introduction of KFS. Purposive sampling was used to select interview participants 
from this target population. Purposive sampling is well suited to a design focused on 
describing the decision process of borrowers because it allows for the selection of 
cases which are best able to inform the research questions (Patton, 1980, p. 230). The 
objective of this study is to identify the use of KFS in home loan decision-making 
processes of Australian borrowers. Therefore, the purposive sampling was critical to 
ensuring the research had the best chance of investigating the different decision-
making processes borrowers used. Thus, participants were intentionally selected to 
maximise variation among borrowers, using a version of purposive sampling 
sometimes referred to as maximum variation or heterogeneity sampling (Patton, 
1980, p. 234). Selecting cases from a variety of participants meant that the research 
results were more likely to capture the core experiences and processes used by 
borrowers, and was more likely to examine a wider variety of decision processes 
which may arise among different sub-groups of borrowers. This variety helped raise 
confidence in the transferability of the findings across multiple kinds of borrowers 
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because it suggested these experiences, processes and decision criteria are not 
specific to a particular demographic of borrower (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 
1980, p. 234).  
The sampling method was intentionally designed to recruit borrowers across 
various gender, education, and income groups in order to determine potential 
relationships between a borrower’s demographics and their decision processes. 
Research into home loan decision-making has found that these qualities may affect 
decision-making processes, including the sources of information they consider and 
the primary drivers of their decision processes (Devlin, 2002). In particular, women 
were found to be more likely to stick with a lender with whom they have an existing 
account. More educated borrowers, and those with higher incomes, were more likely 
to either borrow from a lender they have had a previous mortgage with, or base their 
decision on the interest rate and discounts and special offers they received (Devlin, 
2002). 
The research was also designed to consider the level of borrowers’ experience 
within the market, and whether the loan was for a purchase or a refinance. It was 
expected that more experienced borrowers would have a better comprehension of 
home loan qualities and would better understand the attributes of a loan which they 
value as well as how to search for information surrounding these attributes. 
Similarly, borrowers who are refinancing, as opposed to those taking out a new loan, 
may use a different decision-making process as they face higher switching costs and 
have a stronger relationship with the lender. 
Finally, multiple cases were sought for each sub-group to increase the 
dependability of the claims which could be made about the results (Lincoln & Guba, 
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1985). The use of multiple case studies enables the researcher to compare and 
contrast the decision processes and circumstances surrounding borrowers’ choices, 
generating a more informative and robust research design (Herriott & Firestone, 
1983). This allows for the analysis of patterns which may have occurred within the 
data by examining the similarities and differences of each participant’s decision 
process, and allows for detection of the core themes which dominate borrower 
decision making in a wide range of contexts (Patton, 1980). 
In summary, purposive sampling enabled the researcher, within time and 
resource constraints, to focus on participants best able to address the research 
question (Patton, 1980). All participants were borrowers who had taken out or 
refinanced a home loan for an Australian residential property after the introduction 
of KFS in January 2012. A total of 12 interviews were conducted. The decision to 
cease sampling at 12 interviewees was based on two criteria: (1) the key criteria for 
selection were represented in the data; and (2) saturation was achieved in the data 
analysis (see Section 5.3).  
5.2.2  Profile of participants 
Of the final 12 participants, eight were male and four were female. The 
borrowers ranged in age from 25 to 70, a spectrum of 45 years. Borrowers were also 
drawn from a range of educational backgrounds: five participants had a university 
degree, five held a diploma and two had completed a high school education.  
In terms of borrowing and home ownership experience, the majority of 
participants were taking a loan to purchase a property (10 participants) rather than 
refinancing (two participants). There was also a clear variety in purchase history; six 
144 Chapter 5: Home loan selection decisions 
participants were purchasing their first property while the other six were repeat 
purchasers.  
In terms of the size of financial transaction, sampling reflected both household 
income (a proxy for ability to service debt) and house value (a proxy for collateral) 
to try and understand behaviours across the spread of property types. The spread of 
house value ranged from $250,000 to over $1,500,000. Six participants purchased a 
home between the values of $250,000 and $450,000, and a further five between 
$450,000 and $1,000,000. One participant purchased a property valued at over 
$1,500,000. Two borrowers’ pre-tax household incomes lay under $80,000. The 
majority of household incomes fell between $100,000 and $190,000 per annum (nine 
participants) and one borrower’s incoming exceeded $300,000. Table I1 in Appendix 
I provides a summary of study participants. 
5.2.3  Data collection 
Data were collected in three stages: (1) a demographic questionnaire; (2) an 
interview; and, where necessary, (3) an extended interview with participants who 
were unable to consider and provide feedback about a sample KFS during the 
interview. In Stage 3, participants who were unable to look over an example KFS 
during the interview were emailed one and asked to provide comments on their 
perceptions of the value and limits of KFS. Participants could elect whether feedback 
was handled by subsequent interview or by email. The data collection process is set 
out in Figure 5.1, which shows the progression of the three stages and the method 
used to conduct each. 
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Figure 5.1. Outline of data collection process. 
5.2.4  Instrument design 
Instrument design reflected the data collection process. Three key instruments 
were developed to reflect the three key phases in data collection.  
5.2.4.1 Demographic questionnaire 
An eight-item demographic questionnaire was sent to each participant before 
the interview to help capture which of the decision-maker’s attributes may have 
influenced their decision process (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Ryan & Bernard, 
2000). The demographic questionnaire also contained a question relating directly to 
the purpose of the loan (i.e. purchase or refinance). This acted as a screen to 
highlight participants who had not taken out a loan in their home purchase and who 
therefore did not fit the target population. The demographic questionnaire is 
presented in Appendix J. 
The questionnaire was designed around pre-structured demographic categories 
that required respondents to check the relevant fact bands. This was done to 
minimise the perceived time cost of completing the survey (Dillman, 1991). The use 
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of relatively limited range bands around individual data topics also avoided 
requesting specific values for potentially sensitive information such as age or pre-tax 
household income, to encourage participants to give an accurate and complete 
response (Dillman, 1991). 
The demographic questionnaire was accompanied by the ethical participation 
information sheet, which stated the nature of the research and what was expected of 
participants. Participants were also informed that the interviews may be recorded, 
and were asked to indicate their consent to this. This ensured each participant was 
clear about the nature of the project and what was required of them before taking 
part. 
5.2.4.2 Interview guide 
A critical step in conducting semi-structured interviews is the design of the 
interview guide (Patton, 1980, pp. 342-344). Careful planning during the 
construction of the interview guide increases the richness and depth of the data 
collected and ensures that the objectives of the study and research questions are 
addressed. Good planning can also address potential concerns of interviewer bias 
that might arise due to the researcher’s own beliefs and values, and increases the 
confirmability of the data (Fowler & Mangione, 1990, p. 138; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). 
The interview guide was designed to elicit the key themes to be addressed with 
example questions and potential probe points on the topics of interest. The process of 
developing the interview guide allowed the researcher to clearly identify the 
questions that should be asked and how they should be phrased, and to ensure that 
the data collection would address the research objectives (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
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Given the exploratory nature of this research design, a semi-structured 
interview instrument was designed specifically for the study. This meant that the 
guide was flexible – a framework as opposed to a strict set of questions. Focusing on 
broad topic areas and questions allowed the researcher to steer the interview in a 
flexible but thorough manner. This is consistent with a key marker of qualitative 
research – that it should reflect the views of the participants, not the researcher 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2010). As interviews progressed, the interviews became more 
structured to reflect the emergence of key themes. 
The interview guide included five sections. The opening section introduced the 
researcher, topic and study. The second section focused on general, non-threatening 
screening questions about the process. The third section asked participants to 
describe in their own words how they chose the loan they received, followed by 
specific questions and prompts to further their motivations and the potential factors 
which may have limited KFS use. The fourth section focused specifically on the role 
and use of KFS in the decision-making process and collected data about the 
participants’ opinions of their usefulness and content. Finally, the interviewer 
reviewed the overall process, asked the participants how easy they found the 
experience, and concluded by asking if they would like to add anything. A copy of 
the interview guide is included in Appendix K. 
Before the main study commenced, pilot testing was conducted in two phases. 
First, the structure and questions of the interview were reviewed with non-borrowers 
to ensure that the meaning of the questions was correctly conveyed and that the 
interview flowed effectively. Second, after the protocol was amended it was tested 
with a member of the target population to identify weaknesses in the interview 
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process. The results from this interview are not included in the analysis. The 
interview protocol was finalised post-pilot testing and updated after each interview 
to ensure that all items of importance were adequately explored (Bernard, 1988). For 
instance, after the first interview, questions around the emerging themes in the data 
were introduced and/or refined to ensure necessary data were captured in future 
interviews (Bernard, 1988). 
5.2.4.3 Post-interview follow-up 
Nine of the 12 interviewees examined KFS and provided feedback during the 
interview. Two participants who completed the interview via telephone requested 
that a copy of a KFS be emailed to them so that they could examine it and respond 
later. One participant opted not to view KFS and did not provide feedback regarding 
their specific content and layout.55 Participants had discussed the points of interest 
around KFS in the interview, so the email to participants was kept short, reminding 
them of the key items of information desired. The email sent to these participants is 
included in Appendix L. Email responses to the participants were included at the end 
of the participants’ transcripts and analysed along with their responses during the 
interview. 
5.2.5  The interview process 
The majority of participants requested that the interview be conducted via 
telephone for their convenience, although four interviewees opted to be interviewed 
face to face. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in a location convenient for the 
participant where it was also possible to enable a good quality audio recording 
(Patton, 1980, pp. 380-384). It was also important that participants felt comfortable 
                                                            
55 This participant did comment on the idea of KFS after the purpose and content were described to 
him. 
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so dialogue could flow freely and openly (DiCicco‐Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). Three 
interviews took place at the participant’s home and another interview was conducted 
in a meeting room on QUT’s university campus. 
The interviews were conducted in a conversational style to encourage a free-
flowing conversation. This can elicit deeper insights from participants (Brinkmann & 
Kvale, 2015). All interviews were audio recorded to capture the interviewees’ 
responses and perspectives as fully and fairly as possible (Patton, 1980, pp. 380-
382). This reduced the need to rely upon handwritten notes – which may be 
incomplete or slow down the interview process – and freed the interviewer to focus 
on the interview. A mobile application was used to record telephone interviews and a 
standard voice recorder application was used for face-to-face interviews. 
Field notes were also taken to during the interviews to supplement the 
recordings. This provided four key benefits: (1) notes helped the interviewer 
formulate new questions during the interview; (2) looking over field notes allowed 
the interviewer to reflect on the interview process where there was not enough time 
between interviews for transcription to take place; (3) taking notes helped facilitate 
later analysis; and (4) notes could be used to reconstruct key points of the data in 
case the recorder malfunctioned (Patton, 1980, p. 383). In one instance, a recording 
failed to save correctly. The main points of the interview were reconstructed from 
the written notes, and expanded upon immediately following the interview. Lack of a 
formal transcript meant that while themes were identified in the interview, it was not 
possible to use direct quotations in the analysis. 
Before each interview formally commenced, the interviewer read out the 
required ethical information detailing the purpose of the study and asked whether the 
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participant had any further questions or concerns. Borrowers were also asked to 
confirm their consent to having the interview audio recorded for data analysis 
purposes. The formal interview had three key phases. The interview commenced 
with the formalities and a brief screening process to ensure that borrowers fit the 
target population. Following DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree (2006) the open questions 
used to screen participants were both general and unobtrusive and designed to help 
build rapport while getting borrowers thinking about their home loan decision. 
The second phase of the interview concentrated on understanding the 
borrower’s individual decision process. Borrowers were asked to step the interviewer 
through their decision process in their own words to highlight how they had made 
their decision and what role, if any, KFS had played in their decision. It also helped 
identify potential barriers to KFS use, including those arising from the decision-
making process and/or the borrowers’ choice criteria. Borrowers were then asked the 
primary reason for their loan choice, and whether they had considered any other 
factors when comparing offers. Where necessary, probes and prompts were used to 
further explore the process, including the information used and reasons for key 
decisions, and to explore any other areas of interest that emerged. 
Direct questions about KFS and the influence of KFS on the borrowing 
decision were held until the third phase of the interview to avoid biasing participant 
responses (Dingwall, 1997). This allowed the researcher to discern between 
unprompted and prompted responses about KFS. The researcher commenced direct 
KFS questions by asking participants if they had heard of, or had encountered, KFS 
during their borrowing experience. Where participants had encountered KFS, they 
were asked if they had used them, and their rationale. This ensured that data to 
Chapter 5: Home loan selection decisions 151 
inform the second question were collected. All participants were then presented with 
a KFS and, after being given time to examine it, were asked to provide comments or 
recommendations on the document (see Question 5 in Appendix K, interview 
protocol). Participants were asked if they had seen this document (or one like it) 
during their decision process. Where the interview was conducted over the phone, a 
KFS was emailed to participants. By presenting participants with KFS, the 
researcher was able to gain feedback on the perceived usefulness of KFS, and to ask 
participants who had not encountered one if they would have used it. This helped 
inform the third research question regarding the barriers to KFS use in practice. 
Finally, borrowers were asked to assess the difficultly of collecting and 
comparing information about home loan offers. They were also asked how much 
time they spent comparing loans, and why they stopped comparing offers when they 
did. The researcher concluded the interview by asking participants to raise any issues 
or experiences that they felt the interview had not covered adequately or at all, and 
whether they believed anything important had been missed or misinterpreted 
(Barriball & While, 1994, p. 329). 
The audio from the completed interviews was transcribed verbatim by the 
researcher. This allowed the researcher to become immersed in the data, which 
builds familiarity with the data and helps generate emergent insights (Patton, 1980, 
p. 441). It also provided an opportunity to reflect on the interview process and the 
interview guide.  
Transcription is a key part of managing data and also aids in the analysis, 
coding and reporting of the raw data (Gioia et al., 2012; Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 
56; Patton, 2001, p. 440). Transcription allowed for the participants’ responses, the 
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raw data for the interview, to be presented as fully and fairly as possible without 
losing accuracy (Patton, 1980, p. 380). Despite this, it is acknowledged that there is a 
level of judgement and interpretation required in transposing the spoken word to text 
and that even the transcriptions are a form of ‘processed data’ (Tilley, 2003; 
Wengraf, 2001). Finally, during transcription all identifying information was 
removed to ensure the participants’ anonymity.  
5.2.6  Data analysis 
Data analysis in qualitative research focuses on determining 
categories/constructs, relationships between these constructs, and assumptions based 
on the participants’ views of the world (Patton, 1980, p. 47). The overall approach to 
data analysis, particularly interview data, therefore involves taking the data apart (i.e. 
deconstructing the interview into its constituent data points) and then re-organising it 
into a synthetic view of the topic of interest (Creswell, 2013). Generally this is a 
cyclical model or an iterative process (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Marshall & Rossman, 
2010, p. 155) where the researcher iterates between emerging themes and the data. 
Unlike the phased approach of quantitative research (i.e. design, collection, 
analysis), qualitative research involves analysis throughout the process so that the 
emerging themes and evidence can be fully explored (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 
225). Data analysis essentially begins during the planning and pilot-testing stages of 
the research and continues throughout the overall process. This allows the 
researcher’s understanding to evolve as the interviews unfold, which in turn allows 
the proceeding interviews to benefit from the new level of understanding (Patton, 
1980, p. 318).  
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Coding was conducted in three stages to ensure a high level of qualitative 
rigour (Gioia et al., 2012). In the first stage, open coding was used to analyse the 
data on face value with little attempt made to classify data into themes (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). This process occurred largely during the interviews themselves, as the 
researcher attempted to identify and explore emerging themes (Langley, 1999; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997) and was finalised after all the 
interviews had been completed. In the second stage, axial coding was used to label 
and group consistent responses into second-order categories (Corbin & Strauss, 
1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In the third stage, these second-order categories were 
linked together into broader ‘aggregate dimensions’ surrounding the use of, and 
barriers to the use of KFS. 
Following Gioia et al. (2013), the data progression was then presented visually 
in a ‘data structure’ (Figure 5.2) to display visually how the terms have moved 
through the classification system (Pratt, 2008; Tracy, 2010). As noted in (Gioia, 
Price, Hamilton & Thomas 2010) and Gioia et al. (2012) the diagram is not meant to 
represent causal relationships, but rather to demonstrate how each theme evolved. 
These aggregate dimensions represent the barriers inherent in borrower decision-
making strategies and values that can prevent KFS from being effective in practice. 
5.3 Results 
The results from the interviews show that three barriers reduce the 
effectiveness of KFS in enhancing borrower decision-making. In summary, the 
findings indicate that, overall, KFS played a very limited role in borrower decision-
making, largely as a result of three key barriers: 
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1) Lack of awareness surrounding KFS and their primary purpose often 
prevents borrowers who would otherwise use KFS from requesting one. 
2) Reliance on third-party advice – such as from mortgage brokers – curtails 
borrowers’ personal collection and comparison of information, limiting 
their analysis to either one option or a short list of recommendations. For 
repeat borrowers this advice often came from mortgage brokers, while 
first-time borrowers tended to rely on family members to guide the process. 
Heavy reliance on this advice means that most borrowers choose to accept 
the recommendation outright, with few seeking additional information 
themselves. 
3) Lender loyalty and/or convenience influence the majority of borrowers to 
stay with their existing financial service provider. Price; avoiding time and 
monetary costs, and inconveniences involved in dealing with unfamiliar 
lenders; customer service arising from extended dealings; and the benefits 
provided by product-packaging the home loan with other existing products 
were all incentives for borrowers to continue their relationships with their 
current lender. 
Figure 5.2 visually illustrates progression of the data from the first-order 
concepts to the second- and third-order themes. 
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Figure 5.2: Data structure. 
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At the heart of the issue, borrowers still find that the information available is 
complex. A major contributing factor is that the vast majority of borrowers are 
unaware that KFS exist. Borrowers who examined KFS during the interviews often 
found them to be useful, stating that they believed that KFS presented the loan 
pricing information in a clear and understandable manner. The perceived complexity 
inherent in comparing home loans often led many borrowers to seek out third-party 
advice. Finally, some borrowers perceived KFS to be less useful where they relied 
heavily on third-party advice or faced incentives to remain with the same bank. 
Figure 5.3 sets out the relationship between the constructs detected, and how they 
impact on KFS ability to enhance borrower decision-making in practice. 
 
Figure 5.3. Interviews: Conceptual framework. 
 
Despite the barriers to KFS use, around half of the borrowers reported that they 
would have used KFS when making their decision, had they known of them. These 
borrowers tended to be first-time borrowers who did not rely on third-party advice. 
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Nevertheless, all borrowers reported that they believed the information contained on 
KFS was useful, especially for helping new borrowers comprehend the products 
being offered to them. Appendix M provides quotes representing the responses that 
formed the first-order themes and shows how they relate to the second-order themes 
and, more broadly, to the aggregate dimensions.  
The research will now look at each theme in more depth. It starts by examining 
how the lack of awareness prevents borrowers from using KFS and therefore 
prevents KFS from having a role in borrower decision-making (Section 5.3.1). It 
then examines how borrowers perceive the complexity of home loan information as a 
result (Section 5.3.2). Third, it examines how KFS are received by borrowers, given 
their perception of home loan information (Section 5.3.3). Fourth, it examines how 
third-party advice results from the perceived complexity of the comparative process 
and may stand as a barrier to borrowers’ awareness and use of KFS. Finally, it 
examines how the costs of choosing to deal with a new lender may reduce 
participants’ willingness to deal with new lenders and therefore may reduce the 
impact of KFS. 
5.3.1 Lack of awareness 
The main finding of the research is that the largest barrier to the effective use 
of KFS in practice is the overwhelming lack of awareness that they exist. The vast 
majority of the borrowers interviewed had never heard of a KFS before, nor did they 
encounter one during their home loan process. Only one of the 12 borrowers was 
aware that KFS existed and was able to explain what they were. This borrower had 
encountered KFS while researching for her previous mortgage, but had not seen one 
during her most recent borrowing experience. Only one other borrower vaguely 
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recalled hearing of KFS but had not seen one and did not know what they were. 
Further, they reported that they would not have recalled KFS existence had they not 
been asked.  
This lack of awareness was consistent across borrowers who had done varying 
levels of search. Three borrowers in particular reported searching extensively for 
information, each one of them collecting information directly from lenders and/or 
their websites. Two of these borrowers reported that they had seen other calculators 
available from lenders, but neither been made aware of KFS. The following quotes 
demonstrate the surprise of two borrowers who, despite such extensive search, did 
not encounter one:  
And it’s funny because I feel like I did quite a lot of research into this. And I 
looked at quite a look of videos and looked up a lot of different things and to 
have not seen that you could just find these like this is a bit funny. 
(Borrower 7) 
That fact sheet is exactly what you need to compare loan against loan, not sure 
how I missed them when I was looking, unless they are new? (Borrower 1) 
This lack of awareness also appeared to affect the likelihood that a borrower 
will encounter KFS during their search. The findings suggest that where borrowers 
are unaware of KFS, they do not know to ask for them or what to search for. 
Consequently they must rely entirely on the lender, or the lender’s website, to guide 
them to the document: 
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Maybe they didn’t come up first in the search I guess? When I was typing in, I 
didn’t really know to look for them because I didn’t know that they were there 
to begin with. (Borrower 7) 
These findings show that, when coupled with the requirement for borrowers to 
seek KFS, the lack of awareness creates a significant barrier to their effectiveness. It 
also suggests that where borrowers are unaware, lenders’ disclosure practices do not 
address this by bringing KFS to borrowers’ attention, either in response to requests 
for pricing information or through effective website design. Notably, one borrower 
chose a loan with their current bank without searching at all due to personal 
circumstances. Where borrowers adopt this strategy they are also unlikely to either 
encounter or use KFS in their decision: 
I just went to the local branch where I had my accounts and saw the 
manager... The bank said yes, so I said great. (Borrower 4) 
An obvious and severe consequence of this lack of awareness is that borrowers 
are unable to use KFS when making their decision. However, this also has an 
indirect effect on borrower decision-making because the lack of awareness of KFS 
also means borrowers’ perception of the home loan information available is 
incomplete. The next section of the research discusses the participants’ perceptions 
of the home loan information available. 
5.3.2 Perceived information complexity 
A dominant theme which emerged throughout the interviews was that many 
borrowers still found the information surrounding home loan costs to be confusing 
and difficult to compare. Two-thirds of the borrowers commented that the 
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information surrounding home loan costs was complex, used inconsistent 
terminology, was hard to understand and compare and/or was unclear56 – the very 
issues KFS were targeted at reducing (Australian Government, 2011b, pp. 31-35; 
Economic Reference Committee, 2011, pp. 121-123). This information complexity 
had two major effects on borrowers’ decision making: They either sought advice 
from a third party, or attempted to simply search by considering less, or no, 
information: 
As I said, we use a broker because it’s all so confusing. We use a broker we’ve 
used him for the last 14 years, and we took his information and went through it 
with him and accepted what he recommended. (Borrower 6) 
Um, I think all this sort of financial stuff, because it’s such a cumbersome stuff, 
and the comparisons are not easy to make, I think people just make a decision 
like I did, and just say, yup, great you’re going to give me the money, without 
really going to that comparative level. (Borrower 1) 
Although the majority of borrowers mentioned that the information was 
confusing, both the borrowers’ time available for the search and their prior 
knowledge and experience appeared to affect whether this complex information 
meant borrowers found comparisons difficult. Consequently, of the nine borrowers 
who reported finding information unclear or confusing in some way, only five 
reported that they found it difficult to compare the information. Interestingly, more 
borrowers who had experience or financial knowledge found information 
comparison more difficult. Four of the repeat borrowers claimed that information 
was difficult to compare, as opposed to two first-time borrowers, both of whom had 
                                                            
56 Appendix M contains representative quotes for each of these. 
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a background in finance. An analysis of the responses provides two key factors 
which may explain this: 
1) Borrowers’ prior knowledge and experience with other financial products 
can aid borrowers in comparison. 
2) Borrowers who have more time to compare their options often find this 
makes it easier. 
5.3.2.1 Prior knowledge and experience 
As may be expected, an emerging theme throughout the interviews was that 
prior knowledge due to educational background or prior borrower experience, for 
both home and personal loans, could make the process easier. Three repeat 
borrowers and two first-time borrowers reported that their prior knowledge made 
comparison, for them personally, much easier whereas they would otherwise have 
had difficulty: 
It was pretty self-explanatory, I think again if it was my first time it would have 
been completely different and it would have been completely confusing. 
(Borrower 8) 
I don’t think it’s very difficult to be honest. Because, not talking about home 
loans themselves, but I’m sure it would be similar, by looking at personal 
loans a lot of the big banks offer loan calculators, so you type in the desired 
amount and the desired time and the current offered interest rate and it gives 
you an estimated of how much it would cost you. So I would not say it’s 
difficult at all, I would say it’s all individual, if people are slack enough. Or if 
they’re, I suppose that some people don’t know the information is out there 
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and they don’t know how to look for it either. So it’s sort of a personal 
decision as to whether it’s difficult. (Borrower 10) 
Although four borrowers reported that they found the process easy due to prior 
knowledge, the participants were almost evenly divided in their perceptions of 
information complexity. Five of the 12 participants interviewed believed that the 
information collection and comparison process was difficult. This included half of 
the repeat borrowers and those with university qualifications. Notably, two of the 
three borrowers who reported having backgrounds in finance found information 
comparison difficult: 
I have some financial background but, my husband he has no background at 
all but he had experience with getting loan for property purchase before but 
we were quite frustrated at times because the information is not clear and we 
don’t know, okay, this bank has a long list of administration cost which we 
have to pay and then the interest rates are also different and in the end we 
don’t know. (Borrower 12) 
I think it is, it’s very confusing, even to me I work in finance, that comparison 
rate they provide is not useful at all because it’s based on $150,000 always, so 
I think that the banks should be able to, very easily, what your real comparison 
rate is, based on that amount that you are borrowing. So I was dividing the fee 
by the total loan together to get the basis point impact or something, on each 
fixed sort of fixed fee, then adding that to the variable rate instead of using the 
comparison rate, if that makes sense. (Borrower 1) 
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5.3.2.2 Time constraints 
Time constraints appear to be a determining factor in whether borrowers found 
information comparison difficult. When asked to describe the difficulty of 
comparing information, half of the participants referred to the time required to make 
a decision. Here, the majority of the borrowers who mentioned that the process was 
difficult referred to the time required to make accurate comparisons:  
Well [the broker’s advice] was very important, I don’t have the time to sit and 
follow the home loan market. I have five other companies and I need trusted 
information and the gentleman’s been at it for over 35 years. He’s 72 years old 
and he’s very active and he’s very good. (Borrower 6) 
Definitely a case of getting to what you think is the optimal solution and 
deciding that you’ve wasted enough time looking around (Borrower 2) 
If it was much easier to look at this information, then you’d probably do a 
better job of saving yourself some money. But no, so we are all time poor. 
(Borrower 1) 
In contrast, one of the two first-time borrowers who reported that information 
search was easy reported searching for ‘a good couple of months’ when making his 
decision (Borrower7). Another borrower reported finding information search 
moderately difficult due to the time it would take: 
Moderately. People would need to do a bit of research, but I think on the 
whole it would be ... I mean it would take a bit of time but you would be able to 
find it. (Borrower 11) 
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Figure 5.4 provides a breakdown of the perceived difficulty of information 
comparisons, taking into account the effects of prior knowledge and time: 
 
Figure 5.4. Perceived difficulty of home loan comparisons. 
 
Perhaps less obviously, borrowers who chose to search also appeared to be 
affected by the complexity of the information available. All the borrowers who 
reported collecting and comparing information themselves reported a similar 
comparison process. Each described talking to one or two banks at a time and 
evaluating the available alternatives. The borrowers often negotiated with the banks 
until one offer stood out as better than the other. If they were satisfied with one of 
the offers they weighed up the cost of switching (if necessary) and made their 
decision based on this information: 
I did have a look at one other lender, I had a look at the NAB there, they were 
offering something very very similar, obviously they tried to get as much 
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information about the lender that I was pre-approved with and I just played 
open cards with them because I wanted the best deal possible for myself. 
(Borrower 2) 
As the above quote indicates, the majority of loan comparisons were based on 
the price of the loan despite the complexity surrounding it. Rather than ignoring 
price and focusing on simpler information as has been found in other contexts 
(Bharadwaj et al., 1993; Korobkin, 1998; Nayyar, 1990; Zeithaml, 1988), borrowers 
often delegated the comparison process to a third party, or focused on comparing 
price using proxies such as the interest rate and loan fees. While borrowers did 
consider a number of other factors, the interest rate was particularly influential: 
It gets a little more complicated because CBA gave me a thousand dollars first 
home buyer so if you take that into consideration that’s about a percentage 
cheaper already. And also that I had my house insurance, well I got house 
insurance through CBA in there so it was a further 15% discount which I 
probably would have applied to the other banks so there are some other 
factors... The rate was the majority, about 90% of who I would choose and the 
other factors were sorta just icing on the cake I guess. 
All borrowers appear to have adopted some form of heuristic strategy to help 
them deal with the volume of information (Simon, 1955, 1957, 1990). Some 
borrowers did this by seeking help from a third party. The decision processes used 
by others match those predicted by heuristic models designed to reduce the effort 
required to arrive at a decision (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). For example, no 
borrower examined collected and compared information from all the available banks, 
or sought to compare the individual terms of each product. Rather, as the above 
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quotes show, they considered fewer options, and concentrated their comparisons on 
fewer attributes, usually one at a time before stopping at a loan with which they were 
satisfied: 
Oh, I went straight through to a broker, and the broker considered the best 
banks were, at the time, Heritage and Westpac. There was only a 0.01% 
different with Heritage being the better bank and I chose to go with Westpac, 
because all my bank accounts were already with them and for the 0.01% I 
didn’t think it was really worth switching over. (Borrower 8) 
The research here shows that borrowers still find home loan products 
overwhelmingly complex and that this complexity continues to affect borrower 
decision-making. This means that where borrowers find the presentation of KFS 
makes it simple and easy to compare the information they value, borrowers who 
encounter KFS are likely to benefit, but only where they choose to use them. 
5.3.3 Perceived usefulness of KFS 
Due to the complex nature of the information available to borrowers, all 
participants believed that the information contained on KFS was useful, clear and 
well presented. As one borrower noted:  
When I look at this I can see clearly that, you know, in case of I borrow that 
amount and it finally, I can pay for how many years and then the total amount 
that I pay and also all the fees related to the loan (Borrower 12) 
So that information is crucial and it is long overdue, that they can give them 
something that they can actually see that isn’t the banks scheniving and 
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manoeuvring in how it words its words and all its little phrases and all the 
rest, which they don’t understand. (Borrower 6) 
This was important as a strong theme that emerged from the data is that 
borrowers do value the price of the loan. Regardless of how the participants collected 
their information, whether independently or through a broker, the borrowers who 
compared loans all focused much of their comparison on the price of the loan. In 
doing so, the vast majority of the borrowers (11 of 12) compared interest rates across 
loans and many also considered the fees involved in the loan:  
If their rate wasn’t competitive I wouldn’t have went with them. I would have 
had to say that rate was probably 90% of it. (Borrower 4) 
Consequently, borrowers found the content of KFS, which were focused on 
enhancing price comparisons, extremely useful when comparing loans. In particular, 
two-thirds of the first-time buyers and one repeat borrower stated that they would 
have used KFS in their decision. These borrowers all searched widely for 
information and performed their own cost comparisons of the loan offers available to 
them. As a result, these borrowers believed that the clarity of KFS would have saved 
them a great deal of time and effort: 
That fact sheet is exactly what you need to compare loan against loan 
(Borrower 1) 
Borrowers who had experience taking out a home loan, however, appeared to 
view KFS as a tool for increasing comprehension of loan costs – as a way to inform 
the borrower of what to expect under the loan – rather than as a viable tool for 
making loan comparisons. While all the repeat borrowers acknowledged the 
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usefulness of KFS content, the majority reported that they still would not have used 
the information in their decision (5 of 6 repeat borrowers). Despite this, they were all 
supportive of KFS as a tool for helping inexperienced borrowers comprehend the 
costs of the loan: 
That kind of information is always helpful. It’s helpful for the person that goes 
into the bank, newly married, first-time home buyer and he has no idea what 
he’s walking into. So that information is crucial and it is long overdue, that 
they can give them something that they can actually see that isn’t the banks 
scheniving and manoeuvring in how it words it words and all its little phrases 
and all the rest, which they don’t understand. (Borrower 6) 
I think it gives you that reference point to keep going back to there is a lot of 
figures and a lot of information that gets sent out in an easy fact sheet. 
Knowing exactly what you have to pay back, there’s always a real benefit 
there. That’s always kinda the stressor for most people. (Borrower 8) 
The results here show that the lack of awareness surrounding KFS stands as a 
real barrier to legislative effectiveness, undermining KFS ability to enhance 
borrowers’ loan selection when used as intended. Where borrowers do, however, 
encounter KFS many are likely to use them in their comparison of information, and 
thus benefit from them. 
As a final note, the participants all reported finding that KFS cover all the 
important pricing information. Further analysis of participants’ reasons for choosing 
a particular lender highlighted a number of financial incentives offered by banks that 
exist apart from the loan and thus do not appear on KFS: 
Chapter 5: Home loan selection decisions 169 
 
 
It gets a little more complicated because CBA gave me a thousand dollars first 
home buyer so if you take that into consideration that’s about a percentage 
cheaper already. And also that I had my house insurance, well I got house 
insurance through CBA in there so it was a further 15% discount which I 
probably would have applied to the other banks so there are some other 
factors. (Borrower 3) 
Because borrowers consider KFS useful, and many would use them, the fact 
that the vast majority of borrowers remain unaware of their existence significantly 
undermines their effectiveness. Increasing borrower awareness of KFS therefore 
stands to improve their impact on the market and to enhance the decision quality of 
borrowers who choose to use them. 
5.3.4 Third-party advice 
The second barrier to the success of KFS revealed by the participants’ 
responses was the use of third-party advice and the tendency for borrowers to 
outsource the information search, comparison, and even the final decision to a third 
party. The relationship between the perceived complexity of home loan information 
and third-party advice has been examined above. This section looks at how the use 
of third-party advice may prevent borrowers from becoming aware of KFS’ 
existence, and consequently may prevent borrowers from receiving KFS, which 
further fuels the perception that information comparison is complex.  
Importantly, this created a number of decision processes depending on the how 
extensively the borrower relied on third-party advice, whether they used the third 
party for information or a recommendation, and whether they conducted their own 
search in conjunction with consulting a third party. Figure 5.5 sets out the common 
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decision processes evident within the data and demonstrates how these may prevent 
borrowers from becoming aware of KFS: 
 
Figure 5.5. Alternate decision processes. 
 
All but two of the 12 participants reported seeking advice from at least one 
third-party during the decision, and only two of these participants reported that the 
advice from these third parties did not play a large role in their decision. Rather, the 
majority of the borrowers reported that the advice they received from a third party 
was critical in driving or confirming their decision. Brokers in particular were often 
used as a means of comparing price. In particular, six of the 10 borrowers who relied 
on third-party advice did not conduct their own search for information. That this may 
stand as a barrier to KFS use is evident through the follow quotes: 
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I haven’t seen this for my current mortgage, because I got all the figures over 
the phone from my broker. But I have seen it when I walked into banks 
previously to see what the best offers were, and I had gone into Westpac or 
Commonwealth and been provided these sheets. (Borrower 8) 
Further, brokers often perform a similar role to KFS, comparing information 
across a number of sources. They do so with less effort on behalf of the borrower 
who does not need to search for the information themselves. Also, because 
borrowers sought advice from third parties whom they trusted, they often relied 
extensively on the recommendations they provided: 
I believe this factsheet to be very informative; I probably would've used it 
myself had I not been acting only on third-party advice. It's definitely 
informative of all relevant data, I can't think of anything further to add from 
my viewing of this document. (Borrower 11) 
’Cause if someone’s a professional at something you generally take their 
advice over your own. It’s what they do. (Borrower 10) 
The use of third-party advice may therefore prevent borrowers from 
encountering KFS or even prevent borrowers who are aware of KFS from using 
them. 
Half of the participants, four of whom were repeat borrowers, reported using a 
mortgage broker in their decision. Two other borrowers reported speaking to other 
professional parties, including a financial planner and a family member who worked 
for a bank. The vast majority of these borrowers (7 of 8) stated that these 
professionals formed the primary means of search and comparison.  
172 Chapter 5: Home loan selection decisions 
We worked through a broker and after we consulted him, he told us this is the 
preferred lender. After going through the information from him we accepted 
his information and used that. (Borrower 6) 
The level of reliance on professional advice was often found to be quite 
extreme. Two-thirds of the borrowers accepted the advice provided without 
considering any additional information:  
I think it was more a recommendation under him. I think we put our trust on 
him more than anything without fully understanding his motives because 
obviously that is what he is qualified in doing. We sort of took his personal 
advice, there would have been reason behind it but I can’t remember it at this 
time. (Borrower 10) 
Further, brokers were seen to provide benefits other than price comparison. 
They also provided advice on other aspects of the loan, such as how much to fix and 
which banks would be likely to deal with the client given their personal 
circumstances. For example, brokers were able to provide advice on which lenders 
are more likely than others to lend to self-employed borrowers, and advise about 
other features of the loan and what percentage of the loan, if any, may be best to fix 
given their circumstances: 
And that information that the brokers provided was very very useful. Their 
advice on how much to fix and how much to leave variable, over what kind of 
year, period and everything like that. (Borrower 8) 
Outsourcing was not limited only to brokers. Borrowers also reported seeking 
information or advice from co-workers, friends and family members. One-quarter of 
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the participants, all younger first-time borrowers, sought advice from a family 
member. Two of these borrowers reported that they followed the advice of a family 
member without searching for any further information: 
I just relied on my father, he was the one that got me to sign up with Westpac, 
establish a new bank account with Westpac especially for home loans. 
(Borrower 11) 
Another borrower, who reported searching for information, stated that he dealt 
with the banks exclusively through his accountants. In doing so, he believed that he 
was able to receive higher quality information, rather than relying on his 
understanding of home loans to ask the right questions: 
I actually got my accountants to deal directly with both banks. He could ask 
more of the astute questions or the relevant questions other than me just 
asking you the things that I think are important to me. (Borrower 2) 
Even where third parties were not the only means of information collection or 
comparison, they still played a significant role in the participants’ decision 
processes. Of the five borrowers who conducted their own information search, three 
reported using information from a third party to decide when to stop searching: 
So I negotiated a rate with CBA. I then went to an independent broker this is 
the rate I’m looking at getting, can you improve on that rate. He said, to be 
honest I can’t, that’s a pretty good rate ... if he would have said I could 
definitely get a better rate I would have further discussed with him and then at 
the same time I probably would have ran that process in parallel with talking 
to the bank 
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This use of third-party advice is potentially the least threatening to the success 
of KFS, because borrowers still search for information on their own and, as a result, 
have a chance to encounter KFS. 
Because many third parties to the decision either acted as intermediaries or 
substituted the borrowers’ personal comparison process, they have the potential to 
prevent borrowers from becoming aware of or collecting KFS. Given the lack of 
awareness, however, it is not possible to determine the extent to which third-party 
advice prevents borrowers from receiving KFS because, in the observed sample of 
borrowers, the level of search conducted by borrowers and the sources of 
information considered did not appear to affect KFS collection. 
5.3.5 Borrower inertia 
The final barrier to the effectiveness of KFS which emerged from the data was 
the tendency for borrowers to deal with lenders they have dealt with previously, even 
where they may be slightly more expensive. Over half of the borrowers (eight) 
reported taking out a loan with a lender with whom they had prior history. Borrowers 
often stated multiple reasons for choosing to stay with their bank. Table 5.1 shows 
the reasons cited for staying with their current lender along with their primary reason 
for staying. 
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Table 5.1 
Reasons Cited for Staying With the Current Lender (n=8)
Primary reasons for staying with current lender Primary reason Other reasons 
Price 2 5 
Relationship with lender (personal or business) 2 3 
Customer service quality 2 2 
Access to quick finance 1 0 
Avoiding the inconvenience of switching 1 2 
Familiarity with lenders’ systems 0 5 
Product packages discounts 0 3 
 
These results show that, despite the fact that all seven borrowers considered 
price in their comparison, borrowers often perceived that several other factors 
outweighed the financial benefits available from dealing with an unfamiliar lender. 
Seven of the eight participants who did not switch reported searching for a better 
offer before taking out a loan. 57 
As a whole, participants often valued their relationship with their lender, along 
with the customer service, sense of identity and security it brought. Over half (seven) 
of the borrowers believed that their relationship with their lender led to higher levels 
of customer service: 
I found that I get better service because I’ve got so many loans with the one 
bank every time I go to the bank they know who I am and they know what I’ve 
got. (Borrower 9) 
Further, borrowers often valued the security available from dealing with a 
lender with whom they had developed a relationship. This gave them confidence that 
                                                            
57 The borrower who did not shop for a better loan, Borrower 5, reported being forced to make a 
rushed decision due to personal circumstance. 
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the bank understood their situation and was better equipped to handle their affairs 
efficiently: 
Yes, it’s an interesting one, primarily; the relationship that I had with the 
private bankers that I’ve always worked with at Westpac gave me a great deal 
of comfort that they understood the business that we own as well as my private 
situation. So it was more of a comfort thing rather than anything to do sort of 
figure wise whatever the case may be. (Borrower 2) 
Despite the importance given to price, the idea that the benefits of continuing 
to deal with a familiar lender outweighed price was a common theme among the 
participants. Two participants indicated they knew that a cheaper offer existed. 
Further, five other participants stated that they would require significant savings 
before dealing with a new lender due to the time and inconvenience involved. This 
was particularly the case for participants who were refinancing loans: 
And it’s too much; it’s so hard to change to a different bank. It’s not just, okay 
you put a form in and I’ll drop it to that rate and we’ll fix it for two years. If 
you go to another bank you’ll probably have to give them all sorts of 
information and you know, tax returns and all sorts of stuff, and they don’t 
know you and they don’t know your business and, it would be a lot more 
drama. (Borrower 8) 
The inconvenience involved in moving existing products was not, however, 
isolated to refinancing loans. A first-time borrower reported that in order to use the 
loan’s offset account effectively, both she and her partner had to move their personal 
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banking to the new lender despite both having a good experience with their previous 
lender: 
Yeah for 20 years already. So we were really sad when we moved banks but we 
know that the only reason that we want our loan and we want all our bank 
accounts in one place … the thing with Westpac, they allow you to use offset 
accounts. You can have all your money in the access account and this balance 
can be used as money they can use to calculate the interest rate and help you, 
or help us to reduce the interest rate or interest expense at the end of the 
month. (Borrower 12) 
However, the inconvenience of moving personal accounts and learning to deal 
with new lenders’ systems may also keep first-time borrowers from changing lenders 
to get a better deal: 
The best two were Heritage and Westpac, there was only a 0.01% difference 
with Heritage being the better bank and I chose to go with Westpac, because 
all my bank accounts were already with them and for the 0.01% I didn’t think 
it was really worth switching over.  
Overall, while every borrower claimed that price was important, and 
sometimes even the most important factor in their decision, seven participants (58%) 
reported requiring anywhere between 0.3% and 1% savings on a loan before they 
would consider switching to another lender. Therefore, while price is an important 
part of the decision, seemingly smaller changes in the price do not appear to be 
sufficient to entice borrowers to deal with a different lender. The costs of dealing 
with a new lender therefore increase with the strength and duration of the 
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relationship, making it particularly enticing for borrowers with multiple credit 
products to remain with their current lender. Not only do the relationships between 
individual banking products often make it inefficient to deal with multiple lenders, 
but borrowers also offer discounts for packaging other financial products together, 
which further complicate the comparison and act as a disincentive to changing 
lenders: 
And also that I had my house insurance, well I got house insurance through 
CBA in there so it was a further 15% discount which I probably would have 
applied to the other banks so there are some other factors. (Borrower 3) 
The research therefore demonstrates that the majority of borrowers face strong 
financial and non-financial barriers when looking to change lenders. These barriers 
lead borrowers to require more substantial savings to switch loan products. 
Consequently, they limit the impact KFS will have in markets where the majority of 
loans are competitive by increasing the savings borrowers must identify when using 
KFS before a borrower is willing to switch. 
5.3.6 Participant recommendations 
At the end of the interview, participants were asked if they had any 
recommendations as to how the borrower experience could be improved, either by 
altering KFS or through other changes. Participants made two particular 
recommendations. 
First, three participants reported generally that they would like to see better 
financial education, although they did not propose a method for achieving this: 
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I have a 20-year-old son and I think goodness me if he were to read this 
document buying his first home he would have absolutely no idea what he was 
doing. Um and I do think that not enough emphasis is actually placed on 
informing consumers relative. It’s all good to provide them with a document 
and say read this document. And sign that you understand it. (Borrower 2) 
Second, participants recommended increasing the flexibility of KFS design. 
Two participants, when looking over the form, pointed out that the estimate is 
provided assuming repayments are made monthly, drawing attention to the 
importance of more frequent – but unreflected – repayment schedules. Both 
participants mentioned that it is important that the repayment frequency be able to be 
changed within the form’s calculations in order to show how doing so could change 
the estimate. At present, KFS are only available based on monthly repayments. The 
implementation of this feature may help borrowers gain a better understanding of the 
substantial effects that changes to the repayment frequency can make on the total 
cost of the loan. This change, however, remains pointless where borrowers continue 
to make their financing decision without considering KFS. 
5.4 Discussion 
This chapter set out to determine borrowers’ use of KFS in practice. This is 
motivated by findings in other countries that demonstrate the way in which 
borrowers choose home loans may prevent them from using KFS (Devlin, 2002; 
Ford & Jones, 2001; Illuminas, 2008; Mylonakis, 2007). The research found that 
KFS play no role in borrowers’ home loan decision-making, mainly because of a 
widespread lack of awareness about their existence. Consequently, many borrowers 
find home loan information complex, which leads to difficult and time-consuming 
180 Chapter 5: Home loan selection decisions 
comparisons. This means many borrowers still delegate the comparison process to 
others whom they believe are more qualified to make better decisions. Those 
borrowers who do conduct their own comparisons were found to consider a small 
number of lenders and appeared to compare only a few attributes from each loan. 
The most fundamental finding of the research is that the majority of the 
borrowers do not know that KFS exist. The obvious and severe consequence of this 
is that KFS are unable to play a role in their decision. This means that, despite 
experimental findings that KFS help borrowers identify the cheapest loan when used 
as intended, these benefits are not realised in practice. This is a critical flaw in the 
legislation as all participants reported that they believed that the information 
contained on KFS was useful. Further, almost half of the borrowers examined (5 of 
12) reported that they would have used KFS had they been aware of them. 
Notably, this lack of awareness does not result from limited or misguided 
search on behalf of the borrower. Just under half of the borrowers reported that they 
searched for at least several days, to over a month, and collected information directly 
from lenders and their websites. Despite this, they remained uninformed of KFS. 
This raises significant questions about the choice to require borrowers to seek out a 
KFS in order to receive one, rather than following legislation in other countries that 
requires lenders to provide borrowers with similar information and present it to a 
borrower prior to the point at which the borrower may sign the contract. 
Because of the lack of awareness about KFS, borrowers continue to believe 
that the information surrounding home loans is complex. Consistent with bounded 
rationality theory, this belief has two key effects for their decision processes. 
Consistent with the theory of rational ignorance (Bayern, 2009; Downs, 1957; 
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Mackie, 2008), it discourages search, because borrowers perceive that attempts to 
educate themselves would involve higher costs and lower benefits. Second, it is 
consistent with literature which argues that standard form contracts are often too 
complex to compare (e.g. Eisenberg, 1995). The research demonstrates that 
borrowers use a number of decision shortcuts. The dual objectives of these shortcuts 
are consistent with research into heuristics and biases literature. First, consistent with 
work by Simon (1957, 1990) and other behavioural scholars, borrowers need to work 
within their cognitive limitations in order to compare home loan contracts. Second, 
borrowers use these shortcuts to reduce the effort and time required to arrive at a 
decision (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). 
The extent to and the ways in which borrowers use heuristics to economise on 
time and effort varies. Some two-thirds of the borrowers attempted to do this entirely 
by delegating the decision, or at least the majority of information collection and 
comparison work, to a third party who they believed was more capable of 
understanding the loan offers available and recommending the right one. The vast 
majority of borrowers who did so accepted the recommendations the third parties 
provided, with little or no additional search. In this respect, borrowers believed that 
mortgage brokers and other professionals, in particular, were more qualified to make 
an accurate evaluation of their loan options. 
Less commonly, borrowers attempted to conduct their own search process 
while ignoring a large amount of the information available. In doing so, borrowers 
were found to use two broad styles of heuristics which reduced the cognitive 
demands on borrowers in two key ways (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). First, 
borrowers reduced the number of alternatives they considered at any one time. 
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Borrowers who collected their own information often focused on one or two offers at 
a time and usually made their decision after comparing a single offer from two of the 
major Australian banks. The data comparison processes reported by borrowers also 
provide support for satisficing search strategies, because borrowers often stopped at 
a result that they were comfortable with despite considering only a few offers 
(Simon, 1972, 1990). Borrowers’ selection of lender, and the alternatives they 
considered, also suggests that borrowers’ decisions suffer from availability bias 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). Here, borrowers tended to seek loans with 
well-known lenders, primarily the big four, except where the borrower had previous 
ties to another bank. 
Similarly, borrowers were found to compare offers predominantly on a single 
attribute, usually price, when choosing between alternatives. If a borrower determine 
that a loan other than one offered by their current lender was most cost effective, 
they then considered whether dealing with a new lender was worth the cost of 
switching and the loss of benefits provided by their relationship with the existing 
lender. This process largely follows the matching heuristics proposed by Dhami and 
Ayton (2001) which posits that decision-makers use a series of comparisons based 
on a single cue at a time. The information cues compared are ordered by their ability 
to determine the most valued outcome, and compared to determine whether 
borrowers should move from a default option. The final choice is based on the 
combination of comparison results (Dhami & Harries, 2010). That is to say, 
borrowers first identify a cheaper loan, usually using their current lender as a basis 
for comparison, and then determine whether switching is viable. If the compared 
lender is more expensive, or the borrower deems switching is not worth it, the 
borrower proceeds to borrow from their current lender. 
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These decision processes are consistent with those found to occur in other 
home loan markets without KFS or equivalent documents. Based on these findings, 
the second research concludes, in response to the second research question, that KFS 
do not play any role in borrowers’ home loan decision-making processes. The lack of 
awareness prevents KFS from changing borrowers’ perceptions of search costs and 
prevents borrowers from benefiting from KFS ability to improve heuristic 
judgements of loan quality. 
Research into similar disclosure regimes in other complex Australian industries 
and overseas home loan markets suggests that making KFS mandatory will help 
increase the awareness of their existence (ACMA, 2014; Financial Services 
Authority, 2006). However, this is unlikely to completely address the issue; further 
research into the UK’s KFI suggests that this approach shares a similar flaw to 
previous disclosure approaches, which provide information too late in the decision 
process to be effective at influencing borrower choice (Illuminas, 2008). This same 
research, however, shows that UK borrowers who did obtain KFI earlier in the 
decision process found them useful in guiding their decision. Consequently, 
regulators need to make an effort to ensure borrowers receive KFS while they are 
searching for information to use in their home loan comparisons. 
The interviews also highlight another barrier to the success of KFS, which 
stands independently of the awareness of KFS: Borrowers do not make decisions 
solely on the price of a loan. Consistent with Devlin (2002) the research showed that 
the majority of borrowers place substantial value on their relationship with prior 
lenders. These relationships are seen to lead to a number of benefits, including a 
sense of identity within the bank, the enhanced ability and increased willingness of 
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the lender to meet the borrowers’ needs and a range of benefits for packaging 
products. Here, around two-thirds of the borrowers indicated that they would require 
substantial savings in order to deal with a new lender. The results show that these 
barriers become more prevalent as borrower–lender relationships become more 
complex. Therefore, borrowers who have a number of products with one lender, 
particularly where they are looking to refinance a home loan, were more likely to 
remain with a particular lender. 
Another primary driver of customer inertia was the cost in terms of time and 
effort required to deal with a new lender. Even where borrowers did not have a pre-
existing home loan, they often moved their savings account to the new lender in 
order to use loan features, such as offset accounts, more effectively. In this respect, 
the lack of account portability of banking products can create significant difficulties 
for borrowers. This problem has been noted by the government in the 2014 
Financial Systems Inquiry Interim Report: 
Several submissions identify low rates of transaction account switching as an 
obstacle to improving banking competition. Roy Morgan Research estimates 
that 3.2 per cent of consumers switch their main financial institution each 
year. This means that, on average, consumers switch approximately every 30 
years. The Government introduced a transaction account switching tool in 
2011 to help consumers transfer their direct debits and credits. However, take-
up of the service has been low, with only 17,500 people using the system in 
2013. (Murray Committee, 2014b, pp. 2-19) 
The response to this has been the twin initiative to KFS under the National 
Consumer Credit Protection Amendment Regulations 2011 (No. 2) (Cth) wherein 
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switching fees between loans were banned and additional steps were taken to 
promote cheap, convenient switching (see also Economic Reference Committee, 
2011, pp. 110-144; Fraser, 2011). The aim is to make it easier for borrowers to move 
between lenders, with KFS expected to help borrowers to identify cheaper options. 
At this stage, however, switching remains onerous, and borrowers’ lack of awareness 
currently prevents KFS use from achieving the desired effect in practice. 
Further, while borrowers reported that KFS comprehensively covered all the 
pricing variables, closer investigation into the reasons provided for customer inertia 
also highlighted a number of pricing variables that are not captured by KFS. These 
include savings on non-loan products such as insurance, waiving of fees, special 
interest rates or cash-back offers. This suggests that, by attempting to minimise the 
amount of information provided to borrowers, KFS have excluded some information 
which borrowers find useful in comparing the savings available from each offer. 
Legislation in the UK has attempted to address this by including a section which 
specifically addresses special offers that may be related to a particular loan. While 
important, these stand as secondary issues to maximising KFS effectiveness because 
addressing these barriers will provide no benefit until borrowers use KFS. 
Finally, age, income and gender of borrowers were not found to directly affect 
borrowers’ decision-making. The data contain trends consistent with Devlin (2002), 
which showed that females and borrowers with higher incomes were more likely to 
deal with lenders they had previously dealt with; however, these trends are largely 
explained by the strength of the borrowers’ relationships with the lenders. With the 
exception of one female who switched lenders, these borrowers had all taken out a 
previous loan with the lender they ended up borrowing from. Similarly, while 
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younger borrowers were more likely to deal with a new lender, all borrowers who 
changed lenders were first-time borrowers and usually did so based on third-party 
advice. Consequently, it appears that the primary factor driving a borrower’s 
decision-making appears to be the experience of a borrower and, perhaps more 
specifically, the strength of their prior relationship with the lender. 
Notably, during the interviews three borrowers mentioned having a 
background in finance. All three were first-time borrowers and reported conducting 
their own searches. All three reported that they performed their own comparisons 
and two of the three reported that they found comparing loans difficult. These two 
reported comparing their own analysis with advice from a third party. This suggests 
that while education in finance appears to encourage borrowers to search, they still 
rely on third-party advice to confirm their choice and may still find the information 
available confusing. The level of education also serves as an alternate explanation 
for the different levels of search between first-time and repeat borrowers. 
In response to RQ3, the results from the interviews show that the primary 
barrier to KFS use is that the vast majority of borrowers are unaware of their 
existence. Consequently, KFS play no role in borrowers’ decision processes in 
practice, despite the findings from the experimental study in Chapter 4 which show 
that they improve borrowers’ cost comparisons when used as intended. This means 
that borrowers continue to find pre-contractual home loan information complex and 
still attempt to reduce the effort required to identify a competitive loan by using 
heuristic search and, more prominently, by delegating the comparison process to 
third parties. These findings highlight that the current disclosure requirements are not 
sufficient to ensure borrowers receive KFS even where borrowers conduct extensive 
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search and retrieve information directly from lenders or their websites. Coupled with 
the widespread lack of awareness, this undermines the overall impact KFS have on 
borrower decision-making in practice. 
A second, less significant barrier is the general level of customer inertia born 
from the benefits of relationships with lenders and the consequent inconvenience 
involved in dealing with a new lender. Further, the content of KFS may be altered 
slightly to incorporate a space for special deals. These deals, such as savings on 
associated products, may also impact on the borrower’s overall financial wellbeing, 
although they are not specifically related to the cost of the loan offer itself. 
5.5 Limitations 
A range of limitations are noted as potentially affecting the integrity of results. 
Both interviews and the demographic evidence rely on the participant to make 
subjective reports. Although these reports provide insight into participants’ personal 
experiences and their methods of thinking, this may come at the risk of some 
participants attempting to provide answers that make themselves appear more 
prudent and savvy than they are in practice (Malbon, 1999). Additionally, both sets 
of data rely on individuals’ perspectives of the decision-making process and on their 
ability to accurately recall their progression through it (Last, 2000, p. 153). The 
researcher’s presence also risks bringing with it observer bias and, in consequence, 
skewed findings. Such bias is, however, unavoidable and this issue is inherent within 
most research methods (Dingwall, 1997; Yin, 2008).  
Further, themes found within the interviews may not be perfectly transferable 
to the entire population of borrowers. Targeted studies into specific demographic, 
socioeconomic and geographic variables may be required to further refine the 
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findings detected in this sample. The research here has, however, been focused on 
teasing out the relevant information and themes within the data, and achieving 
‘theoretical saturation’ where no new data is being presented and the concepts are 
well defined (Bloor & Wood, 2006; Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). Therefore, 
larger samples do not necessarily indicate a higher quality of research (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987, pp. 160-161). The use of purposive sampling techniques to 
maximise the variation within the sample population helps reduce the likelihood that 
systematic differences undermine stronger themes, such as the widespread lack of 
awareness of KFS detected in the sample. 
Finally, while the research here provides insight into the barriers that affect 
borrower decision-making practices, it does not provide any detailed insight into 
factors in the home loan market that may cause or strengthen these barriers. The 
interviews raise concerns that even where borrowers report searching extensively, 
they did not encounter a KFS.  
5.6 Summary 
The research conducted in this chapter has shown that, despite the 
effectiveness of KFS in enhancing borrowers’ comprehension of costs and 
improving their judgements of loan quality, borrowers remain largely unaware of 
their existence and consequently do not benefit from them. This raises serious 
questions about the requirement for the borrower to ask for or search for KFS and 
suggests that this requirement greatly reduces the likelihood borrowers encounter 
one during their decision. 
Given the widespread lack of awareness of KFS, in spite of some borrowers’ 
extensive search, the following chapter conducts a final study to investigate how 
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lender disclosure practices may be ineffective at guiding borrowers towards KFS. 
This final analysis seeks to determine the difficulties borrowers may face during 
their search for KFS, and the barriers that may prevent borrowers who are unaware 
of KFS from obtaining one. It is designed to provide additional insight into the 
barriers which prevent KFS from having a significant effect in the market and 
explain, at least in part, the lack of awareness of KFS.  

Chapter 6: Lender disclosure practices 191 
 
 
Chapter 6: Lender disclosure practices 
This chapter looks at lenders’ disclosure practices for delivering KFS to 
potential borrowers. Building on prior findings that KFS promote cost-competitive 
loan selection (Chapter 4) and that their benefit is impaired when borrowers are not 
aware of their existence (Chapter 5), this chapter analyses how lenders’ conduct 
enhances or detracts from KFS’ effectiveness. In particular, delivery of KFS to 
borrowers in accordance with standards set out under s 133 of the National 
Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (NCCP 2009) is tested for effectiveness in 
promoting KFS awareness among borrowers.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, currently lenders are only legally responsible for 
producing KFS when specifically requested by a borrower to do so. Borrowers 
therefore need to be aware of KFS’ existence to ask for them – potentially using the 
correct terminology – or rely on bank staff to voluntarily provide KFS information. 
For tech-savvy potential borrowers, the option of finding KFS information on 
lenders’ websites is contemplated under s 133AC of the legislation. However, the 
Act is silent about where on lenders’ websites the KFS generator should appear and 
what explanatory material should be provided around it, so capacity to integrate 
online KFS information effectively into borrower search processes is again 
influenced substantially by lender discretion. 
Relying entirely on borrowers to know about and demand KFS arguably places 
a significant hurdle in the way of widespread use of KFS. For this reason, parallel 
UK legislation requires lenders, as part of all loan process inquiries, to provide 
borrowers with a Key Facts Illustration (KFI) – the KFS equivalent (Financial 
Services Authority, 2006, p. 15). The UK legislation further ensures that borrowers 
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encounter KFI before they select a loan by requiring that the loans’ KFI be included 
and signed off as part of formal loan documentation. 58  Whether Australia’s 
legislative allocation of risk around KFS disclosure away from lenders and on to 
borrowers undermines the Act’s objective will be the primary point of inquiry. 
Chapter 6 is structured around the two methods of KFS delivery contemplated 
by the NCCP 2009: (a) on-site delivery in response to prospective borrowers’ 
requests for pricing information; and (b) online delivery through the inclusion of 
KFS electronic generators on lenders’ websites. Section 1 opens by reviewing 
research into lenders’ on-site KFS disclosure conduct undertaken immediately after 
the legislation was introduced in 2012. Findings from two studies that revisit and 
extend these outcomes three years later are then presented. The following section 
focuses on the use of online KFS, analysing the user-friendliness of lender websites 
in this respect. Results and conclusions complete the chapter. 
6.1 Research background: The Choice study 
Research by Australia’s largest independent consumer advocacy group, 
Choice, first raised concerns that the voluntary nature of KFS provision on the part 
of banks might undermine successful introduction (Choice, 2012). Choice 
researchers were particularly concerned that only borrowers who were capable of 
specifically requesting ‘a Key Facts Sheet’ when visiting banks would receive one 
(Choice, 2012). Accordingly, in the two months immediately after the provision 
commenced, Choice visited a sample group of mortgage lenders who, as holders of 
an Australian Credit Licence, were subject to KFS requirements. 
                                                            
58 MCOB rules 5.5.1, s 2.4.2. 
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Choice researchers visited 18 banks and credit unions around Sydney, 
requesting ‘fee and rate information for home loans products which [they] could take 
away and compare’ (Choice, 2012, p. 6). During their interaction with lenders, data 
collectors intentionally avoided use of the term ‘key facts sheets’ to determine the 
standard of information provided to borrowers who are either unaware of KFS or 
unable to ask for one. Choice reported its requests for information surrounding loan 
costs resulted in the provision of lenders’ brochures, rates sheets, other 
documentation designed by the lender and, in one case, handwritten calculations 
setting out detailed loan costs. However, only one of the 18 lenders visited provided 
KFS in response to the inquiry for pricing information, and only then after being 
asked four times.  
These results suggest that where borrowers either are unaware that KFS exist 
or fail to ask specifically for a ‘Key Facts Sheet’, they are unlikely to obtain one over 
the counter. Rather, lenders are likely to present their own information. As this 
information differs across lenders it not only makes comparisons difficult but 
negates the objective of standardised disclosure legislation. Choice (2012, p. 13) 
summed this up by stating ‘... consumers should not have to come up with three 
magic words – key fact sheets – to get access to clear information to help them find 
the best mortgage offer’. The Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) responded to the Choice findings by stating that they would be ‘monitoring 
compliance with new reforms by looking at individual complaints and industry-wide 
conduct’ (Choice, 2012). ASIC subsequently incorporated the recommendation that 
borrowers seek out KFS from all authorised lenders into its own home loan fact 
sheet and ‘Moneysmart’ credit lending webpage (ASIC, 2014, p. 2). To date, no 
further activity has appeared in publically available ASIC records. 
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6.2 Methodology  
6.2.1 Aim 
In the wake of the Choice findings and in light of the findings that borrowers 
were generally unaware of the existence of KFS (see Chapter5), three studies were 
undertaken to investigate whether lenders’ disclosure practices surrounding KFS 
have become more consumer friendly. These studies are motivated by the two ways 
in which lenders are required to provide KFS: (1) in response to on-site requests for 
one and (2) through online search on lender websites.  
Studies 1 and 2 replicate and extend the research conducted by Choice (2012). 
They are designed to investigate lenders’ provision of information around KFS in 
response to on-site requests. Borrowers must request KFS before lenders are required 
to provide them,59 so the nature of these requests and the precision necessary for 
these requests to yield KFS has significant implications for the legislation’s success. 
These two studies are designed to determine how specific such requests must be 
before borrowers will be provided with KFS. Examining the nature of request 
required for a borrower to acquire a KFS also provides insight into whether a 
borrower who is unaware of the terminology is likely to acquire KFS, and the 
information they must provide to do so. 
Study 3 is focused on the online disclosure requirements and examines 
lenders’ websites for the presence, location and promotion (or obfuscation) of KFS. 
In doing so, it seeks to determine how lenders have addressed the requirements to 
provide KFS generators on their websites.60 This is important because the legislation 
only requires lenders to: 
                                                            
59 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 133AD(1)(a)(i).  
60 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 133AC. 
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 make KFS generators available on their webpage61  
 inform consumers that KFS may be generated62  
 provide instructions on how to do so.63  
Accordingly, how, where, and with what other explanatory material this 
appears is left to lender discretion. The dual purpose of the study is: (1) to ascertain 
lender compliance in installing KFS generators for their standard home loan products 
on their websites; and (2) to determine the locations of and pathways to these KFS 
generators, as well as the detail and purpose of information that lenders choose to 
provide around them.  
By seeking to understand lenders’ disclosure practices under the legislation, 
the research provides insight into practices that may limit borrower exposure to KFS. 
This informs the fourth research question: 
RQ4: How do the disclosure requirements for KFS impact the likelihood that 
borrowers will receive one?  
6.3 Study 1: Site visits – Soliciting home loan cost information 
6.3.1 Design 
Study 1 replicates the methodology of the Choice study (2012) around general 
inquiries for home loan pricing information. Requests focused on information 
contained on KFS, or which equated to the same purpose. As the term ‘key facts 
sheet’ was not used, the legal obligation on lenders to supply such was not triggered. 
Three key elements of the Choice study (2012) were incorporated: (1) lenders were 
not made aware of the purpose of the visit; (2) use of the term ‘key facts sheet’ or 
                                                            
61 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 133AC(2)(c). 
62 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 133AC(2)(a). 
63 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 133AC(2)(b). 
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related terminology which could constitute a KFS-specific request was avoided; and 
(3) lenders were asked for information the borrower could ‘take away to compare the 
fees and interest rates of [their] home loan with other offers’ (Choice, 2012, p. 2). 
Research was conducted in February 2015 – three years on from both the original 
study and the introduction of KFS.  
6.3.2 Sample 
The survey was taken using a sample of 20 licensed mortgage lenders who, as 
holders of an Australian Credit Licence, were subject to KFS requirements. 
Paralleling the Choice selection of lenders within the Sydney CBD, all lending 
institutions with customer service branches within the Brisbane Central Business 
District (CBD) were visited. The sample comprised the four major banks, two major 
bank subsidiaries (out of a possible three), five smaller banks (out of a possible 20), 
two foreign banks (out of a possible seven) and six credit unions (out of a possible 
81).64 No building societies were included in the sample because only two regional 
branches are located within this state.65 One lender, a credit union, had closed its 
Brisbane branch, resulting in a final sample of 19 lenders. A breakdown of the total 
sample by lender type is presented in Table 6.1.  
  
                                                            
64 Numbers are based on APRA’s list of authorised deposit taking institutions retrieved 12 April 2014. 
Available at: http://www.apra.gov.au/adi/pages/adilist.aspx. 
65 Branches are regional: Rockhampton, Gladstone, Biloela, Gracemere, Emerald, Yeppoon and 
Robina Town Centre. 
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Table 6.1 
Site Visits: Lender Participants 
Type of Lender Number 
Large banks 4 
Large bank subsidiaries 2 
Other banks 
Foreign banks 
5 
2 
Credit unions 6 
Total 19 
 
Canvassing a wide variety of lender types is important because lenders of 
different types typically have different resources available with which to train staff 
and staff branches. Further, research has found systematic differences in the pricing 
structures and competitive strategies across lender type, such as higher fees for 
smaller lenders (Ashton & Ramsay, 2010; ASIC, 2008; Naylor, 2010; Foster, 2010), 
which in turn influence the level of incentive that lenders have to produce KFS. 
Concern that geographical concentration may bias outcomes is considered in 
both the original Choice Sydney survey (2012) and the 2015 Brisbane study. The 
Choice study overwhelmingly demonstrated non-provision of KFS across all 
surveyed lenders, despite sampling a wide variety of Sydney lenders (Choice, 2012, 
p. 5). Similar results were returned in the 2015 Brisbane study, suggesting the 
sampling’s geographical concentration is unlikely to significantly bias results. It is 
contended, however, that regardless of potential sampling bias, detection of barriers 
to KFS access nevertheless demonstrates weaknesses in the legislation. 
6.3.3 Procedure 
The protocol for visits to all banks is diagrammed in Figure 6.1. The first point 
of contact with lenders was the information desk, or in the case of a small number of 
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lender sites without information desks, tellers handling general inquiries. The term 
‘general inquiries staff’ therefore encompasses both.  
Requests for home loan information were broken into three steps A, B and C). 
The objective was to start the request around home loan information in broad terms, 
then increasingly narrow down the language of the request towards the specific 
contents of KFS. Following Choice (2012), Step A consisted of lenders being asked 
for information which the borrower could ‘take away to compare the fees and 
interest rates of [their] home loan with other offers’. Where KFS were not presented, 
as Step B the lenders were asked for information setting out the costs for their 
standard variable loan of $300,000 over 30 years. Finally, in Step C, information 
required to produce KFS for the desired loan and lenders was sought: lenders were 
questioned as to whether they had anything that would help borrowers compare like 
details across loans from different lenders. The protocol for Study 1 is set out in 
Appendix N. In instances where lenders referred researchers to meetings with a 
home loan specialist, this offer was accepted and the same requests repeated and 
coded as steps D, E and F. If a lender had not produced a KFS by the end of this 
process, the search was terminated. Appendix O outlines this process along with 
points of referral to other staff members and the number of information sources 
provided at each stage. 
Upon leaving a branch, notes were recorded about the visit, and any documents 
received from the lender were catalogued and grouped by the step in the process at 
which they were received (i.e. the point of inquiry and the position of the person 
from whom information was received). Each note was placed in a labelled envelope 
for subsequent reference and analysis, including for supplemental language or details 
that may have appeared around KFS. 
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Reasons why KFS were not provided were noted, and any instructions that 
lenders provided were recorded. The title of the person/people dealt with, the time 
taken, and the cause of any sizeable delays were also noted. The overall data 
collection process is outlined in Figure 6.1.  
   
Figure 6.1. Study 1 procedure: General requests for pricing information. 
 
For uniformity, all data collection was conducted by the researcher, a single 
inquirer, a 25-year-old male dressed in smart casual attire. To avoid potential bias, 
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documentation was stored once the transaction and recording was complete. No 
documentation provided by previous lenders was taken in to other lenders’ offices.  
6.4 Results and findings 
The results of the Brisbane study showed, unambiguously, that lenders do not 
provide KFS where borrowers request pricing information. Out of the 19 lenders 
visited, no KFS was received at any point during the information request process.  
Lenders’ responses were largely homogenous across all institutions. Upon 
receiving a request for home loan pricing information (Step A), lenders’ staff either:  
1) offered the borrower the opportunity to speak with a home loan specialist66  
and/or 
2) delivered a number of lender-designed documents which primarily 
consisted of home loan brochures, rate sheets, fees and charges schedules, 
and home purchase guides. In addition, in some instances handwritten 
notes, non-government fact sheets, and general terms and conditions 
documents were supplied. This is set out in Table 6.2. A further 
breakdown of the type of information contained in each document is 
presented in Appendix P.  
No documentation received in these categories contained any reference to KFS.  
  
                                                            
66 Ten of the 19 lenders referred the borrower directly to their lending staff. Another lender referred 
the borrower through to the lending staff at Step C. 
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Table 6.2 
Study 1: Documentation Collected from Lenders  
Step 
Key 
Facts 
Sheet Brochure 
Rate 
sheet 
Home 
purchase 
guide 
Non-
govt. 
fact 
sheet 
Fees and 
charges 
schedule 
General 
loan 
terms 
Financial 
services 
guide 
Hand 
written 
notes 
Hand 
written 
calcs. 
# # # # # # # # # # 
A 0 9 8 5 0 2 2 1 0 0 
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
D 0 7 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 
Total 0 16 13 7 2 2 2 1 3 2 
Per 
cent 0% 84% 68% 37% 11% 11% 11% 5% 16% 11% 
 
More specific requests (steps B and C) resulted in redirection to these 
documents, with particular emphasis placed on the rate sheets or fee schedules.  
Two lenders provided calculations for monthly repayments. These calculations 
were handwritten, based on the lender’s own online mortgage repayment calculator 
facility, with one lender manually entering the rate from the rate sheet they provided. 
Neither calculation used KFS information – meaning that standardisation across 
other documents was not readily achievable. Moreover, subsequent testing for 
consistency between these lenders’ KFS outcomes and those supplied under the 
mortgage repayments calculator revealed, in one case, a 0.2% difference in the 
interest rates used.67  Inconsistencies in estimates between lender calculators and 
KFS, as encountered in this instance, suggest that borrowers using only one source 
may risk receiving inaccurate information upon which to base their decision. Figure 
6.2 sets out the total documentation received.  
                                                            
67 Testing was conducted on 12 April 2015. 
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Figure 6.2. Study 1: documentation received. 
 
Both sets of in-bank calculations took roughly five minutes for the home loan 
specialist to perform. Overall, data collection processes across lenders varied from 
five minutes to half an hour. Most visits lasted 10 to 25 minutes with only two 
exceeding 25 minutes. The average time spent collecting information from a lender 
was 12.5 minutes. Visit duration depended primarily on the number of staff dealt 
with and the information provided. Visits under 10 minutes usually consisted of 
contact with a single staff member, while both visits that exceeded 25 minutes 
involved more than one staff member and delivered handwritten calculations of 
monthly repayments. The majority of the time with staff was spent going through the 
content of the loans and providing explanations of important terms (i.e. loan-to-value 
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ratio), and determining the personal circumstances of the borrower in order to 
provide a recommendation.  
Table 6.3 
Study 1: Duration of Site Visits 
Decision time Number of lenders KFS presented 
Less than 5 Minutes 1 0 
5–10 Minutes 4 0 
10–15 Minutes 5 0 
15–20 Minutes 4 0 
20–25 Minutes 3 0 
25–30 Minutes 1 0 
More than 30 Minutes 1 0 
Total 19 0 
 
Regardless of the precision of the request, duration of the visit, or position of 
the staff member/s with whom discussions were held, no KFS were received from 
any of the lenders. In the context of Step C – the most precise request for 
information that would appear on a KFS but without using the key words – two 
responses were commonly provided. Lenders’ staff, when asked for a document 
providing a standardised breakdown of loan costs, either stated that no such 
document was available, or drew attention back to the in-house documentation 
already provided, indicating that this was all the information available. 
6.5 Study 2: Site visits – Soliciting KFS standardised loan data  
In light of the non-production of any KFS in Study 1, the second round of data 
collection was undertaken to ascertain what difference using the specific words ‘key 
facts sheet’ would make to the disclosure outcomes. The same methodology and 
collection protocol was repeated, with the only distinction being that the inquiry was 
limited to asking for a key facts sheet. All other conditions remained the same and no 
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representations were made to suggest that the borrower wanted to take out a loan. 
Due to the specific nature of the request Study 2 contained only two phases and is 
represented in Figure 6.3. The protocol for Study 2 is set out in Appendix Q. The 
specific request for KFS allowed for a contrast between the results of the first and 
second studies to determine the extent to which the barriers encountered in Study 1 
extend beyond general requests. 
 
Figure 6.3. Study 2 procedure: Specific requests for KFS. 
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6.5.1 Results and findings 
In the second round of data collection, 12 of the 19 lenders directly provided 
KFS on site in response to the researcher’s request. Notably, three lenders erred 
when producing KFS information from their website, presenting other information 
which they believed to be a KFS; two had made phone calls requesting help to 
generate them. Two other lenders affirmed that that the information they had 
provided was all the information available and that they did not offer KFS 
documents despite specific use of the term ‘Australian Government key fact sheets’ 
and stating that other lenders had been able to provide them. Finally, two other 
lenders’ general inquires staff members provided all the information they could, and 
asked that the researcher return after making an appointment to deal with a home 
loan specialist as they were unable to provide any information beyond the lender’s 
general pricing brochures. In all cases, it became apparent that the staff member was 
unable to provide KFS and further requests became impracticable. In three cases the 
researcher was asked to move on to so the staff member could serve other customers.  
All 19 requests started with the general inquiries staff. The request for KFS 
was met with four general types of response: 
1) Two lenders provided KFS immediately. 
2) Seven lenders presented non-KFS information surrounding home loan 
costs. 
3) Eight lenders immediately referred the borrower to a home loan specialist. 
4) Two lenders provided lender designed home loan fact sheets.68 
  
                                                            
68 A flowchart demonstrating the process of data collection in Study 2 is set out in Appendix R. 
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Table 6.4 
Stage Two: Information Documents Collected from Lenders by Stage of Enquiry
Step Key Facts 
Sheet Brochure Rate sheet 
Home 
purchase 
guide 
Non-
KFS 
fact 
sheets 
Fees and 
charges 
schedule 
Website 
information 
# # # # # # # 
A 2 5 5 1 2 1 0 
B 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 
C 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 12 5 5 1 2 1 2 
Per cent provided 63% 26% 26% 5% 11% 5% 11% 
 
One variable that emerged as significant in this process was the relative position 
of the staff member within the institutions. Generally – and perhaps unsurprisingly – 
more specialist staff were able to facilitate KFS more easily and immediately. In 
particular, general inquiries personnel often appeared unaware of, or at least 
unfamiliar with, KFS and how to provide them. Out of the 19 lenders visited, only 
two general inquiries staff members were aware of, and able to provide, KFS 
themselves. In two other cases a second general inquiries staff member overheard the 
request and helped their colleague locate and produce KFS once it had become 
obvious that they were unsure how to handle the request (Step B). In two cases 
where staff members made phone calls, both were still unable to produce KFS 
information but ended up offering other information in substitution. Nine general 
inquiries staff directed the request to a home loan staff member. Finally, one teller in 
a credit union branch located the generator online, but unsure of how long it would 
take to complete, provided the link and requested that the researcher generate the 
KFS at home so that they could continue to serve other customers.  
On the other hand, all but one home loan specialist were aware of KFS. Seven 
home loan specialists successfully provided KFS upon request, although four 
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experienced some difficulties in locating and using the lenders’ online KFS 
generator. One home loan specialist brought the researcher’s attention back to the 
information provided by the general inquiries staff member and stated that they did 
not provide a sheet despite use of the term ‘Australian Government’s home loan Key 
Facts Sheet’ and although several other lenders had already been able to provide one. 
Notably, one KFS provided was dated as of 2011, and contained an interest rate 
which was overstated by around 2%. As KFS were only required from 2012, this 
suggests a fault in the system rather than non-current information. In order to 
determine the extent of this issue several KFS were generated from the lenders’ 
online calculator with no further issues. It is important to note that it was the staff 
member who identified this issue and provided the correctly dated rate sheet before 
then stressing to the researcher the importance of not relying on KFS information. 
Significantly, one home loan specialist who was aware of KFS still failed to 
provide one. This home loan specialist instead produced website information that 
only becomes available after use of the lender’s online KFS generator. As discussed 
further in Study 3’s website analysis (Section 6.5.2), some lenders’ KFS generators 
produce additional information that falls outside the legislative parameters before 
generating the actual KFS document. Here the home loan specialist used the 
generator correctly, but printed off and provided this non-prescribed information, 
instead of proceeding to and retrieving the final KFS. Presumably this was a user 
error and it was not picked up by the researcher until the subsequent compilation 
stage. In this respect it would have been equally inconvenient for a borrower who 
had to revisit the bank to procure an actual KFS. Figure 6.4 visually displays the 
reliance of lenders’ general inquiries staff on help to produce KFS and breaks down 
the provision of KFS by staff member role: 
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Figure 6.4 Stage 2: Provision of KFS by staff role. 
 
Additionally, a breakdown of KFS provided by lender type revealed that larger 
lenders, in particular the four major Australian banks and their subsidiaries, are more 
likely to provide KFS to borrowers. On the other hand, the vast majority of credit 
unions were unable to provide a KFS when required, with credit unions making up 
seven of the nine non-responses. Credit union offices were usually smaller and 
contained less staff members than the major banks and staff had less assistance 
available to them. In particular, credit union staff often did not have immediate 
access to a home loan specialist who they could refer the request to or seek 
assistance from. Figure 6.5 demonstrates a breakdown of the provision of KFS by 
lender type. 
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Figure 6.5 Study 2: Provision of KFS by lender type. 
 
Along with the provision of KFS in response to the specific request, Study 2 
predictably yielded a smaller range of information materials from lenders. Further, 
all information collected, with the exception of one home loan purchase guide, was 
centred on promoting the comparison of home loan products. This greatly reduced 
the amount of information a borrower was required to search through, thus reducing 
the time required to compare offers. Figure 6.6 provides a breakdown of the 
information provided during the 19 observations. 
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Figure 6.6. Study 2: Documentation received. 
 
Overall there appeared to be a lack of awareness of KFS, or uncertainty as how 
to generate them. This was particularly the case among general inquiries staff and 
was responsible for the cases of non-provision. Specifically, six of the seven lenders’ 
staff who did not provide KFS appeared unaware of their existence. This proves to 
be a significant issue for legislative compliance, preventing staff members from 
adequately providing KFS where requested even where they attempt to do so. Lack 
of awareness surrounding KFS also prevented one home loan specialist from 
attempting to generate one, affirming that the lender did not offer such a document. 
Consequently, the lack of awareness among lenders’ staff surrounding KFS, 
particularly among lenders’ general inquiries staff, creates a significant barrier to 
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KFS provision. Further, even where staff members were able to produce KFS, 
several were unsure of how to do so, which often resulted in delays that may deter 
borrowers from collecting multiple KFS.  
Despite delays in producing KFS, arising from difficulties lenders faced in 
producing KFS, over half the lenders took less than five minutes from initial entry to 
providing a KFS. This meant that specifically requesting KFS information shortened 
visit times considerably to an average of 5.8 minutes, although website failure in one 
instance produced an 18-minute delay. Other delays that arose were primarily due to 
having to wait for otherwise occupied staff members, particularly home loan 
specialists. This is presented in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 
Stage Two: Duration of Site Visits 
Decision Time Number 
of lenders 
KFS 
presented 
Per cent 
(KFS) 
Cumulative 
total (KFS) 
Less than 3 Minutes 1 0 0% 0 
3 Minutes 3 2 66.7% 2 
4 Minutes 6 5 83.3% 7 
5 Minutes 3 2 66.7% 9 
6 Minutes 1 0 0% 9 
7 Minutes 1 1 100% 10 
More than 8 Minutes 4 2 50% 12 
Total 19 12 63.1% 12 
 
In summary, this research demonstrates that lack of borrower awareness 
regarding the KFS is significant, but is not the sole barrier to the provision of KFS in 
response to requests for information. A lack of awareness on the part of lenders’ staff 
can severely limit KFS provision in practice, even in response to highly specific 
requests. This is particularly the case in smaller branches such as credit unions with 
smaller staff cohorts than larger equivalents. Further, while lack of awareness of 
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KFS across home loan specialists per se did not appear to be a significant problem, 
many experienced difficulties in generating KFS and five stated that it was unusual 
to receive a request for one. These results and their implications are discussed along 
with the research findings from the third study in the concluding section, 6.6.	
6.6 Study 3: Website analysis 
In study 3, the second line of exposure that borrowers potentially have to KFS 
is examined. Studies 1 and 2 probed the availability of KFS to borrowers who visit 
lenders’ offices; Study 3 examines the outcome for borrowers who opt for online 
information gathering. How lenders address legislative requirements that KFS 
generators be available on their websites is specifically surveyed. As in Studies 1 and 
2, the two questions most at issue are: (1) whether borrowers unfamiliar with KFS 
are likely to encounter them in this process; and (2) whether borrowers familiar with 
KFS are able to easily access them across lenders to easily create a comparative data 
pool around home loan costs. 
Legally, the onus to discover KFS rests with borrowers rather than lenders 
(Section 2.4.5). This said, all home loan lenders who hold an Australian Credit 
Licence and have a website with home loan inquiry capacity are required by law69 to 
offer borrowers access to KFS generators. To ensure KFS printouts meet the 
prescribed format and remain uniform across all lenders it is also legally prohibited 
for lenders to place additional information on an actual KFS document.70 Beyond 
this, however, no further specifications exist. How and where on sites lenders place 
their KFS generators, what explanatory information – if any – is provided, and how 
consistent this is across lenders remains at the discretion of individual entities. 
                                                            
69 National Credit Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth), s 133AC. 
70 National Credit Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth), reg 28LB. 
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During this study, the websites of 27 licensed and non-licensed lenders were visited 
to compare how this mandate had been translated into practice. 
Website analysis was approached from two perspectives: (1) that of borrowers 
who were gathering loan package information and lacked any knowledge of KFS; 
and (2) that of borrowers who, while familiar with KFS, visited multiple sites to 
accumulate comparative information around the best pricing structures. Placement, 
prominence, user-friendliness of explanatory material, and consistency were 
therefore considered variables significant to access and usability. 
Generally, the most useful KFS generators were hypothesised to be: 
 located with the home loan information in a sufficiently prominent format 
to attract user attention (Hoek et al., 2011; Malbon, 1999) 
 able to provide adequate explanatory material around KFS functions to 
enable borrowers to distinguish the government-authorised KFS calculator 
from the lender-affiliated non-standardised options also on offer 
 subject to minimal web page transits – ‘clicks’ from the site entry to print 
out 
 generally consistent in placement and language with that afforded by a 
number of other lenders’ sites (for efficiency in information gathering 
across sources) 
 devoid of unnecessary or supplemental information or links that could 
potentially confuse the reader (Bharadwaj et al., 1993; Platzer & Bröder, 
2012). 
How closely websites matched these objectives is set out below and discussed 
in greater depth in the Section 6.6.3. In summary, however, lenders’ sites revealed a 
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wide range of approaches to placement, explanatory material and capacity to access 
the KFS generator. For borrowers unfamiliar with KFS terminology and their 
purpose, therefore, the capacity to discover KFS and incorporate them effectively 
into pre-loan decision-making would be limited, and perhaps non-existent. 
6.6.1 Sample 
Purposive sampling (Patton, 1980) was used to select the different types of 
lenders. This provided insight into the potential differences in lenders’ disclosure 
practices. This broader representation of lenders meant that behaviour that was 
potentially specific to a particular type of lender could be identified. In particular, 
this allowed analysis around how lenders who were non-price competitive treated the 
comparative bottom line capacities that KFS calculations facilitate. 
The sampling frame was drawn from the Australian Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (APRA) List of authorised deposit-taking institutions with multiple cases 
being selected for each type of lender (Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, 
2014). Two major banks’ subsidiaries, which would otherwise be excluded for their 
interrelated status, were added to assess whether this relationship potentially 
impacted their disclosure practices. The sample was further extended to take in non-
authorised deposit-taking institutions (non-ADI lenders), including four without 
Australian Credit Licences who were exempt from the requirements. These lenders 
were selected from the ASIC’s Review of mortgage entry and exit fees report (ASIC, 
2008). Table 6.6 contains a breakdown of the sample by lender type:  
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Table 6.6 
Online Analysis: Sample of Lenders by Type 
Lender type Number 
Large banks 4 
Large banks’ subsidiaries 2 
Other banks 5 
Credit unions 5 
Building societies 5 
Non-ADI lenders with a credit licence 2 
Non-ADI lenders without a credit licence 4 
Total 27 
 
None of the four unlicensed lenders, however, had chosen to provide KFS, 
effectively reducing the sample to 23. No other non-ADI lenders in the sampling 
frame were unlicensed. 
6.6.2 Methodology 
The starting point for all website studies was gauged by using the lender’s 
home page as the entry point. This was generally reached by searching for the 
lender’s name, for example, ‘Westpac’ or ‘ANZ’, plus ‘home’. Progression was then 
made through the respective categories and links until the actual generator capable of 
producing KFS was reached. Figure 6.7 sets out this protocol: 
216 Chapter 6: Lender disclosure practices 
 
Figure 6.7. Protocol for checking lenders’ websites for KFS. 
 
Content analysis (Hodder, 1994, p. 155; Krippendorff, 2012) was used to 
examine websites’ text and layout. Content analysis enables the researcher to extract 
textual information from these sites and systematically identify its relevant 
properties. In this case, the relevant textual information pertains to the existence and 
purpose of KFS and other calculators, placement of KFS more broadly, and analysis 
of the surrounding material. This was then categorised to provide a meaningful 
reading of KFS position across multiple lenders. 
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Information gathering centred on two questions: 
1) Was the site legally compliant? 
2) How user-friendly was placement of the KFS generator? 
User-friendliness around graphics and explanatory material involved 
identifying features that could potentially either guide borrowers towards or distract 
them away from KFS generators. A feature was deemed to aid in access to KFS if it: 
a) drew attention to, or provided succinct information about KFS and their 
purpose 
and/or 
b) reduced the effort required to generate a KFS. 
For example, both criteria could be met where a link to the lender’s KFS generator 
appeared on the lender’s home page using a colourful or prominent graphic. In this 
way, a lender draws borrowers’ attention to the KFS and provides a direct path to the 
generator. 
Features deemed to hinder KFS generation included those that extended the 
process of reaching the document or generator, created unnecessary point(s) of 
confusion, or otherwise reduced the likelihood of borrowers obtaining KFS. Again, 
an example would be the inclusion of non-KFS information – such as references to 
bank-affiliated calculators or similarly named tools – either surrounding, or in more 
prominent locations than the KFS generator such that borrowers might potentially 
become confused and their progression towards the KFS generator might be 
undermined. 
Positioning of explanatory language around KFS, such as instructions for use, 
identification of purpose and authorisation, or broader commentary about related 
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matters was measured in two ways. Use of the term ‘government authorised 
standardised fact sheet’ or its equivalent was coded, as was the extent to which 
assistance or instructions were provided for generating the document.  
6.6.3 Results 
6.6.3.1 Legal compliance 
The threshold question around site analysis went simply to whether a KFS 
generator was compliant with regulatory requirements71 was present. Lenders were 
deemed to have met legislative compliance if the website informed the borrower that 
it had: 
1) capacity to offer KFS: that is, a link using the term ‘key facts sheet’ was 
displayed. As some lenders provided other home loan ‘fact sheets’, a label 
simply referring to KFS as ‘fact sheets’ was not accepted. No further 
description of KFS or their purpose was deemed necessary to meet this 
criterion. 
2) sufficient prompts to enable use of the KFS generator: that is, a KFS 
generator existed that informed the borrower, either through text or 
dropdown menus, of the information available to be entered in each field 
to produce a KFS. In other words, sufficient information and/or prompts 
existed to enable a borrower who had no foreknowledge of the information 
required to effectively produce KFS. 
3) capacity to generate the KFS: that is, a borrower was presented with a 
document which complied with the content and formatting requirements 
for KFS under Regulation 28LB, National Credit Consumer Regulations 
2010 (Cth). In this respect, the inclusion of additional content on the form 
                                                            
71 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009, s 133AC 
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was of particular relevance, as this is specifically prohibited in order to 
ensure that borrowers are not distracted from uniform disclosure 
objectives. 
Overall, 22 of the 23 lenders who held an Australian Credit Licence met the 
legislative requirements set out under s 133AC. None of the four unlicensed lenders, 
however, provided KFS. The one non-compliant (licensed) lender, while providing 
the KFS generator, fell short by issuing KFS that included supplemental information. 
In this instance it was a graph which broke down the repayments of principle and 
interest. As noted above, supplemental information is prohibited under Regulation 
28LB as it undermines the uniformity objectives of the KFS. Collection of KFS for 
lenders’ home loan products revealed a wide range of prices for these products. Of 
the 23 lenders observed, the cheapest loan product cost the borrower $609,366 for a 
basic home loan of $350,000 over 30 years, while another lender’s complete variable 
rate home loan cost $898,989 over the same period, for the same amount, and with 
the same repayment frequency and loan-to-value ratio. Further, one lender’s ‘super 
saver discount variable home loan’ cost a total of $849,261 over the 30-year period. 
This is compared to the average loan cost of the lenders’ products which amounted 
to $689,697 across all different product types. 
These figures had significant implications for the monthly costs of each loan. 
For example, the monthly repayments for the most expensive loan were $592 a 
month higher than the average and the most cost effective loan was $210 a month 
lower than average. Further, the ‘super saver discount variable home loan’ was $335 
more expensive than the average monthly repayments in the sample. That this 
lender’s discount or ‘basic’ home loan was more expensive than other lenders’ 
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‘complete’ home loans shows the value of clear and comparative pricing 
information. 
6.6.3.2 User-friendliness 
Although assessing user-friendliness is necessarily subjective, three variables 
were used to rationalise analysis. These were: 
a) placement (prominence, visibility) 
b) user-friendliness of explanatory language 
c) depth of placement within the website: number of ‘clicks’ or hyperlinks 
required to reach KFS generators – and uniformity across competitive 
lenders. 
Discussion around each is set out below. A case study of the four major banks’ 
sites is provided in Section C to illustrate the relative difficulties that minor 
treatment changes around terminology, placement and explanatory material may 
create.	
A. Placement	–	prominence	and	visibility	
The prominence and visibility of design features such as eye-catching graphics, 
headings or placement categories were the first points of reference. The majority of 
lenders websites were found to provide little or no assistance to borrowers seeking 
KFS. Five lenders, however, did include a large, eye-catching graphic with an 
embedded link to draw borrowers’ attention to their KFS generator. Figure 6.8 
provides an example of one such ‘button’. 
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Figure 6.8. Example of eye-catching graphic, by AMP Bank Limited, 2014. Retrieved from 
https://www.amp.com.au/personal/home-loans/products/home-loans. 
 
A related issue proved to be the use of language that was similar to or 
overlapped with other features such as ‘fact sheet’, ‘fact sheet calculator’ and 
‘compare our home loans calculator’. All sites identified ‘fact sheets’ as being 
available, although in many cases these were unrelated to KFS and often served 
different functions such as providing an overview of the loans features.  
One lender, for example, offered visitors a link to an ‘easy sheet’ for their 
home loans on their home page. The capacity to access the KFS did not arise until 
subsequent pages were canvassed. Another lender, by contrast, offered visitors the 
following options: ‘[Lender] lending rates’, ‘Home loans fees and charges’ and ‘All 
forms and downloads’, as well as the following calculations: ‘Home loan 
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comparison calculator’, ‘Mortgage comparison calculator’, ‘Lump sum repayment 
calculator’ and ‘Home loan repayment calculator’.  
The KFS generator was eventually cited as the 11th calculator option under 
‘mortgage and home loan calculators’ and was not included in the ‘Forms and fact 
sheets’ section at all. 
A third lender provided access to their own fact sheet on their home loans page 
and also provided a list of calculators – none of which contained KFS. Borrowers 
needed to navigate two further pages to find the KFS generator link. Even then, it 
was positioned last in a list of six ‘resources’ surrounding the loan. 
Probably the biggest issue in respect of KFS placement, however, was the 
tendency for most lenders to site the KFS within their own lists of calculators and 
tools. Eighteen lenders in the study cited the KFS generator on a list of calculator 
options which contained between three and 22 unrelated calculator functions. The 
majority of lenders offered between 8 and 13 such alternatives with KFS generators 
uniformly placed towards the bottom or, in 10 instances, last in the line-up.  
If ‘calculators’ constituted a standardised placement pattern, this might not 
have been as markedly problematic: borrowers would become familiar with the idea 
and those searching for KFS would be able to jump rapidly through the relevant 
steps. Five lenders, however, did not adhere to this, adopting varied placement. 
Several placed the KFS generator with information about loan options, providing a 
KFS link as part of the information surrounding these home loans’ features. Another 
lender conversely, placed the KFS generator in the ‘resources’ category. This 
disparity, taken with the above examples, attenuates the likelihood of a new 
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borrower discovering KFS without prior knowledge. It also constitutes an arguably 
unnecessary impediment to those doing fast information gathering searches. 
B. Use	of	explanatory	language	
User-friendliness of explanatory language was approached in two ways. First, 
the extent to which the function of the KFS generator was identified as a 
government-authorised standardising fact sheet was considered. Second, user 
directions about how to generate the document were analysed.  
Government and/or regulatory endorsement statements were present on a very 
limited percentage of sites: only five of the lenders used related language. Variations 
in this respect were non-uniform in content and the message varied significantly, 
with 2) – and arguably 3) – below conveying less of the spirit of the document than 
the others.  
1) ‘Since 1 January 2012, all credit providers are required to provide you 
with a Key Facts Sheet for selected home loan products. This will give 
you the ability to easily compare home loans and decide whether to apply 
for this home loan.’ 
2) ‘This website only produces Key Facts Sheets for loans regulated by the 
National Credit Code. The document produced does not apply to 
unregulated loans.’ 
3) ‘All lenders are required by law to have a fact sheet that sets out the 
interest rate, establishment fees, ongoing fees your monthly repayments 
and the total amount you will pay back.’ 
4) ‘Home Loan Key Fact Sheets are part of the Australian Government’s 
banking reforms which came into effect on 1 January 2012.’ 
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5) ‘All credit providers are required by law to make a Key Facts Sheet 
available to you for their mortgage products, so you can use it to quickly 
and easily compare loan features across all financial institutions.’ 
Of the five lenders who mentioned that KFS were part of a government 
initiative, three stated that the KFS provided standardised information across lenders. 
Three lenders provided this information alongside their KFS generator, although in 
one case a borrower had to scroll to the end of the page and read the fine print. The 
other lender, however, a credit union, provided a ‘frequently asked questions’ section 
on their website’s home loan page. This section also addressed other important 
issues such as the purpose and nature of KFS, how to obtain them, and the fact that 
KFS do not constitute offers for credit and are obligation free. Notably though, while 
the frequently asked questions noted that the borrower could generate KFS from ‘any 
applicable home loan page on this website’72 the FAQ webpage did not provide a 
link to the generator. 
More commonly, site language or use of a logo tended to obfuscate the 
independent nature of KFS. This occurred in some instances through the use of 
labels or wording which gave the impression that KFS belonged to the bank. For 
example, one lender included its name in the title along with ‘[Lender] home loan 
Key Fact Sheets tool’. Another six lenders stated that the calculator could be used to 
provide home loan key fact sheets for that particular lender’s home loan tool – a 
correct statement to the extent that the document was indeed informative of that 
particular bank’s comparative pricing but short, again, of the ‘spirit’ of the 
regulation. In its limited format, borrowers unfamiliar with the KFS purpose might 
fail to realise that the same document was available for comparison on other lenders’ 
                                                            
72 https://www.cua.com.au/personal-banking/home-loans/key-fact-sheet-frequently-asked-questions 
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websites. Figure 6.9 provides an example of how the use of lenders’ logos or names 
could prove potentially misleading. 
 
Figure 6.9. Website example: Lender details suggest KFS is a lender initiative, by AIMS 
Financial Group, 2015. Retrieved from http://ola.aims.com.au/HLKFS/default.aspx. 
 
Again, as set out in the previous section, the lack of distinction between the 
KFS generators and other similarly named calculators or tools, or the use of 
ambiguous (if any) descriptions, served to obfuscate the KFS status as a government 
tool and to undermine the likelihood that borrowers would discover the tool. 
User directions and related information provided to lead borrowers towards 
and facilitate their use of the KFS generator also varied substantially. Typically, 
information about KFS was provided at one of two places: either with the link to the 
KFS or on the KFS generator page (once clicked). In the vast majority of websites, 
the link to the KFS generator contained no additional description other than the term 
‘Request a key facts sheet’. Of the six lenders that did provide a description of KFS 
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with the link leading to the generator, only half mentioned that KFS could be used to 
compare home loans or to produce a personalised estimation of home loan costs. 
Table 6.7 provides a breakdown of the type of information provided with the links to 
KFS generators. 
Table 6.7  
Quality of Description Accompanying Link to KFS Generator 
Description detail Number of lenders 
No description 17 
Ambiguous description 3 
Short description of purpose 2 
Detailed description 1 
 
When borrowers opted to follow a link to the KFS generator, however, in 19 
cases they were provided with further directions and information. Eight lenders 
provided information about the purpose of KFS while 11 simply provided 
instructions on how to use the generator to produce a KFS. Four lenders provided the 
minimal amount of information necessary to meet the legislative requirements, two 
lenders labelled their links to the KFS generators ‘Request a Key Facts Sheet’ and 
then used drop-down menus and field headings to guide the borrower through the 
generator. 
Five lenders adopted an interesting variation on this, however, by erring in the 
other direction. They provided substantial amounts of information about how to fill 
in the form and how to use KFS. In the course of this, they also provided information 
about how doing so might interface with their different loan products being 
promoted, putting borrowers at risk of being distracted from completing the form. In 
itself, this overload of information and choice was possibly more off-putting to a 
time-conscious consumer than the stark approach of the majority. For users who 
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were familiar with KFS and seeking such, it consumed time to work through; for 
those unfamiliar with KFS, it tended to make the process far more complex than 
necessary. Figure 6.10 provides an example of the amount of information some 
lenders provide surrounding their KFS. 
 
 
Figure 6.10. Website example: Amount of information, by Newcastle Permanent Building 
Society, 2015. Retrieved from 
https://secure.newcastlepermanent.com.au/onlineforms/KeyFactsSheet/KeyFactsSheet.aspx. 
 
A related issue also existed around the output of KFS generators. One third of 
lenders’ KFS generators produced additional information which appeared before a 
borrower could access the requested KFS. Before they could click the ‘generate’ 
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button positioned at the end of the material, borrowers were required to scroll 
through roughly one page of information. Interestingly, while not considered in the 
legislation, the content and layout of this information was consistent across the 
lenders. One further significant glitch, however, was that lenders using this method 
of generating KFS only provided borrowers with an option to receive KFS, not an 
actual KFS. For the purpose of this study these lenders were deemed as having 
complied with s 133AC. However, as discussed in Section 6.6 this may have 
significant implications for borrowers’ retrieval of KFS. Notably, six of the seven 
borrowers who presented this information were building societies or credit unions. 
C. Depth	of	placement:	Website	clicks	to	reach	KFS	
A final proxy used to assess user-friendliness was the number of webpages 
navigated – or ‘clicks’ necessary – to go from a lender’s home page to the KFS 
generator. Although several lenders websites required borrowers to transit five links 
or clicks, and only one website had a posting on its primary page, the standard for 
most pathways to a lenders’ KFS generator required two to three clicks. This is set 
out in Table 6.8. 
  
Chapter 6: Lender disclosure practices 229 
 
 
Table 6.8 
Number of Clicks to KFS Generator
Lender code 2014 
Big bank 1 2 
Big bank 2 3 
Big bank 3 3 
Big bank 4 3 
Subsidiary 1 3 
Subsidiary 2 2 
Building society 1 3 
Building society 2 5 
Building society 3 3 
Building society 4 5 
Building society 5 3 
Credit union 1 3 
Credit union 2 3 
Credit union 3 3 
Credit union 4 3 
Credit union 5 1 
Other bank 1 3 
Other bank 2 3 
Other bank 3 2 
Other bank 4 3 
Other bank 5 3 
Licensed ADI 1 3 
Licensed ADI 2 3 
Non-licensed ADI 1 N/A 
Non-licensed ADI 2 N/A 
Non-licensed ADI 3 N/A 
Non-licensed ADI 4 N/A 
Average 2.96 
 
Despite the convenience of this metric, it is potentially misleading around 
usability for borrowers who are unfamiliar with KFS as it assumes a level of 
uniformity in approach that is substantially absent across lenders. This is perhaps 
best illustrated by actual site data. For simplicity, the four main banks’ sites are 
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analysed. Although each registered as ‘three-to-four’ clicks to get to the KFS 
generator, varying levels of knowledge were required to effectively reach this end.  
The general search term used to start each survey was ‘home loan’ plus the 
name of the bank, for example, ‘Westpac’ or ‘ANZ’. 
6.6.3.3 Case 1 – National Australia Bank 
The KFS is located under ‘Home Loan Calculators and Tools’ on the home 
loan page. It sits tenth out of 11 calculator tools, respectively:73  
 Loan repayment calculator  
 Borrowing power calculator  
 Home loan savings calculator  
 Extra repayment calculator  
 Stamp duty calculator  
 Home equity calculator  
 Lump sum repayments calculator  
 Split loan calculator  
 Home loan simulator  
 Key facts sheet  
 NAB home loan selector. 
Selecting the KFS calculator opened access to the ‘NAB Home Loan Key 
Facts Sheet Tool’ (see Figure 6.11) No descriptions around government authorised 
status or legislative purpose appears; the only description is: ‘The Key Facts Sheet 
provides your loan information in a prescribed standard format. This will assist you 
to compare this loan against other home loan products and lenders.’ 
                                                            
73 http://www.nab.com.au/personal/loans/home-loans/loan-calculators 
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Figure 6.11. NAB Key Facts Sheet Tool, National Australia Bank, 2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.nab.com.au/personal/loans/home-loans/loan-calculators/key-fact-sheets. 
6.6.3.4 Case 2 – Australia and New Zealand Bank 
Like NAB, ANZ KFS generator was accessed through ‘Calculators & Tools’ 
on the ANZ Home Loans page. 74  The generator was positioned somewhat 
differently, however, as it was preceded by a range of categories (with links) that 
included: 
 How much can I borrow  
 Calculate my repayments  
 Compare and select the right loan (covering only ANZ products)  
 Find out the costs – ‘ANZ Home Loan Fee Calculator – helps you 
determine the costs with buying or refinancing …’ 
                                                            
74 http://www.anz.com.au/personal/home-loans/calculators-tools/ 
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 Additional tools and calculators  
– Equity calculator  
– 100% mortgage offset calculator  
– ANZ comparison rate calculator 
– Home loan scenario calculator 
 ANZ property profile report  
 Home loan key facts sheet  
 Home loan documents signing  
 Ways to apply for a home loan.  
Again, the only descriptors were ‘Request a key fact sheet – the key fact sheet 
will summarise the key facts about a standard home loan’. Upon linking to the KFS 
generator page, however, rather than using a simple grid like NAB had done, ANZ 
opted to provide extensive descriptions of what is – and isn’t – covered by KFS, 
including in relation to several boutique products offered by ANZ. The government 
requirement for KFS is explained but only as part of the broader information flow 
well down the page and, in this context, is easily overlooked. In particular, heavy 
emphasis on the boutique product ‘ANZ Breakfree Loan’ is promoted before access 
to the actual form commences (see Figure 6.12). 
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Figure 6.12. ANZ: KFS generator, by Australian and New Zealand Banking Group, 2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.anz.com.au/personal/home-loans/calculators-tools/request-fact-sheet/. 
 
6.6.3.5 Case 3 – Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
While KFS appear on the Commonwealth Bank’s home loans page, there is no 
actual heading ‘Key facts sheet calculator’. 75  Instead, the option, ‘Home loan 
calculator – what would my repayments be’ is the link required to access the 
calculator which produces KFS. This was noted in the description, however, only 
after describing the primary function of the calculator, and there was no reference to 
KFS as an independent government action: ‘With our home loan calculator you can 
estimate your repayments. You can also generalise a personalised Key Fact Sheet 
                                                            
75 https://www.commbank.com.au/personal/home-loans.html 
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based on your loan amount, term and repayment’. 76  Without sensitivity to the 
capitalised letters in this quote, the average consumer would be unlikely to realise 
the significance of this listing. Further, the link to this calculator was provided at the 
bottom of the home loan page after around two pages of information. Figure 6.13 
shows the location of the link, however, it is important to note that the website was 
set to 33% of its original size when the screenshot was taken. 
                                                            
76 https://www.commbank.com.au/personal/home-loans/loan-calculator.html 
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Figure 6.13. Commonwealth Bank home loan page, by Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 
2015. Retrieved from https://www.commbank.com.au/personal/home-loans/home-loan-calculators-
and-tools.html. 
 
When clicking through to the calculator, no information other than the relevant 
blanks for input is provided. Further, the borrower must change the tab of the 
calculator which the link leads to, in order to get to the right place. Once at the 
correct calculator they must scroll down to find the link, which appears in small font 
relative to the information around it, in order to produce a KFS. Figure 6.14 shows 
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the calculator and the placement of the KFS link and the tab which the borrower 
must click to access the calculator after following the link. 
 
Figure 6.14. Commonwealth Bank: How much can I borrow calculator, by Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia, 2015. Retrieved from https://www.commbank.com.au/personal/home-loans/how-
much-can-i-borrow.html. 
 
Where the borrower attempted to retrieve a KFS from the tools and calculator 
page, they still needed to select the ‘How much can I borrow’ calculator from among 
six other options and a subsequent section headed ‘Fact sheets’ which listed 12 more 
calculator options and 12 reference guides.  
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Case 4 – Westpac Bank  
Notably, the first result in the Google search using the standard term used for 
other lenders – ‘home loan’ plus name of lender – did not lead to a version of the 
Westpac website in which a KFS generator, or any other home loan tools, was 
locatable. While this version of the website did provide a list of calculators, these did 
not include KFS. Using the search function of the website located the generator in 
the first two links, and a list of calculators containing these links; however, 
attempting to manually find the same list of calculators using the directory provided 
led to a different list of calculators which did not include the KFS. 
To locate Westpac’s KFS using Google, the borrower had to click on the third 
result: ‘Calculators and tools Westpac home loans’. Notably, the first link also had a 
sub-heading title ‘Calculators’, but this led to the list which did not include KFS.  
The ‘calculators and tools’ page (as opposed to the ‘calculators’ page) was 
visually divided into two columns: 13 calculator options were nominated on the left; 
5 sets of ‘tools’ appeared on the right with KFS the last item on this list (see Figure 
6.15).  
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Figure 6.15. Westpac tools and calculators page, by Westpac Banking Corporation, 2015. 
Retrieved from http://info.westpac.com.au/homeloans/calculatortools/. 
 
The home loan Key Fact Sheet tool appears 5th in the list of tools, and is 
companied by the description: ‘Get your fact sheet by entering the loan amount, 
length of the loan, interest type and product name into our key fact sheet tool’.  
For those selecting the KFS tool option, the calculator appears with no further 
explanation of origin or purpose, as below. Although the prominent W logo signals 
site ownership, its positioning over the KFS generator raises potential confusion 
around the KFS as a Westpac calculator – and therefore on par with the wide range 
of other generators on offer (Figure 6.16). 
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Figure 6.16. Westpac KFS generator, by Westpac Banking Corporation, 2015. Retrieved from 
http://info.westpac.com.au/homeloans/keyfactsheet/westpac.html. 
 
Overall, from the perspective of the researcher, Westpac’s positioning 
presented the greatest access challenge of this group. The dual website problem that 
offered access to KFS on one site but not the other, the positioning of the calculator 
under ‘tools’ on the same page as other calculators, and the lack of descriptive 
information around the purpose and affiliation of this KFS limited its potential use 
for comparison. Without a purposeful search, it is unlikely the KFS generator would 
have been encountered.  
Smaller lenders 
While similar differences occurred across all 23 lenders, several patterns were 
observable among the general population. First, the majority of lenders – 18 out of 
23 – kept their KFS generators with their home loan tools and calculators, either in a 
list on the home loan page or on a separate page. The second place in which 
borrowers kept their KFS was with the application information for the individual 
240 Chapter 6: Lender disclosure practices 
loans. Five of the lenders observed chose to do this, either by providing a link to the 
generator or by including the KFS generator in a tab or drop-down menu on the 
actual page. 
Aside from the location of the KFS generators, links were often available from 
several different webpages which could also help a borrower locate a KFS. Two-
thirds of the lenders provided links to the KFS generator from their home loans page. 
Five lenders provided KFS with their home loans and another four lenders provided 
links from the individual loans applications page. Notably, 19 of the 23 licensed 
lenders also had webpages specifically designed to help borrowers compare their 
own loan products against one another. These pages either focused on providing 
price comparisons, titled ‘compare our interest rates’, or laid out the different 
products features, ‘compare our home loans’. Only seven of these pages made 
reference to KFS and no lender provided a link from both pages. Finally, one of the 
three lenders who provided additional home loan fact sheets informed participants on 
their fact sheet page that the sheets provided were not KFS and provided a link to 
their KFS generator. A count of the different locations from which links were 
available is presented in Figure 6.17. 
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Figure 6.17. Location of links to KFS generators.77 
 
6.7 Discussion 
The main finding from this research is that lenders’ disclosure practices 
surrounding KFS stand as a significant barrier to the receipt of KFS – especially 
where borrowers are unaware KFS exist. The findings from Study 1 demonstrate that 
borrowers are unlikely to receive KFS where they make a request for loan pricing 
information without using the term ‘key facts sheet’. Study 2 found that specific 
requests for KFS increase the likelihood that borrowers will receive one, particularly 
from home loan specialists, and reduces the amount of lender designed 
documentation a borrower is likely receive. It also highlights that the lack of 
awareness detected among borrowers in the interviews conducted in Chapter 5 also 
extends to lenders’ staffs, particular those whose job is to provide general 
                                                            
77 As lenders often had multiple links to their KFS generators this number exceeds the 23 observed 
lenders. 
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information. Study 3 identified several features of lenders’ websites which threaten 
to reduce the likelihood that borrowers will become aware of and receive KFS while 
searching online. 
The results from the first study showed that collecting home loan pricing 
information without using the term ‘key facts sheet’ can be a time-consuming 
exercise that often results in the receipt of a wide variety of inconsistent documents 
designed by lenders – but no KFS. A simple request for pricing information which 
could be compared off site could take over 15 minutes for a single lender. Further, 
the documents received varied in terms of content, layout, focus and terminology, 
increasing the time required to compare the offers they advertised. Due to their 
general nature these documents also failed to transparently and simply provide a 
borrower with an idea of what their desired loan requirements would cost them. 
Rather they required borrowers to determine which information applies to their 
circumstance, and estimate the cost themselves using interest rate and fee 
information if they wished to compare offers. 
Adding to this, requests for comparative pricing information and, at times, 
even a specific request for KFS results in information irrelevant to price 
comparisons. For example, providing general terms and conditions documents, home 
buying guides and financial product summaries merely distracted the borrower and 
did not provide any information which helped them compare the individual loan 
costs. This corroborates findings from Choice (2012) which yielded similar results 
for Sydney lenders immediately following the implementation of KFS in 2012. 
Studies 1 and 2 extend Choice (2012) by showing that even specific requests 
for the type of information KFS contain (i.e. comparative pricing information) does 
Chapter 6: Lender disclosure practices 243 
 
 
not result in their provision. This is important because the request for ‘rate and fee 
information which can be taken away and compared’ used by Choice is met by the 
interest rates and fee schedules provided. However, the request for comparative 
pricing information with which to compare loans and, more specifically, information 
which breaks down the cost so the borrower can compare like for like across loans, is 
not met where lenders provide interest rate sheets and fee schedules. 
Study 2 further revealed that specific requests for KFS greatly reduced the 
duration of the visits and resulted in more targeted information which, for the 
majority, included provision of KFS. Despite this, the lack of knowledge of KFS 
among lenders’ general inquiries staff means that unless a borrower is referred to, 
and speaks with, a home loan specialist they are unlikely to receive KFS. This may 
have severe implications for borrowers who wish to make a quick inquiry for 
information or who shop for information at busy branches or during busy times of 
the day (i.e. during lunch breaks) where specialists may be busy, because it reduces 
the likelihood they will receive KFS without coming back and/or making an 
appointment. 
These results emphasise a weakness in the legislation: placing the onus on 
borrowers to request KFS. Coupled with the low level of awareness of KFS 
demonstrated in the interviews, the research shows that lender disclosure practices 
under the current regulation create a serious barrier to borrowers’ exposure to KFS. 
In particular, that none of the 19 lenders observed provided KFS in response to 
inquiries for information which could be used to compare the costs for a specific 
loan suggests that this issue is far reaching and forms a significant barrier to the 
success of the legislation. 
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Turning to the website analysis, evidence from Study 3 shows that the links to 
KFS generators were often presented in among lists of similarly named calculators 
and options and KFS generators were often treated as another one of the lenders’ 
many home loan calculators. Despite the observed lenders providing a number of 
links to their KFS generators, the majority of these links lacked any form of (clear) 
distinguishing features or description to highlight that KFS were a separate, 
government initiative. Only one-fifth of the lenders attempted to draw borrowers’ 
attention to KFS through by using graphics or other eye-catching formatting. 
Borrowers were therefore required to know what KFS were in order to understand 
the purpose of the link. This reduces the likelihood that borrowers who were not 
aware of KFS would use the generators. Even once borrowers had proceeded to the 
KFS generator, little information, with a few exceptions, was provided to distinguish 
KFS as a government tool, separate from those designed by the lenders themselves. 
While KFS were generally available to borrowers within only a few clicks 
from the home page, this did not mean that it was always simple to locate them. 
Several features of lenders’ websites also stand as potential barriers to KFS 
generation. The provision of non-KFS home loan fact sheets, the generation of KFS 
from calculators with a different primary purpose, and the generation of unnecessary 
information all stand to confound the process of producing KFS. These features may 
confuse or distract borrowers who search for KFS because they are prominent or use 
similar terminology and placement on the website. 
Insight into the difficulties a borrower may have locating KFS on lenders’ 
websites and the negative impact some of the features found in Study 3 can have on 
online KFS retrieval may be drawn from observations in Study 2 where 15 lenders 
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attempted to provide KFS from their websites. These observations showed that, for 
borrowers, locating KFS generators, even when aware of the term ‘key facts sheet’, 
could prove difficult and confusing. This is evident as five of the 10 lenders’ general 
inquiries staff who looked for KFS themselves had to ask for help in producing one. 
Two lenders still provided general information from the lender’s website after 
making a phone call for help and being asked, twice, specifically for KFS. The 
generation of additional information from KFS generators also prevented one 
lender’s home loan specialist from providing KFS. Here the specialist provided 
information that was available only after using the lender’s KFS generator, but 
which appears before the actual KFS. Finally, one teller produced the lender’s own 
non-KFS home loan fact sheet, which indicates that these too stand as a barrier to 
KFS retrieval. 
Notably, the above observations were of lenders’ staff using a website that, 
arguably, should have been familiar to them. Further, each person was aware that 
KFS existed and could be generated online. These issues are likely to be 
compounded where borrowers are unaware of KFS because they not only need to 
locate KFS generators but must also become aware of their existence, their use and 
their benefits during search. In this respect, only around one-third of the lenders who 
provided KFS generators offered such information. This meant that borrowers may 
be deterred from attempting to use the generator due to the time it will take to 
produce KFS. Borrowers may also have concerns surrounding obligations which 
may arise from the use of KFS, or misconstrue KFS as offers for credit.  
Finally, as KFS are used to compare loan offers, a borrower is required to 
produce at least two KFS before they may do so. Here, the level of inconsistency 
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surrounding placement of KFS generators and the links leading to them is likely to 
result in an onerous and time-consuming search process. KFS are designed to reduce 
these search costs, saving borrowers time and energy, so these inconsistencies erode 
the benefits of using KFS and may prevent some borrowers from choosing to use 
them. 
The results from the Study 3 show that the freedom created by the wording of s 
133AC appears to have resulted in the ineffective provision of information 
surrounding KFS: many lenders rely on the minimal amount of information to meet 
the requirements. This reduces the likelihood that borrowers will become aware of 
and use KFS, as well as increasing the time and effort a borrower must expend to 
collect multiple sheets so they can make a comparison, greatly reducing the benefits 
of KFS. 
Overall, the research conducted in this chapter raises serious questions about 
the disclosure requirements surrounding KFS. Borrowers, particularly those who are 
unaware of KFS, appear unlikely to become informed about KFS and thus appear 
unlikely to receive them unless they specifically know to request one from a home 
loan specialist or to search specifically for them online. 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter has examined how the attitudes and disclosure practices of lenders 
influence the likelihood a borrower will obtain and use KFS. It has emphasised 
barriers which apply, or which are compounded, where borrowers are unaware of 
KFS and their benefits. This forms the final part of the evaluation of the regulatory 
approach to improving home loan decision-making adopted by the National 
Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009.  
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By looking into the environment in which borrowers make their home loan 
decisions, this research rounds out the findings from the experiments and interviews 
conducted in the previous chapters, which focused on the implications of KFS for 
borrowers. The findings in this chapter have generated insight into how the lenders’ 
disclosure practices under the current regulation may limit borrowers’ awareness and 
use of KFS in home loan comparisons. Evidence has also demonstrated the negative 
impact that placing the onus on borrowers to seek out KFS has had on the 
legislation’s overall effectiveness. The following chapter concludes the thesis, 
summarising the contributions and presenting the conclusions and recommendations 
arising from the research. 

Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations 249 
 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions and 
recommendations 
This thesis has investigated the theory, implementation and effectiveness of the 
Australian Government’s 2012 legislative introduction of prescribed home loan Key 
Fact Sheets (KFS) into the Australian home mortgage market. The basic objective of 
this research was to determine whether this form of consumer protection improved 
Australian borrowers’ capacities to effectively assess different home loan costs 
across a range of home loan products available in the market. The research was 
designed to determine whether (i) the presentation and format of KFS successfully 
enhance borrowers’ ability to compare loan costs (ii) KFS do in fact influence home 
loan choice and (iii) the disclosure requirements under the Act effectively ensure 
borrowers who may benefit from KFS content receive them at a time when they are 
most useful to their decision. Three stages of research were conducted to meet this 
objective. In Stage 1 the theoretical impact of KFS was explored through controlled 
laboratory experiments. In Stage 2 analysis moved to the real-world experience of 
borrowers who have taken out loans in the window since KFS were introduced, and 
their actual experiences and motivations around loan choice while focusing on the 
role KFS played in their decision. Finally in Stage 3 this research was completed 
through a study of lenders’ disclosure practices around KFS provisions when faced 
with borrower inquiry. It was anticipated that outcomes would inform future 
legislative reform and also provide a better understanding of how the heuristics and 
biases studies of behavioural economics may best be used to enhance borrowers’ 
decision-making behaviour.  
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This research complements a historical review of pre-loan disclosure 
legislative practices, and compares the results from the results from the current 
regime with other national systems, (see Chapter 2). Parallel experiences in the US 
and the UK were outlined and key points of difference and overlap were assessed so 
they ascertained to help inform, evaluate and interpret the empirical findings 
documented in later sections. Taken in conjunction with an analysis of Australia’s 
legislative objectives in introducing KFS, it was anticipated that this thesis would 
provide feedback as to the effectiveness of the regulatory design. Results set out in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6 point to unanticipated problems in translating the theory of 
improving disclosure into practice in the marketplace. Specifically, KFS disclosure 
practices proposed by O’Shea and tested in the empirical study conducted in Chapter 
4 do enable consumers to easily and quickly identify the most cost-effective 
packages on the market; however, other variables – ranging from lack of knowledge 
through to third-party influence – may nevertheless inhibit their use.  
The thesis’s quantitative research involved studies that confirmed the 
prescribed disclosure of KFS does improve the quality of decision makers’ 
judgements of loan costs. The qualitative studies, however, highlight other sources 
of concern in the borrowers’ decision-making process. The insights from this 
research also inform the respective effectiveness of two theories (namely the rational 
maximiser theory of neoclassical economics and the more recently emergent 
principles of behavioural economics decision theory) to inform consumer protection 
reform. 
This chapter proceeds by: (1) outlining conclusions reached to the research 
questions; (2) highlighting their implications for theory and practice; and (3) 
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summarising limitations and delimitations of the research, including the validity and 
reliability of the findings. Finally, areas for future research are highlighted. 
7.1 Empirical findings 
As outlined in chapters 1 and 2, in January 2012 the Australian parliament 
introduced prescribed home loan KFS with four goals. The four research questions in 
this thesis mirror those goals and seek to identify the success of the legislative 
reform three years on by focusing on the goals of improving product transparency 
and comparability in order to improve borrowers’ cost comparisons. The extent to 
which KFS induce demand-side competition and minimise compliance costs fell, 
therefore, outside research scope. The four research questions outlined in Chapter 1 
were: 
RQ1: Do KFS help people identify the most cost-effective loan from among a 
number of alternatives? 
RQ2: What role, if any, do KFS play in borrowers’ loan decisions? 
RQ3: What factors, if any, limit the effectiveness of KFS in practice? 
RQ4: How do the disclosure requirements for KFS impact the likelihood that 
borrowers will receive one? 
Stage 1’s experimental design addressed RQ1 by evaluating the impact of KFS 
on a theoretical user’s home loan price comparison processes. During Stage 2, 
borrowers were interviewed to investigate their decision processes in practice and 
the extent to which these featured KFS, to inform RQ2 and RQ3. Finally, the field 
studies and analysis of lenders’ websites were designed to examine how lenders’ 
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disclosure practices under the current regulation could influence the likelihood a 
borrower would receive a KFS, addressing RQ3 and RQ4. 
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarised within 
the respective chapters: Chapter 4 - Effectiveness of KFS; Chapter 5 - Home Loan 
Selection Decisions; and Chapter 6 - Lender Disclosure Practices. This section will 
synthesise the empirical findings to answer the research’s four research questions. 
7.1.1 KFS and the identification of lowest cost loans 
Results from the experiment indicate that KFS help borrowers better 
understand loan costs. In results that corroborate those of O’Shea (2010), the simple, 
transparent and concise disclosure design principles utilised by KFS helped 
individuals to better understand the cost of the loans available to them. This, coupled 
with the standardised design and simplification of terminology, was also found to 
lead to a significant increase in the number of borrowers who were able to identify 
the most cost effective loan from among the alternatives provided. This evidence 
supports the move for targeted disclosure as the concise, clearly formatted design of 
KFS appears to increase the transparency of key loan costs and improves users’ 
comprehension of these costs and their resulting price comparisons. 
While KFS help users accurately identify the most cost-effective home loan 
from among several alternatives, there was no improvement in decision time. This 
was unexpected because borrowers were provided with pre-calculated estimates of 
cost, which eliminated the need for complex cost calculations. The lack of change in 
decision time suggests that the participants may have allocated a limited amount of 
time or effort to the decision process, and selected a subset of the available 
information to consider according to these self-imposed limitations. The findings 
Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations 253 
 
 
support the notion that borrowers rely on more accessible information over valid 
information when making decisions. It also supports the notion that making valid 
information more accessible increases the likelihood borrowers will consider it and 
consequently empower their heuristic processes to arrive at better results without 
increasing the demands on time or effort. 
7.1.2 Role of KFS in the loan decision 
Despite the positive effect of KFS on rational decision-making, results from 
the interview phase of the research suggest many borrowers remain unaware of KFS, 
how to obtain them and/or the benefit they may provide during a borrower’s decision 
process. This meant almost half of the sampled borrowers did not receive or use KFS 
despite believing they would have used them if they knew of their existence. Perhaps 
surprisingly, given the wide variation in age, education and financial experience of 
the interview participants, no borrower interviewed used KFS when comparing their 
home loan alternatives. This lack of awareness did not appear related to the extent of 
a borrower’s search activity nor the sources of information they considered. The lack 
of borrower awareness surrounding KFS therefore appears as a major barrier to KFS 
use in practice.  
A key reason for the lack of awareness appears to be the use of third-party 
advice in the borrowing decision whether through professional engagement of 
brokers or through more informal reliance on family, friends or existing connections. 
This may be explained by a range of variables. The complexity of the decision 
appears to encourage borrowers to use external advice when making their loan 
decisions. Borrowers, perhaps not surprisingly, appear to use brokers to undertake 
the delegated functions of collecting and comparing information. Given their role, 
254 Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations 
this suggests that broker services may act as a substitute for KFS – providing the 
borrower with better home loan price comparisons. Similar effects appear to exist for 
advice from non-professional third parties. It appears that it is not uncommon for 
first-time borrowers to seek advice from friends or family members and to base their 
decision exclusively on their recommendations despite these third parties lacking any 
professional experience regarding home loan selection. Based on conjecture, it is 
expected that there is likely to be an important difference in the quality of advice 
offered by professional mortgage brokers and that offered by uninformed third-
parties. Further, most borrowers who sought advice from a third-party reported that 
they would not have used KFS even if they had been aware of them. 
7.1.3 Limiting factors on the practical effectiveness of KFS 
The research supports international findings that not all borrowers base their 
decision solely on the financial cost of a loan with many focusing on non-loan 
related factors when making their decision. These factors included the benefits of 
continuing to deal with a lender with whom they have previous history (and 
conversely the inconvenience, time and financial cost of dealing with a new lender). 
These factors may prevent borrowers from switching to a cheaper option. The 
presumption that KFS lead to a more price-competitive market is thus questionable, 
at least in many situations such as during the decision to refinance or when the costs 
of dealing with a new lender are perceived as being high.  
The importance many borrowers place on ongoing borrower-lender 
relationships highlights two aspects of the home loan market which are fairly unique 
and have important repercussions for disclosure based policy. First, borrowers are 
required to enter into a long-term relationship with their suppliers. This requires an 
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abnormal commitment to a supplier and increases the costs, both financial and 
otherwise, of switching between lenders. These relationships also have tangible 
effects on the overall borrowing experience and future implications for borrowers’ 
long-term monthly costs. Second, there is a high level of interrelation between credit 
products (and other financial products such as insurance) with many lenders offering 
product packages or products with features such as home loan offset accounts which 
offer significant benefits for consolidating several products with the one lender. In 
credit markets especially, the barriers to effective competition therefore transcend 
simple price comparisons, which often apply in other markets. 
7.1.4 Effect of disclosure requirements for KFS on borrower access 
Another key finding of the research was the difficulty in accessing KFS in the 
field. Where borrowers collected information from lenders or their websites, they did 
not report receiving KFS or any other standardised loan comparison sheets. 
Fieldwork corroborated this. Quite simply, KFS are unlikely to be provided unless 
the borrower directly requests them by name. Borrowers’ requests for pricing 
information that do not contain the term KFS are unlikely to result in their provision, 
even where the borrower asks for the same information, set out in the same format 
and/or for the same purpose as KFS. Therefore, it appears that borrowers who are 
unaware of KFS are unlikely to gain exposure to them during their normal loan 
selection process. Requests which specifically used the term ‘Key Facts Sheets’ were 
likely to result in KFS provision from home loan specialists or larger lenders; 
however, these variables had no effect on KFS provision for general requests in the 
observed cases. 
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Further, the lack of awareness of KFS appears to extend beyond borrowers to 
lender staff. The fieldwork looking at the provision of KFS highlighted that lenders’ 
general staff were largely unaware of KFS or how to produce them for customers. 
Home loan specialists were more aware of KFS, but only around half of the requests 
made for KFS were referred to specialist staff, and even then, some home loan 
specialists had difficult generating a KFS upon request.  
Similarly, little information exists online to guide borrowers to lenders’ KFS 
generators. Little to no information is provided with links to the generators to 
explain what KFS are, how they vary from individual lender’s custom designed cost 
calculators, or why a borrower would want to generate a KFS specifically. Further, 
these links are usually buried in a list of tools and resources which have a wide range 
of other descriptive names. Information provided with the generator is similarly 
sparse: the vast majority of lenders failed to describe the purpose and benefits of 
KFS, or that they were a government mandate and not another lender-designed 
resource. 
In particular, the barriers in practice appear to prevent borrowers who are 
unaware of KFS from becoming aware of and receiving one. Even where borrowers 
are aware of KFS, these issues, combined with the generally inconsistent placement 
of KFS generators, increase the time and effort a borrower is required to expend in 
order to receive KFS. Consequently, KFS are likely to not feature in a borrower’s 
decision process – negating their impact. 
7.2 Implications for theory 
The overall findings support a behavioural approach to regulation, 
demonstrating that a pure neoclassical economic view of man as a rational utility 
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maximiser may not result in effective regulation. The findings show that borrowers, 
while willing to engage in fact finding, often do not take sufficient steps in self-
education, given the complexity of the loan market, to encounter documents such as 
KFS. The absence of mandatory KFS provision – or at a minimum, a far greater 
awareness campaign around the use of such documents - therefore, results in a 
flawed theory of regulation which prevents KFS from achieving their intended aim 
of enhancing borrowers’ ability to compare the cost of their loan alternatives. While 
the experiment demonstrates the effectiveness of KFS in assisting users to identify 
the cheapest home loan, borrowers often do not collect and compare the home loan 
information available to them even where they believe it is valuable. This runs 
contrary to the assumption that people, as rational utility maximisers, will seek out 
the information they value and incorporate it into their decision. The problem caused 
by limited search behaviour is compounded by borrowers’ general lack of awareness 
about KFS, and the requirement for borrowers to directly request KFS. Taken 
together, these factors mean KFS appear rarely used in practice. 
The research highlights the need for theory to recognise the interplay of the 
different mechanisms involved in decision-making and how they may counter or 
interact with one another. Understanding the target audiences’ decision-making 
behaviours as a whole and how mechanisms such as disclosure design, availability 
and disclosure requirements interact with these behaviours would allow for more 
balanced insight into overall decision-making effectiveness. This can only be 
achieved by investigating how these decision-makers collect and compare 
information and how they ultimately decide on which alternative they prefer. 
Understanding borrowers’ behaviour in totality moves beyond testing borrowers’ 
abilities to make accurate inferences (i.e. which loan is the most financially cost 
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effective), to better understand borrower behaviours and values and identify common 
themes among the subjective choices made by the target audience. 
Similarly, the results highlight the importance of understanding the 
environment in which the target audience makes their decisions. This means that 
regulators need to understand the criteria borrowers use to make decision in the 
home loan market, notably the ongoing relationship borrowers have with their credit 
providers and the high level of interrelation between lenders’ products. For KFS, this 
means that simply showing a borrower that one loan is the most financially cost 
effective on a single criterion of loan cost alone may not translate as an optimal 
decision for that consumer. Consequently, understanding such issues is vital for 
developing effective and impactful regulatory approaches to protecting consumers 
and enhancing their overall decision quality. 
These criteria aside, the findings demonstrate that increased comprehension 
arising from targeted, concise disclosure leads to improved price comparisons of 
home loans. This addresses a gap in the literature by extending the testing of pre-
contractual home loan disclosure to consider how targeted price disclosure impacts 
borrowers’ price comparisons. Further, it extends this research by considering how 
such disclosure performs when provided with the information available before 
applying for a loan. The research also extends previous findings by using the KFS 
legislation to examine the effect this disclosure has in practice. Here, results show 
that the target audiences’ search practices and decision criteria and the disclosure 
requirements for the information may result in disclosure that effectively performs 
its function when used as intended but fails to achieve the desired change in 
behaviour in practice because it does not feature in their decision-making process.  
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Interestingly, despite the improvement to decision accuracy, KFS made no 
difference to decision time in the experimental context. This suggests that people (at 
least in the experimental conditions) make decisions in set amounts of time based on 
a perceived acceptable time cost, and attempt to make their decision within this time 
frame even where this requires them to ignore information (Bayern, 2009; Downs, 
1957; Eisenberg, 1995). It is noted that these results were based on observations of 
students in a laboratory setting and may not reflect borrower behaviour. Evidence 
from the interviews, however, corroborates this, demonstrating that borrowers often 
attempt to make decisions in what they perceive to be a reasonable time, even where 
they are conscious that doing so may result in a sub-optimal outcome. It is suggested 
that regulators should therefore seek to understand and account for the effect their 
target audience’s time constraints, self-imposed or otherwise, may have on their 
decision behaviour and aim to maximise the accuracy of the decision in the time 
given to it. 
Finally, the research shows that where borrowers are unaware of KFS, they are 
unlikely to encounter them through their usual search process and consequently 
cannot use them. The requirement for borrowers to request or seek out KFS has 
therefore significantly limited their effectiveness. Further, the online requirements 
appear insufficient to ensure lenders’ websites reliably lead borrowers to their KFS 
generators and allow for a great deal of ambiguity and inconsistency surrounding 
lenders’ online KFS generators. This creates a number of unnecessary barriers that 
borrowers must overcome to generate KFS, and may prevent them from 
understanding the benefits of KFS and thus from attempting to generate one. Again, 
this highlights the importance of ensuring that prescribed disclosure successfully 
reaches its target audience during their typical decision-making processes and the 
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dangers of regulation which relies on consumers’ search habits and prior knowledge 
to allow borrowers to receive one. 
7.3 Implications for practice 
At the practical level, the findings indicate that regulatory intervention would 
benefit from a holistic approach to designing and testing proposed interventions. 
While the legislative amendments relied heavily on empirical research to help design 
the content and presentation of KFS, this research did not extend to other critical 
aspects of the intervention, particularly its implementation and delivery. This thesis 
demonstrates that an effective disclosure mechanism, while important, is only one of 
multiple parts required for effective intervention and does not in itself ensure that 
prescribed disclosure will successfully improve decision-making in practice. 
Consequently, legislators need to take a holistic approach to understanding the target 
audience’s purchase decision process and tailor disclosure requirements around this 
to ensure that the target audience will receive the disclosure in the window in which 
it provides maximum benefit. 
More specifically for the home loan context, KFS effectiveness is undermined 
by a combination of borrowers’ search behaviours and the disclosure requirements 
surrounding KFS. The complexity of the loan decision appears to lead many 
borrowers to outsource the information search to third parties, including not only 
specialist mortgage brokers but also more informal – and not necessarily better 
informed – friends or family. This behaviour is reinforced by the widespread 
unawareness of KFS: the majority of borrowers do not know to ask for or seek KFS 
when making a decision. Thus, the qualitative data suggests borrowers generally do 
not encounter KFS, even where they collect information from the sources through 
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which it is available. That borrowers who would use KFS may collect pricing 
information from sources through which KFS are available yet fail to find one 
demonstrates that the disclosure requirements surrounding KFS are largely 
ineffective. 
Further, the findings that borrowers use multiple decision approaches suggests 
that disclosure interventions may need to be segmented in order to effectively benefit 
the widest possible audience. The different values borrowers place on items such as 
price, comfort and time significantly affect their search behaviour, as well as the 
perceived usefulness of certain information. Specifically for the purpose of this 
thesis, KFS appear to appeal to borrowers who conduct their own search for 
information where those seeking third-party advice – whether professional or more 
informal - often reported that they would not use it. Therefore, it is uncertain whether 
taking action to ensure that borrowers who use a broker receive KFS will effectively 
improve their decision-making. Further, different decision-making processes may 
involve different issues. Mortgage brokers, for example, are not paid directly by 
borrowers and, consequently, may have incentives to recommend sub-optimal offers. 
Issues also arise around enhancing informal third-party advice from friends and 
family who may, or may not, have any credible experience in home loan decision-
making. By segmenting the intended target of regulatory intervention based on an 
understanding of borrower decision-making behaviour, and the criteria which drive 
certain decision processes, regulators may be able to better target the information at 
the borrowers who will value it and benefit from it most. 
The research from the third stage of the thesis suggests a general lack of 
industry awareness surrounding KFS that may prevent borrowers from receiving a 
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KFS even where they specifically request one. This finding is perhaps most 
important for smaller lenders who employ fewer staff and do not always have home 
loan staff available to speak to borrowers. In these scenarios, equipping general 
inquiries staff with the knowledge required to generate KFS may improve 
compliance with the legislation. This is likely to require complementary legislative 
intervention, shifting the onus of KFS provision to lenders. As noted in Chapter 2, 
this has been done by in the UK requiring lenders to provide a KFS equivalent to 
borrowers before entering into a contract with them. 
7.4 Recommendations 
Given the significant barriers that this thesis has demonstrated currently limit 
the effectiveness of KFS in the home loan market, targeted legislative reform is 
strongly advocated if the original objectives set out by parliament are to be reached. 
Specifically, borrowers’ awareness of KFS should be raised across groups that have 
been found to benefit from and express interest in using such comparative tools. 
These appear to be first-time or relatively inexperienced borrowers who are often 
unfamiliar with the nature of loan documentation, terminology, and the wide range 
of polycentric variables that drive total loan package costings. Minimising the 
density of such information in the information gathering stage before selecting a loan 
is, as set out in Chapter 4, of significant value to promoting the most cost-effective 
loan package choice. 
Two approaches are proposed to raise borrower awareness. First, a KFS 
promotion campaign to ‘relaunch’ this initiative is advocated as a de minis step, 
along with affirmative follow up from ASIC around lender compliance as it 
undertook in 2012 as the ‘watchdog’ for this initiative. Second, current regulations 
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need to be re-drafted to transfer the duty of disclosure to lenders. Specifically, 
regulations should require lenders to provide KFS to borrowers prior to entering into 
a contract with them, preferably offering KFS in the initial stage in which any 
borrower requests home loan pricing information in addition to the contract sign off 
point adopted in UK legislation. This would align Australia’s legislation with UK 
and US requirements and enhance the probability that KFS will be ‘discovered’ and 
used effectively in the early stages of loan selection – the window in which such 
disclosure have been shown to be of optimal value. It also presents the opportunity to 
encourage more widespread recognition by borrowers of ease of access and potential 
use that this tool presents across the broader lending pool of mortgage providers.  
It is suggested that standardised language around the function of KFS be 
adopted as part of the existing regulation and that uniform placement of KFS on 
lenders’ websites – such as under tools and calculators – be prescribed. Enhanced 
employer training of lending staff – both general and specialists – is also 
recommended to ensure that full disclosure to borrowers is made around loan 
selection tools and information. An additional, potentially cost-effective mechanism 
in this respect might be prescribed signage within lending branches alerting 
consumer/borrowers to this government initiative. Lenders already have KFS 
generators on their websites and relevant information in place in their offices, so 
introducing these more affirmative steps would be relatively cost effective. It would 
also accord with recent research and findings by behavioural economists as to what 
constitutes the most effective reform mechanisms in consumer protection fields. 
It is recognised however, that provision of information is not free. Care should 
be taken when deciding on how best to improve awareness, regardless of whether 
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this is done directly or through regulatory amendments, to ensure that the benefits of 
the increased accessibility outweigh the costs of increasing the disclosure 
requirements. Therefore, any attempt to increase awareness should be based on 
empirical research designed to test the effectiveness of each solution so that benefits 
can be accurately weighed against costs. As mentioned in Chapter 2, a cost effective 
implementation was one of the goals for KFS, and this mindset should be maintained 
when considering how best to promote KFS to future borrowers. 
More generally, it is advocated that prescribed disclosure documents should be 
based on empirical research and subject to consumer testing. The effective design of 
KFS is due largely to the detailed empirical research into effective disclosure and 
testing of prior models of pre-contractual home loan disclosure. In particular, O’Shea 
(2010) highlights that simply relying on prior research without testing the design in 
context may result in ineffective disclosure even where the design is based on prior 
research. Findings from this thesis form a starting point for insights into matching 
the type of information borrowers desire with the sources of information they 
consider when deciding upon a home loan. 
Finally, two recommendations are made towards improving current KFS 
design. First, design should be amended to include a section for special offers that 
may apply as the result of choosing a particular loan – particularly where the loan 
may form part of a financial package. This approach has been adopted in the UK and 
allows KFI to capture potential savings and benefits associated with the loan which 
are not built into the loan structure itself. This necessarily impacts borrowers seeking 
to make fully informed loan decisions, given the benefits surrounding financial 
product packages. Second, it is suggested that borrowers are provided with the 
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option to calibrate alterations in repayment frequency schedules used in KFS 
estimates to highlight the changes this makes to the overall cost of the loan. 
7.5 Limitations and delimitations 
All studies carry limits around outcomes and findings. Specific issues arising 
out of the experiments, semi-structured interviews, replication of the Choice study, 
and online analysis carried out in chapters 4, 5 and 6 are set out in full in those 
sections. At a broader level, however, the overall findings arising out of this work 
are constrained by the limits that purposeful sampling pools present. Although not 
indicative of a flawed or marginal quality study (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, pp. 160-
161), specific findings cannot reliably be generalised to broader respective 
populations. Survey tools with extended regional and targeted socioeconomic reach 
would potentially refine outcomes and provide broader support. As structured, 
however, this research focuses on identifying themes and patterns (Bloor & Wood, 
2006; Guest et al., 2006) in borrower behaviour and values and highlighting the key 
issues borrowers face in practice. This research further reflects consistent findings in 
similar studies in the UK, by O’Shea as the basis for the KFS legislative model, and 
by the consumer advocacy group Choice (2012). 
While the purpose of the experiments was to determine whether the theoretical 
principles underlying KFS had been applied correctly, and therefore the use of a 
student sample is appropriate, the precise statistical findings cannot be generalised to 
the population of Australian home loan borrowers. Consequently, findings from the 
experiment cannot be interpreted as a precise measure of the effect KFS will have on 
borrowers’ ability to compare loan costs. Rather the findings demonstrate that, 
theoretically, KFS are likely to improve borrowers decision processes where used as 
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intended. As identified in Chapter 4, the participants’ higher level of education, or 
differences in the sample, is not expected to significantly bias the results because 
KFS allow borrowers to simply compare the estimated total cost of a loan by 
comparing a single dollar figure for each loan option.  
The widespread lack of awareness found among borrowers prevented the direct 
observation of how KFS impact on borrowers’ decision-making when used. 
Therefore the observation of how KFS impact users’ decision-making processes is 
confined to the laboratory results provided by Chapter 4. Borrower responses, 
however, indicated that borrowers do find the content and layout of KFS useful. 
Almost half the borrowers stated that it would help them compare loans more easily 
and accurately. 
It is worth noting that this research was conducted during a period in which the 
Reserve Bank of Australia’s cash rate was at the lowest it has been in 30 years 
(Reserve Bank of Australia, 2015b). During the observed period the interest rate fell 
from 4.25% to 2.25% p.a. against a 15-year average of 5.13% p.a. with a high point 
of 17.5% in January 1990 (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2015a; Trading Economics, 
2015). This allows lenders to pass these low costs on to borrowers, increasing 
housing affordability. Consequently, borrower decision-making behaviour during 
this period may have been influenced by the increased affordability of housing. 
Where loan costs rise in future, pricing and affordability are likely to become more 
important to borrowers, increasing the benefits provided by KFS. 
7.6 Areas for future research 
The uptake of KFS use by informed borrowers remains an area of critical 
importance for future research. As documented in chapters 4, 5 and 6, KFS do work 
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as a mechanism for identifying the most cost-effective loan packages. Price 
sensitivity, however, is not the only dynamic that borrowers turn to in making 
decisions. Behavioural economics theory offers an alternative view as to what 
effective law reform may look like in the context of consumer information 
asymmetry. Using this approach, and tracking in greater detail how ‘informed’ 
borrowers react with both KFS and other dynamics as influential tools, would 
provide generally valuable data as to how this – and related areas of consumer 
lending and credit – can best be regulated in future.  
None of the participants in the interviews used KFS in their decision, so the 
research has been unable to determine the role KFS play in decision-making when 
borrowers choose to use them. Although half of the borrowers interviewed reported 
that they would have used KFS when comparing loans, these results appear 
inconsistent with findings from the UK, which suggest borrowers largely ignore KFI 
until after the decision (Illuminas, 2008). However, the findings from the UK come 
from a context in which borrowers predominantly receive KFI after they have made 
their decision. Consequently, by studying how KFS operate when obtained early in 
the process, better insight can be gained into their role and effectiveness in practice 
and whether the approach should be continued, amended or terminated. 
Further research should also investigate in detail the extent to which time and 
experience play a part in borrowers’ decision-making processes. Findings from the 
interviews show that the amount of perceived time available to a borrower is likely 
to affect the borrower’s perceptions of information complexity, and consequently 
their decision processes. Examining the effect of time pressures on borrowers’ 
decisions in more detail may generate insight about how better to equip borrowers 
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with the information they desire in the time they allocate to the decision. This is 
particularly important given that: (a) KFS were not found to significantly decrease 
borrower decision-making time and (b) collecting KFS information – either over the 
counter or online – could prove a timely and difficult process. 
Perhaps more interesting are the findings that while experience may simplify 
the loan selection process for some borrowers, others with similar financial 
knowledge or borrowing experience still find loan comparisons difficult. 
Understanding how different levels of financial knowledge and different levels of 
experience in the home loan market influence borrowers’ decision-making criteria 
and data collection strategies is important. This will ensure that borrowers of varying 
experience may be best equipped to select a loan that contains the features they value 
in a time period which borrowers are willing to spend comparing their options. 
Additionally, research should investigate how borrowers search for loan 
information online and how they navigate lenders’ websites. This research may be 
used to better place information about lenders’ KFS generators where borrowers are 
most likely to find it. This includes the information surrounding the links to the 
generator that is required to attract borrowers’ attention, and the information that 
encourages borrowers to use the generators. Further, descriptions of KFS and their 
benefits should be tested so that clear and effective information can be provided to 
lead borrowers to KFS generators and promote their use. 
Disclosure testing should be conducted on the different information contained 
on KFS to determine whether borrowers find the information useful. In the research 
conducted so far, it appears that the information borrowers focused on was centred 
on the first half of KFS content, predominately the breakdown of costs. Other 
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information, such as the warnings to consider the features of the product, was not 
mentioned in the borrowers’ comments. By seeking to understand what information 
borrowers value, regulation can be better tailored in the design of KFS to ensure they 
contain all the information borrowers who would use them find relevant and useful. 
This insight can then be used to reposition, reframe or supplement such information 
as borrowers do find valuable. For example, rather than simply including a general 
list of features borrowers may wish to consider, testing could be conducted to 
determine if breaking this list into a primary list of included features and a secondary 
list for other potential features borrowers should consider returns a greater benefit.  
Finally, while this chapter has provided some starting points for amendments, 
there has been a strong call from the Standing Committee of Official of Consumer 
Affairs and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Management Committee for 
regulation surrounding pre-contractual home loan disclosure to be based on 
consumer testing (O'Shea, 2010, pp. 2-4). In the past, this disclosure testing has been 
limited to the effectiveness of the disclosure mechanism, ignoring how best to 
achieve timely delivery of this disclosure to borrowers who would use it. Future 
research should extend this focus to include investigating effective methods of 
disclosure delivery to ensure that disclosure which is designed to enhance consumer 
decision-making reaches the intended audience as early in the decision process as 
possible. For example, legislatively requiring a lender to offer KFS to any borrower 
who enquires into the cost of a loan, or at least provide a short statement of the 
availability of such a government initiative, would appear to increase the likelihood 
that borrowers who could benefit from such documentation will encounter and 
incorporate it into their comparison process. 
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7.7 Summary  
Overall, the regulatory amendments brought about by the National Consumer 
Credit Protection Amendment (Home Loans and Credit Cards) Act 2011 have been 
notable for their virtual invisibility in the home loan market practices. Although KFS 
successfully convey loan costs to borrowers in a clear and comparable format, their 
use in practice has been found to be minimal at best. Findings demonstrate this is 
because borrowers lack exposure to KFS availability and function. In typical home 
loan searches, KFS are not readily encountered. Substantial research on a borrower’s 
part in the early information gathering stages is required to identify and procure 
these forms. Typically, this appears to require that the borrower is aware of both 
KFS existence and the benefits of using them. 
In electronic searching, barriers exist through inconsistent placement, non-
prominent positioning and a lack of standardised descriptive information around 
KFS functions. In site visits, lender practices and training levels are such that lender-
related information is the primary material distributed and, in circumstances where 
KFS are specifically requested, difficulties around production often mar efficient 
distribution. Access in this respect is, arguably, caused largely by legislative drafting 
wherein lenders are required to distribute KFS only when asked by a borrower and, 
as seen in site visits, only when asked in very specific language. The need to request 
KFS, therefore, provides an unnecessary barrier to access that reflects Australia’s 
traditional approach to consumer protection legislation wherein market corrections 
are addressed through consumer education, but it fails to translate to real-world 
practices. Rather, findings in this context align with predictive behaviour and 
solutions that behavioural economists have recently began to advocate. Reallocating 
the burden of disclosure to lenders, as exists in UK and US contexts, would be a 
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significant step in advancing greater use of these documents. This in itself, however, 
does not ensure borrowers will receive them early enough in the process to be 
effective and, as a result, legislation should require proactive provision of KFS to 
borrowers seeking home loan pricing information as early as possible. 
As noted at the outset, home loans are often the biggest single ‘purchase’ 
Australian consumers make. Also, monthly outgoings in this respect are usually one 
of the most significant budgetary expenditures for households, and in turn influence 
both spending and savings patterns across the Australian economy. Ensuring that 
competition in this sector remains vital is therefore critical to the country’s welfare 
as a whole. KFS represent an important step in this chain. Used properly, the 
prescribed format minimises a wide range of disparate loan pricing information and 
creates a solid basis for comparing home loan ‘apples’ with ‘apples’. It is therefore 
advocated that a relatively straightforward reform initiative would be to heighten 
borrower awareness through re-allocating disclosure obligations to lenders as part of 
their broader loan documentation and duty-of-care obligations. This should be 
combined with additional requirements standardising the placement of KFS on 
electronic sites and the use of prescribed descriptive information about the 
government’s intended role and function for KFS. In this way, the strength of all 
stakeholders can be ensured: consumers will get a better chance of understanding the 
bottom-line costs of the range of loan packages available in the market; lenders will 
be able to promote new and innovative packages clearly and easily with relatively 
little additional cost or effort; and the Australian economy will benefit from 
enhanced protective measures around competition broadly in this critical sector. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: KFS and Annotated Comments 
NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION REGULATIONS 2010 - 
SCHEDULE 5 
Key Facts Sheets    (regulation 28LB) 
Part 1 -- Model of Key Facts Sheets 
This Key Facts Sheet is an Australian Government requirement under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 
2009 
KEY FACTS ABOUT THIS HOME LOAN 
Date produced: [date] 
  
[lender logo] 
Australian credit licence number: [lender's 
ACL number] 1 
THIS IS NOT AN OFFER OF CREDIT. This Key Facts Sheet is provided to help you compare this home loan 
with the home loans of other lenders. 
What you have told us 
Loan Amount: 
Term of the home loan: 
Interest type: 
Lender and product name: 
[loan amount] 
[loan term] 
[fixed or variable] 2 
[lender and product name] 
HOW DOES THIS HOME LOAN COMPARE? 
Description of this home loan
Repayment method Principal and interest 3 
Repayment frequency Monthly (other repayment options are available) 4 
Interest rate 
5 [variable interest rate] per annum 
[fixed interest rate] per annum fixed for [number] years, then a variable 
rate currently [variable interest rate] per annum 
[variable interest rate] per annum variable for [number] years, then a 
[ * fixed/ * variable/ * discount interest rate] per annum 
*   Delete whichever is not applicable 
[ * fixed/ * variable] [introductory interest rate] per annum for [number] 
years, then a variable rate currently [variable interest rate] per annum 
*   Delete whichever is not applicable 
Personalised comparison 
rate: (interest rate 
including fees) 
[Personalised comparison rate] per annum 6 
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Estimated cost of this home loan 
Total amount to be paid back (including the loan amount and 
fees) [repaid amount] 
7 
This means you will pay back [amount] for every $1 borrowed 8 
Establishment fees [establishment fees] 9 
Ongoing fees [monthly fees] 11 per month 
[annual fees] 12 per year 
10 Repayment per month (including ongoing fees) [monthly repayment] 13 
10 Repayment per year (including ongoing fees) [yearly repayment] 14 
10 Repayment per month for first [number] 15years (including 
ongoing fees) [monthly repayment] 
13 
10 Repayment per year for first [number] 15years (including 
ongoing fees) [yearly repayment] 
14 
10 Repayment per month after [number] 15years (including 
ongoing fees) [monthly repayment] 
13 
10 Repayment per year after [number] 15years (including 
ongoing fees) [yearly repayment] 
14 
  
There may be circumstances in which other fees are payable. Fees applicable for the loan you apply 
for will be shown in the loan contract. You can also obtain a list of fees applicable to this type of 
loan from our branches 16 or through our website at [ lender's website ]. 
Other loan set-up fees, such as valuation fees 16A and lender's mortgage insurance, and Government 
charges, such as registration fees and stamp duty on property transfer, have not been included. These 
will be determined after application. 
Additional fees may be payable if you choose to repay your fixed rate home loan early. 17 
  
18 What happens at the end of the fixed rate period?
At the end of the fixed rate period you may be able to fix the rate at a new fixed interest rate for a 
further period. If a further fixed rate is not entered into, the rate will convert to the applicable 
variable interest rate. Under the current variable interest rate, if interest rates do not change, your 
monthly repayment would [increase/decrease] by around [change in repayment]. 19 
 At the end of the fixed rate period, the rate will convert to the applicable variable interest rate. 
Under the current variable interest rate, if interest rates do not change, your monthly repayment 
would [increase/decrease] by around [change in repayment]. 19 
  
18 What happens if interest rates increase?
This is a variable rate loan. If your interest rate was to increase by 1% per annum, your monthly 
repayment would increase by around [change in repayment 2] 19 
This is a fixed rate loan. Your repayments will not change during the fixed rate period. After the 
fixed rate period, if the variable interest rate was to increase by 1% per annum, from the current 
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variable interest rate of [variable interest rate], your monthly repayment would increase by around 
[change in repayment] . 19 
  
How can I repay my loan faster? 
This loan allows you to make additional repayments to pay off your home loan faster. If you 
increased your monthly repayments by $200 a month to[monthly repayment + $200] you would 
repay the loan in [new loan term], instead of [loan term], based on the current variable interest 
rate stated in this Key Facts Sheet . 19 
This loan allows you to make additional repayments to pay off your loan faster but such repayments 
may attract a fee. You should ask your lender about the fee before making additional repayments. 19 
This loan does not allow you to make additional repayments to pay off your home loan faster. 19 
Altering the frequency of repayments may also help repay the loan faster. 
  
How to find the best deal for you 
To obtain the best deal for you, it is important to shop around and compare interest rates, fees and 
features before you apply for a home loan. Choosing the best home loan for you may save you 
money. For more information about how to get the best deal on your home loan visit the ASIC 
consumer website at www.moneysmart.gov.au. 
 
FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS KEY FACTS 
SHEET 
Which home loan is right for you? 
When choosing a home loan, it's important to work out what you want from your 
loan and how much it will cost you. Given the wide range of loans on offer--with 
different interest rates, product features and fees--it pays to shop around to find the 
loan that fits your needs and circumstances. Some loans offer features that may be 
appropriate for your situation and result in savings over the life of the loan. 
Some features you may wish to consider include: 
-          ability to split your loan between fixed and variable interest rates; 
-          ability to make extra repayments; 
-          an offset account; 
-          a redraw facility; and 
-          linked credit card and savings accounts. 
But compare the costs and benefits of these features before you agree to them. 
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For more information on choosing the right home loan for you, you may also wish to 
visit the ASIC consumer website at www.moneysmart.gov.au. 
Where can I find out more about this loan? 
If you want more information on the terms used in this document or about this home 
loan, please contact us [lender's contact details], or visit our website at [lender's 
contact website]. 
This Key Facts Sheet is an Australian Government 
requirement. 
The Australian Government requires all lenders selling standard home loans to give 
you a Key Facts Sheet like this one when you ask for one and provide the necessary 
information. 
Key Facts Sheets contain information presented in the same way to help you 
compare and select the most appropriate home loan for you. You should request Key 
Facts Sheets when shopping around for a home loan to help you find the home loan 
that is right for you. 
This Key Facts Sheet is not an offer of credit. The lender is not obliged to provide 
you with the home loan described in this Key Facts Sheet. You will need to apply for 
the loan and meet our lending criteria before we can determine whether you are 
eligible for this loan. 
You should also be aware: 
-     the interest rates and fees and charges are those that apply as at the date of 
production of this Key Facts Sheet. 
-     the amount required to be paid does not include fees which are dependent on 
events that may not occur (for example, late payment fees if you do not make 
repayments on time). 
-  the amount of the repayments shown in this Key Facts Sheet will change if 
interest rates, fees and charges change and if a different loan type, loan term 
or loan amount is used. 
What is the personalised comparison rate? 
The personalised comparison rate helps you understand what the total cost of your 
home loan might be, taking into account known fees and charges that will apply 
(other than government fees, charges or duties) by building those costs into the 
interest rate. It also helps you understand the impact of fixed or introductory rates of 
interest on the total amount of interest you could pay over the life of the loan. 
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Part 2 -- Information about preparing a Key Facts Sheet 
- Notes in model of Key Facts Sheet 
2.1              A lender that prepares a Key Facts Sheet for a particular consumer 
must include the following information at the numbers marked in the model in 
Part 1: 
                        1  If the lender is an ACL holder--this is the lender's ACL number. If 
the lender is not an ACL holder, no ACL number is required. However, the lender 
must disclose that the credit provider's ACL will be provided in the credit contract. 
The lender is exempted from the requirement to set out its ACN or ABN 
in subsection 153(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 on the Key Facts Sheet. 
                        2  This must be an interest type in the table in regulation 28LA. If a 
fixed loan is specified, the term of the fixed rate period must also be indicated. 
                        3  Under regulation 28LA, the repayments under the home loan must 
repay principal and interest for the full term of the loan. 
                        4  The repayment frequency must be based on monthly repayments. 
                        5  This is the current interest rate applicable to the loan on the date on 
which the Key Facts Sheet is produced. 
                            If discounts to this interest rate apply, the discount and the period 
in which it will apply must also be disclosed here. 
                            Only one of the 4 paragraphs in this box is required. Omit the 
paragraphs that do not apply to the loan this Key Facts Sheet relates to. 
                            A licensee may replicate this item if more than 1 discount period 
applies 
                        6  This rate must be calculated in accordance with the formula in 
subregulation 100(3) but using the designated amounts provided by the consumer 
under sections 133AC and 133AD of the Act. This rate includes each fee or charge 
(if any) payable by the debtor at the time each repayment is made, being a credit fee 
or charge (other than a government fee, charge or duty) that is ascertainable when 
the comparison rate is disclosed (whether or not the credit fee or charge is payable if 
the credit is not provided). The tolerances in subregulations 100(4), (5) and (6) also 
apply to this rate. 
                        7  This is the sum of the principal and all interest and fees certain to 
be payable over the life of the home loan. The fees include each fee or charge (if 
any) payable by the debtor at the time each repayment is made, being a credit fee or 
charge (other than a government fee, charge or duty) that is ascertainable when the 
comparison rate is disclosed (whether or not the credit fee or charge is payable if the 
credit is not provided). 
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                        8  This is the total amount to be paid back, divided by the loan 
amount, expressed as a dollar amount for every dollar borrowed. 
                        9  These are the fees and charges, paid to the lender on the 
commencement of the loan, used for the purpose of calculating the Personalised 
Comparison Rate. 
                      10  If the home loan is a variable rate loan or a fixed rate loan with a 
term that expires at the end of the fixed rate period, only the first 2 sections 
('Repayment per month (including ongoing fees)' and 'Repayment per year 
(including ongoing fees)') are required. If the home loan is any other type of standard 
home loan, the remaining sections are required. 
                      11  This is any fee paid each month to the lender on a regular and 
ongoing basis. 
                      12  This is any fee paid each year to the lender on a regular and 
ongoing basis. It does not include the monthly ongoing fee in note 11. 
                      13  This is the sum of amounts payable per month on the home loan 
and any fees paid to the lender that are charged in that month. 
                      14  This is the sum of the amounts payable per year on the home loan 
and any fees paid to the lender that are charged during the year. 
                      15  This is the length of the fixed rate period for fixed loans, the length 
of the discount rate period for introductory rate loans, and the length of the period 
before the discounted rate applies for discounting rate loans. 
                      16  The reference to the lender's branches in this sentence may be 
removed if not applicable. 
                   16A  Omit the reference to valuation fees if: 
                             (a)  a credit provider charges a valuation fee in all cases; and 
                             (b)  the amount of the valuation fee is included in the amount for 
establishment fees mentioned in the Key Fact Sheet. 
                      17  Only include if break fees are payable on the loan. 
                      18  Omit this section if: 
                             (a)  the interest rate will be fixed for the entire term of the loan; or 
                             (b)  the loan is a variable rate loan for which a fixed interest rate 
component is not available after the initial fixed rate period expires. 
                      19  Only one of these paragraphs is required. Omit the paragraph that 
does not apply to the loan this Key Facts Sheet relates to. 
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- Assumptions 
2.2              The tolerances and assumptions under section 180 of the Code apply 
to the calculation of any amounts in this Key Facts Sheet. 
- Publication online 
2.3              If a Key Facts Sheet is published online, links must be provided to the 
websites mentioned in the Key Facts Sheet. 
- Adopting the Key Facts Sheet for non-prescribed purposes 
2.4              A lender may produce a Key Facts Sheet for home loans if Part 3-2A 
of the Credit Act does not require the lender to provide a Key Facts Sheet. A lender 
that provides such a Key Facts Sheet must, to a reasonable extent, comply with the 
requirements for producing the Key Facts Sheet, but must omit any reference to the 
production of the Key Facts Sheet being an Australian Government requirement. 
Source: National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 (Cth) Schedule 5, by Australian 
Government, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2010L00631 
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Appendix B. Example United States Truth in Lending Statement 
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Figure B1: Example Truth in Lending Statement. Reprinted from Sample Truth-in-lending disclosure 
statement, by Hardford Housing Authority, 2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.harfordhousing.org/Download/2179-1297.pdf 
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Appendix C: United Kingdom Key Facts Illustration 
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Figure C1: Example Key Facts Illustration. Reprinted from MCOB 5 Annex 1R, by Financial 
Conduct Authority, 2013, retrieved from 
http://media.fshandbook.info/Forms/mcob/mcob5_annex1R_20130401.pdf 
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Appendix D: Experiment Recruitment Email 
Hello #fname# #lname#!  
We would like to invite you to participate in an experiment conducted with the School of 
Accountancy. You are eligible to enrol in one of the following sessions:  
 
#sessionlist#  
 
If you would like to participate, this link will take you to the enrolment page:  
 
#link#  
 
Some alternates will be recruited for this experiment. Participant slots will be allocated on 
a first‐come, first‐served basis. Alternates will receive a $5 show‐up payment just for 
coming, and can leave immediately before the start of the session. Participants will receive 
a flat payment of $15 upon completion of the experiment. Please bring a calculator (A basic 
calculator will suffice but please do not use your phone) and writing utensils with you to 
the experiment. 
 
The No‐Show Policy is in effect for this experiment. (Please see the FAQ on the recruiting 
site if you don't remember what this policy is.) So, please don't enrol unless you are 
confident that you can come for the whole time.  
If you would like more information in regards to this experiment please do not hesitate to 
email ross.skelton@student.qut.edu.au 
 
Many thanks for your consideration of this request. 
 
Ross Skelton 
PhD Student  
School of Accountancy 
Queensland University of Technology 
Phone: 3138 2468 
Email: ross.skelton@student.qut.edu.au  
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Appendix E: Compensation Details 
In order to determine whether a participant was able to correctly rank the 
loans, the relationship between each loan and the ranked immediately higher than it 
was examined. This is best explained with an example. Assume Loan A was the 
most cost effective and Loan D was the second most cost effective: so long as D was 
ranked higher than A, then the participant was regarded as having correctly 
identified the relationship between the loans, even if A was ranked 1 and D was 
ranked 4 (instead of 2). Once all of these relationships were considered together, it 
could be determined how well the participant ranked the loans. While more complex 
than just determining how many loans were correctly ranked, this was done to 
prevent a poor ranking of one loan from throwing out the analysis on all the other 
loans. For example, if a participant ranked the most expensive loan first, but 
correctly ranked the other three loans, two-thirds of their answers would be correct, 
despite none of the loans being ordered correctly. This is demonstrated in Table E1. 
Assume the correct ranking is 1, 2, 3, 4 and the participant answered 4, 1, 2, 3:  
Table E1 
Compensation Scheme 
Marked by Ranking Marked by Relationship 
Correct Rank Rank Identified Correct 
Relationship 
Relationship 
Identified 
1 No 2 > 1 Yes 
2 No 3 > 2 Yes 
3 No 4 > 3 No 
4 No   
 
As Table E1 shows, at an extreme, a single mistake can result in all the 
participants’ answers being considered incorrect. Whereas by considering the 
relationships, more accurate insight into the participants’ comprehension and ability 
to compare the loans can be considered.   
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Appendix F: Experiment Post-Test Questionnaire 
1) How difficult was it to compare the different loans?  
Very Easy Very Hard  
2) Without looking back at the loans, can you remember the name of the loan 
you believed was cheapest? If so what was it?  
 
 
3) Is there any information you felt would have made your decision-making 
easier? 
  
 
 
4) Do you have any other comments about the information you were 
presented with? 
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5) How easy was it to locate, calculate and compare the following information 
for each loan:  
Interest Rate:     Very Easy Very 
Hard  
Fees and Charges:     Very Easy Very 
Hard  
Total Estimated Amount Repayable on the Loan:  
Very Easy Very 
Hard  
Interest Charges:     Very Easy Very 
Hard 
Monthly Repayments:    Very Easy Very 
Hard 
 
6) Using the information provided, answer the following questions as best 
you can for Loan A:  
What was the interest rate of loan?       
 
What was the type of interest rate?       
 
What is the loan term?         
 
What is the monthly repayment amount?       
 
What was the interest charged over the life of loan (do not include 
repayments of the original amount borrowed)?      
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7) Please check the box if you considered the following information when 
deciding which loan was cheapest: 
Interest Rate 
Fees and Charges 
Loan Features 
Comparison Rate 
Loan Type (Fixed or Variable) 
Total Estimated Amount to be Repaid 
The Name of the Loan 
 
8) Please rank how important this information was in reaching your final 
decision.  
Interest Rate:     
Very Low Influence Very High 
Influence 
Fees and Charges:     
Very Low Influence Very High 
Influence  
Loan Features:          
Very Low Influence Very High 
Influence  
Comparison Rate:     
Very Low Influence Very High 
Influence  
Loan Type (Fixed or Variable):     
Very Low Influence Very High 
Influence  
Total Estimated Amount Repayable on the Loan:     
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Very Low Influence Very High 
Influence  
The Name of the Loan:  
Very Low Influence Very High 
Influence 
9) How easy was it to find the information you needed from the following 
documents:  
General Information:  Not Very Useful Very 
Useful  
Interest Rate Tables:   Not Very Useful Very 
Useful  
Key Fact Sheets (If Applicable):  Not Very Useful Very 
Useful  
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Appendix G: Demographic Questionnaire – Experiment 
What is your year of birth?  
 
Please indicate your gender.  Male Female  
What is your course of study?  
Please indicate your current level of study.  Undergraduate  
Postgraduate  
Overall, how would you rate your 
performance at university?  Well above average  
A little above average  
Average  
A little below average  
Well below average  
Have you ever participated in economic 
experiments before ?  Yes No  
How many of the participants in this session 
do you know ?   
Please enter the country you were born.  
 
If you were born overseas, how long have 
you held an Australian citizenship (in 
years)?  
 
How many times have you applied for a 
home loan?   
How many times have you applied for a 
credit card?   
How many times have you applied for a car 
loan?   
-
-
-
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How many times have you applied for any 
other type loan?   
How many times have you applied for a 
mobile phone contract?   
 
How would you rate your financial literacy: Not Very Good 
Very Good  
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Appendix H: Screenshots of Experiment Interface 
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Figure H1: Screenshots of experiment software design.
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Appendix I: Interview Participant Demographics 
Table I1 
Demographic Information of Interview Participants 
Ref 
# Gender Age Purpose 
New 
or 
Repeat 
Prior 
Home 
Loans 
Educational 
Background 
Income 
(AUD) 
House 
Price 
1 
Male 25-34 Buy New 0 
University 
Degree 
100,000 
–149,999 
250,001 - 
450,000 
2 Male 45-54 Buy Repeat 3 Diploma 300,000+ 1,500,000+ 
3 
Male 25-34 Buy New 0 
University 
Degree 
100,000 
–149,999 
450,001–
1,000,000 
4 
Female 45-54 Buy Repeat 2 Diploma 
150,001–
199,999 
250,001–
450,000 
5 
Female 75+ Buy Repeat 5+ 
University 
Degree 
150,001–
199,999 
450,001–
1,000,000 
6 
Male 55-64 Refinance Repeat 5+ Diploma 
100,000 
–149,999 
250,001–
450,000 
7 
Male 25-34 Buy New 0 Diploma 
100,000 
–149,999 
250,001–
450,000 
8 
Female 25-34 Buy Repeat 1 Diploma 
100,000 
–149,999 
450,001–
1,000,000 
9 
Male 45-54 Refinance Repeat 5+ High School 
80,000 –
99,999 
450,001–
1,000,000 
10 
Male 25-34 Buy New 0 High School 
100,000 
–149,999 
250,001–
450,000 
11 
Male 35-44 Buy New 0 
University 
Degree 
40,000 –
79,999 
250,001–
450,000 
12 
Female 35-44 Buy New 0 
University 
Degree 
Less than 
40,000 
450,001–
1,000,000 
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Appendix J: Demographic Questionnaire – Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Participant’s age: 
 
Under 18 years old  
18 ‐ 24 years old  
25 ‐ 34 years old  
35 ‐ 44 years old  
45 ‐54 years old  
55 ‐ 64 years old  
65 ‐ 74 years old  
75 years or older   
 
2) Participant’s gender: 
 
Male  
Female
 
 
 
3) What is the purpose of the 
home loan? 
 
Purchase  
Refinance  
Other
 
4) Is this your first time taking out 
a home loan? 
 
Yes  
No   
 
 
 
5) Prior borrowing history: 
number of home loans or 
refinance loans sought prior to 
this?  
 
1 time prior to this  
2 times prior to this  
3 times prior to this  
4 times prior to this  
5 times prior to this  
More than 5 times  
Not Applicable
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6) Participant’s educational 
background:  
 
Primary School  
High School  
Diploma  
University Degree  
PhD or Masters  
No Formal   
Other
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7) Participant’s pre‐tax household 
income 
 
Less than $40,000  
$40,000 ‐ $79,999  
$80,000 ‐ $99,999  
$100,000 ‐ $149,999  
150,000 ‐ $199,999  
$200,000 ‐ $249,999  
$250,000 ‐ $299,999  
More than $300,000   
 
 
 
8) Purchase price band of the 
property for which the home loan 
was acquired:  
 
Less than $100,000  
$100,001 ‐ $250,000  
$250,001 ‐ $450,000  
$450,001 ‐ $1,000,000  
$1,000,001 ‐ $1,499,999  
More than $1,500,000   
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Appendix K: Updated Interview Guide 
Introduction 
Hi, is this [Name]? My name is Ross Skelton, and I’m calling in regards to the 
research interview we scheduled. Is now still a good time to talk? 
-Introduce small talk as appropriate to build rapport. Be respectful of their 
time- 
Thank you for your agreeing to take part. As I think you are aware, I am 
undertaking a PhD at the Queensland University of Technology looking at how 
people make home loan decisions. Through this research I hope to make 
recommendations aimed at improving the information lenders provide and make it 
easier for borrowers to pick a better home loan. My research has been approved by 
the QUT ethics committee and you should have received two documents. First, a 
participant information sheet which provides the background on this study and 
details on the ethics procedures. Second there is also a short demographic 
questionnaire. Do you have these documents? 
Any answers you provide will not be attributed to you and you are free to 
answer as many or as few of my questions as you would like. All the information 
collected will be stored securely on the QUT campus using the facilities provided 
and according with QUT’s ethical code of conduct. If it is OK with you, I will record 
the interview. I am doing this so that I can go back and check your answers if I need 
to. You can ask to not to be recorded at any time – just let me know. You may also 
decide not to answer any question if you would prefer. Are you OK if I begin 
recording now? 
Appendices 333 
 
 
Hopefully you’ve had a chance to look over the ethics form. At this stage, did 
you have any questions or concerns related to the research? 
1. Confirm qualification of the participant:  
• You recently purchased a home, is that correct? When was the purchase (month 
and year)? 
• If you don’t mind me asking, did you require finance? From a financial 
institution/bank? 
• If the answer is no, terminate and thank for time. 
• Or: You have recently refinanced an existing home loan, is that correct? When 
was the purchase (month and year)? 
• If this is a refinance: What motivated you to refinance your loan? 
2. Investigate their decision process 
• When did you make the decision on finance - before or after the purchase? 
• Could you step me through the process you used you used in deciding the lender?  
• Probe on any information they used:  
• Where did you get that information?  
• Did you consider any other lenders?  
3. Investigate their motivation 
• Which lender did you end up borrowing from? 
• Why did you choose the lender you did - what as the primary reason?  
 - Probe: were there signs of  
  - price? 
  - bundle of products? 
  - pre-existing relationship? 
  - outsourcing of decision? 
• Were there any other reasons? 
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4. Key probes (these should change depending on answer to #3; if they are clear on 
the criteria, just confirm it and probe on the other key points.  
 Relationship 
 - Did you have any other products with this financier prior to your loan?  
 Outsourcing 
- Did you seek advice or rely on anyone else when making your decision?  
- Who was that and why did you use them?  
- How important was this advice to your final decision? 
- Do you know how they made their recommendation – for instance 
did they recommend offers from the smaller banks? 
- Do you know if they considered which lenders you had other 
dealings with? 
 Bundle of products 
- Do you have any other accounts with this lender? 
- If so, how long have you been dealing with this lender? 
- What role did the other products or attributes of the bank (e.g. ATM 
network, credit cards, offset facility, etc.) play in your decision, if any? 
- Would you consider taking out a loan with a smaller lender? Why/Why 
not? 
5. Key facts sheets 
 If they mentioned the KFS:  
- Where did you hear about the Australian Government home loan Key 
Facts Sheets?  
- Did you use them?  
- Why or why not?  
- How did you use them? 
 If they have not mentioned the KFS:  
- Have you ever head of home loan Key Facts Sheets? 
  - If yes, then ask if they used them (see preceding question) 
  - If no 
   - Show them the Key Facts Sheets and explain them: 
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A Key Facts Sheet provides you with an estimate of the cost based on your 
personal information. Generally you give them the information they want so 
the loan amount, the loan term, and the type of product you’re looking for 
and they generally come back to you with a sheet that estimates the total cost 
over the life of the loan, based on the details that you have given them. So it 
will add up all the fees and will calculate the interest charges presuming it 
stays the same over a 30- year period. And it will provide you with a total 
estimate of the cost. 
- Do you think this information would be helpful when 
making your decision? 
   - Is there a reason that you think you haven’t run across them? 
6. General/final questions 
• How difficult do you believe it is to collect and compare information about the 
different loan offers available to you? 
• How much time do you estimate you spent on searching and comparing? Why do 
you think you stopped searching comparing and searching when you did? 
• Is there anything else you would like to say, or anything you believe I may have 
missed? 
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Appendix L: Email to Participants Requesting KFS Comments 
“Hi [Participant] 
 
As mentioned attached is an example of the key facts sheet. If you could look over 
it and let me know what you think, whether you believed you would have used it 
or any comments or ideas for improvement that would be amazing. 
 
Thanks, 
Ross” 
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Appendix M: Representative Quotes Underlying Second- and Third-
Order Themes 
Table M1 
Representative Quotes Underlying Second- and Third-order Themes 
Dimension 1: Lack of awareness 
Theme 1: Collected information from lenders 
Searched 
lenders’ 
websites 
“And it’s funny because I feel like I did quite a lot of research into 
this. And I looked at quite a look of videos and looked up a lot of 
different things and to have not seen that you could just find these 
like this is a bit funny.”  
 “and I’ve found a lot of websites advise people ….” 
 “Most sites, most banks websites have a little thing where you can 
have a chat with the person live or send off an email with what you 
need to ask and they are pretty good with it.” 
 “So just, I guess, online. So trying to get on and get my head 
around everything you know, from looking up Youtube videos of 
people that were doing property investment and development and 
adding just looking through loans and trying to understand the 
differences between why you would go with fixed and not just a 
variable, a fixed or a variable and how much of a difference all of 
that would make.” 
 “Yeah, it’s pretty difficult. Those comparison websites, the thing 
about them is, they are pretty handy but they are always trying to 
get your details.” 
Requested 
information 
from lenders 
“... probably its CBA, but I remember first we called them and let 
them know that OK we want to buy or change our property and 
that is how we would like and the value of it and how much we are 
having uh for deposit.” 
 “I had a look at the NAB there, they were offering something very 
very similar, obviously they tried to get as much information about 
the lender that I was pre-approved with and I just played open 
cards with them because I wanted the best deal possible for 
myself.” 
Theme 2: Did not encounter KFS 
Had not 
heard of 
KFS 
“Nope, they got one?” 
“Uh, Vaguely yeah?” 
“Maybe, maybe, I dunno. Maybe.” 
“Errr, I may have skimmed across it during the process of buying a 
house but it doesn’t ring any bells.” 
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“I haven’t seen this for my current mortgage, because I got all the 
figures over the phone rom my broker. But I have seen it when I 
walked into banks previously to see kinda what the best offers were, 
and I had gone into Westpac or Commonwealth and been provided 
these sheets.” 
KFS not 
provided 
with lenders' 
loan 
information 
“I will have a look in my bank folder, and if I’ve got one I’ll send it 
through. I don’t recall seeing one, but I didn’t compare loans so it 
wouldn’t have been something I was really looking at.” 
“I’d have to look in my folder to see if I actually got one of these. I 
wouldn’t be able to tell you off the top of my head.” 
 “I haven’t seen this for my current mortgage, because I got all the 
figures over the phone from my broker. But I have seen it when I 
walked into banks previously to see kinda what the best offers were, 
and I had gone into Westpac or Commonwealth and been provided 
these sheets ... Um, my experience with Westpac at Fortitude 
Valley, my first loan, was very helpful. My experience with Westpac 
at Aspley wasn’t so great. So it really depended on how much 
information and how long they have been in it for.” 
 “... they send all the information to our email address and we just 
go through that and then consider the different banks and different 
options... I wish I would have had this information to make a 
decision when we got our loan.” 
Did not find 
KFS online 
“Funny I never came across those while looking – they might have 
a vested interest in making them obscure to find? I did see their 
calculators, but from memory they tended to be very basic e.g. no 
fees included, you had to input the rate you thought etc. So not too 
handy.” 
 “That fact sheet is exactly what you need to compare loan against 
loan, not sure how I missed them when I was looking (unless 
they’re new?).” 
 “I dunno, maybe they didn’t come up first in the search I guess. 
When I was typing in, I didn’t really know to look for them because 
I didn’t know that they were there to begin with.” 
Dimension 2: Perceived complexity of information 
Theme 3: Time Constraints 
Perceived 
lack of time 
“If it was much easier to look at this information, then you’d 
probably do a better job of saving yourself some money. But no, so 
we are all time poor.” 
“I needed the money in a hurry, and I just went to the local branch 
where I had my accounts and saw the manager.” 
“Definitely a case of getting to what you think is the optimal 
solution and deciding that you’ve wasted enough time looking 
around.” 
“If you’ve got a bit of time and you can just go around and talk to 
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your banks.” 
  “I don’t have the time.” 
Comparison
s take a lot 
of time 
“Probably a good couple of months, really making sure that I was 
making the right decision.”  
“A lot of time, cause you know it went on for about a month before 
I made a decision as such. Um. Yah, I wouldn’t know in terms of 
hours spent, but it really took me about a month to make a fully 
informed decision after I’d spoken to third parties too.” 
 “People would need to do a bit of research, but I think on the 
whole it would be ... I mean it would take a bit of time but it would 
be able to find it." 
 “It’s too time consuming. We all have jobs we’re all trying to make 
a living.” 
 “Well [the broker’s advice] was very important, I don’t have the 
time to sit and follow the home loan market. I have five other 
companies and I need information and I need trusted information 
and the gentleman’s been at it for over 35 years. He’s 72 years old 
and he’s very active and he’s very good.” 
Theme 4: Difficult to compare loans 
Inconsistent 
terminology 
“... it’s quite difficult because they all call everything different 
things.”  
 “So that information is crucial and it is long overdue, that they can 
give them something that they can actually see that isn’t the banks 
scheniving and manoeuvring in how it words its words and all its 
little phrases and all the rest, which they don’t understand.” 
 “Ah gee, it ’s not hard; it’s easy for me because I understand it. 
Cause I ask the questions that give me the right answers. And if you 
answer the questions that I ask then I can translate them into things 
that I understand. It’s when they talk their language, that’s why I 
never let them talk. I say this is, what are the fees, what are the 
rates how much is it going to cost me, you know what answer you 
are looking for.” 
 “And they have six different banks which have six different words 
which mean six different things.” 
Obfuscation 
of 
information 
“I believe they try to cloud the water with other aspects of why 
their loan is more appealing than the one that you’ve been offered 
at the moment. And a lot of the time consumers don’t understand 
the implications of the various sorts of parts of the loans that they 
have to offer.” 
 “When I started to speak to the NAB, it was almost as if we were 
talking cross purposes with Westpac and the NAB I find it very very 
difficult to try and determine what the NAB was offering in 
comparison to Westpac. I think that confuses a lot of people too.” 
340 Appendices 
 “Mainly because the banks don’t want anything to do with what the 
government issues because it’s going to interfere with the way they 
trade and the way they suck you in. So I sincerely doubt they are 
going to run around throwing that information around.” 
 “Okay, that’s interesting. Funny I never came across those while 
looking – they might have a vested interest in making them obscure 
to find? “ 
Information 
is confusing 
“I think it is, it’s very confusing, even to me I work in finance …” 
“The home loan market is highly confusing. It changes by the day.” 
 “So the situation really is totally confusing and after you’ve been 
through six banks you’d actually pay 50% interest just to get them 
to organise themselves.” 
 “... that comparison rate they provide is not useful at all because 
it’s based on $150,000 always, so I think that the banks should be 
able to, very easily, what your real comparison rate is, based on 
that amount that you are borrowing.” 
 “This bank has a long list of administration cost which we have to 
pay and then the interest rates are also different and in the end we 
don’t know and then also they talked about year there were some of 
them there for like 15 years and then some for 20 and then 30 years 
and it was quite frustrating to make a decision.” 
  “how do you expect a normal average Joe to go and read all that 
rubbish. It’s hugely difficult, it’s hugely confusing.” 
  “... for me, I don’t have the time to investigate this sort of thing and 
cause they use different words and different things like that.”  
  “If it was much easier to look at this information, then you’d 
probably do a better job of saving yourself some money.” 
Theme 5: Prior knowledge and Experience 
Prior 
knowledge 
“That is great for 99% of the population but due to my corporate 
finance background I did my own modelling on different scenario 
testing.” 
 “So I knew that paying the mortgage package of I think it was like 
$395 per year gave me discounts on the interest rates.” 
 “I don’t think it’s very difficult to be honest . Because, not talking 
about home loans themselves, but I’m sure it would be similar, by 
looking at personal loans a lot of the big banks offer loan 
calculators, so you type in the desired amount and the desired time 
and the current offered interest rate and it gives you an estimated 
of how much it would cost you. So I would not say it’s difficult at 
all, I would say it’s all individual, if people are slack enough. Or if 
they’re, I suppose that some people don’t know the information is 
out there and they don’t know how to look for it either. So its sort 
of a personal decision as to whether its difficult.” 
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 “Definitely, because with my background in finance I could have 
done it easily by putting all those amounts together amongst the 
different banks and then I can make a decision easily.” 
Experience “I have about eight properties with Westpac I have about five 
properties that run on cash only.” 
 “I have some financial background but, my husband he has no 
background at all but he had experience with getting loan for 
property purchase before but we were quite frustrated at times 
because the information is not clear and we don’t know, okay, this 
bank has a long list of administration cost which we have to pay 
and then the interest rates are also different and in the end we 
don’t know.”  
 “I’ve talked to a lot of people and they’ve been in business and 
what’s the interest rate on the loan and they just don’t know they 
just get a figure they pay any month. And if they on direct debit 
most people don’t even know what amount they are paying out per 
month, you know? They just don’t know. I know a lot of people and 
they just say we just asked for the money and we got it. And you go, 
ah okay."I have about eight properties with Westpac I have about 
five properties that run on cash only.” 
 “It was pretty self-explanatory, I think again if it was my first time 
it would have been completely different and it would have been 
completely confusing.”  
Dimension 3: Impact of KFS 
Theme 6: Perceived usefulness of KFS 
KFS content 
is useful 
“That kind of information is always helpful. It’s helpful for the 
person that goes into the bank, newly married, first time home 
buyer and he has no idea what he’s walking into.”  
 “It’s very much the stuff that I was looking up, just in a nice 
concise and me not having to figure it out way. It’s good. I think 
it’s quite well set up. Really easy to read and understand. And it 
shows you all the things you do need to know in order to make that 
decision.” 
 “I believe this factsheet to be very informative; I probably would've 
used it myself had I not been acting only on third-party advice. It's 
definitely informative of all relevant data, I can't think of anything 
further to add from my viewing of this document.” 
 “The sheet is extremely informative and I think especially for 
someone that hasn’t bought before. I think it gives you that 
reference point to keep going back to there is a lot of figures and a 
lot of information that gets sent out in an easy fact sheet. Knowing 
exactly what you have to pay back, there’s always a real benefit 
there. That’s always the stressor for most people.” 
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KFS content 
is clear 
“Yeah, they could understand that, all the rest of it yeah is pretty 
straight forward, they could understand that yeah. What the 
repayments are and the repayments per year is including ongoing 
fees is $20,321 that’s fine that’s not hard to understand.” 
 “Definitely, because with my background in finance I could have 
done it easily by putting all those amounts together amongst the 
different banks and then I can make a decision easily.” 
 “When I look at this I can see clearly that, you know, in case of I 
borrow that amount and it finally, I can pay for how many years 
and then the total amount that I pay and also all the fees related to 
the loan.” 
 “It would have been incredibly useful it would have made it a 
whole heap easier without having to do all the maths myself. 
Knowing that they were available to just pull up like that.” 
Theme 7: Would Use KFS 
Borrowers' 
value price 
“And it basically, as you can see there, lists the price and how 
much you should be paying back. So it really helps you compare 
the price.” 
 “I just said what is the interest rate at the time with the lender that 
I was and it was lower than what I was on at the time, and I said 
well that sounds good to me.”   
 “It was based on price and interest rate mainly, and also whether it 
could be fixed or unfixed.” 
 “If their rate wasn’t competitive I wouldn’t have went with them. I 
would have had to say that rate was probably 90% of it.” 
 “Especially, the thing with Westpac they allow you to use offset 
accounts, You know you can have all your money in the access 
account and this balance can be used as a, as um money they can 
use to calculate the interest rate and help you, or help us reduce to 
reduce the interest rate uh or interest expense at the end of the 
month. So we wanted to do that to save the cost. Whatever we could 
do.” 
 “It was based on price and interest rate mainly …” 
Perceived 
purpose of 
KFS 
“I could have done it easily by putting all those amounts together 
amongst the different banks and then I can make a decision easily.” 
 “No, I mean it’s useful, but I wouldn’t have used it to compare.” 
“And it shows you all the things you do need to know in order to 
make that decision.” 
“That fact sheet is exactly what you need to compare loan against 
loan.” 
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“I would get that information naturally, I am aware of that 
information, I’ve been through the process a number of times. I 
know what kinds of loans I can get, I know where they come from, I 
know what they’re slinking and I know what their up to. I know 
interest against repayments of principle and interest I know what it 
costs you, I know what rates are, I know what levies are. People 
don’t know that.” 
“It would have been incredibly useful it would have made it a 
whole heap easier without having to do all the maths myself.” 
 “I think it gives you that reference point to keep going back to 
there is a lot of figures and a lot of information that gets sent out in 
an easy fact sheet. Knowing exactly what you have to pay back, 
there’s always a real benefit there. That’s always kinda the stressor 
for most people.” 
 “Yeah, they could understand that, all the rest of it yeah is pretty 
straight forward, they could understand that yeah. What the 
repayments are and the repayments per year is including ongoing 
fees is $20,321 that’s fine that’s not hard to understand.” 
Dimension 4: Use of third parties 
Theme 8: Heavy reliance on third parties 
Advice 
replaced 
comparison 
“It was probably critical if he would have said I could definitely 
get a better rate I would have, further discussed with him.”  
“Cause if someone’s a professional at something you generally 
take their advice over your own. It’s what they do.” 
“I got a broker you ask him and he does it all. And if I think he’s 
not giving me the right answers I’ll get someone else to do it.” 
 “I think it was more a recommendation under him. I think we put 
our trust on him more than anything without fully understanding 
his motives because obviously that is what he is qualified in doing. 
We sort of took his personal advice, there would have been reason 
behind it but I can’t remember it at this time.” 
 “I just relied on my father, he was the one that, yeah he got me to 
sign up with Westpac, establish a new bank account with Westpac 
especially for home loans.” 
 “I believe this factsheet to be very informative, I probably would've 
used it myself had I not been acting only on third-party advice.” 
  “I went to my broker. He said do this and do that, and whatever, 
and I just picked the best one.” 
Third parties 
replaced 
personal 
search 
“I went straight through to a broker, and the broker considered the 
best banks were, at the time, Heritage and Westpac.” 
“I went through a broker and the broker does all the work 
anyway.” 
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“Well basically we worked through a broker. So we worked 
through a broker and after we consulted him, he told us this is the 
preferred lender. After going through the information from him we 
accepted his information and used that.” 
  “Yeah no, I just used the broker like the interface between me and 
all the other banks.” 
 “We talked to a guy, a financial broker …” 
 “Oh, I went straight through to a broker, and the broker 
considered the best banks were, at the time, Heritage and Westpac. 
There was only a incredibly useful. It would have made it a whole 
heap easier without having to do all the maths myself, being the 
better bank and I chose to go with Westpac, because all my bank 
accounts were already with them and for the 0.01% I didn’t think it 
was really worth switching over.” 
 “It’s actually with my dad using Westpac for his home loans. Yeah 
he was the one who was stipulating that Westpac should be the 
relevant bank to use since he has used Westpac for a lot of his 
transactions already. So uh, yeah that was the process yeah.” 
 “I have a lot of trust in him and he has sorta been guiding me 
through it and he has property development himself so I know that 
he has a good idea behind it he’s been doing his job for quite a 
long time and is quite high up so I have quite a lot of trust in him.” 
 “I actually got my accountants to deal directly with both banks. He 
could ask more of the astute questions or the relevant questions 
other than me just asking you the things that I think are important 
to me.” 
Theme 9: Third parties used as an information source 
Confirmed 
choice with 
third party 
“I was with Commonwealth and I was pretty happy being with 
Commonwealth. I’d been with them for, all my life essentially. And 
they had a good deal, but it also came down to, my uncle works for 
a bank and he was able to get me a really good home loan for a 
good rate.” 
“so I negotiated a rate with CBA. I then went to an independent 
broker.” 
 “Yes Yeah, I spoke to [the lenders] and I speak to the phone and 
then they send all the information to our email address and we just 
go through that and then consider the different banks and different 
options that we have available and then, and you know talk to 
different friends and different people who have some financial 
knowledge.” 
Information 
sought from 
third parties 
“I think we were just trawling through iSelect or whatever to find 
the best rates …” 
“I probably stopped searching once I spoke to a few friends and 
worked out what rate they were obtaining.” 
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 “And we look at the alternatives, he gives us three alternatives, so 
we work on the best of four but basically we generally end up, 
although a couple of times we have changed it, with what he’s 
recommended.” 
 “and you know talk to different friends and different people who 
have some financial knowledge and then we end up with Westpac. 
On our own decision.” 
Dimension 5: Inertia 
Theme 10: Relationship benefits 
Improved 
customer 
service 
“I think the relationship that I had with the private bankers that 
I’ve always worked with at Westpac. That gave me a great deal of 
comfort that they understood the business that we own as well as 
my private um, situation so I think it was more of a comfort thing 
rather than anything to do sort of figure wise whatever the case 
may be.” 
 “I believe that because I am a member there and they can see my 
history that they would probably give me a decision quicker than a 
bank that didn’t know me and that I had no accounts with.” 
 “Well I found that I get better service, well in saying that, because 
I’ve got so many loans with the one bank they know every time I go 
to the bank they know who I am and they know what I’ve got, 
whether I use a broker or not it’s not hard for them to look up 
what’s happening in my life with my loans, and they go, well, 
you’re a valued customer and you get better service; for that 
reason, because they know who you are.” 
Familiarity 
and comfort 
“Also the comfort for me knowing that if anything would go wrong 
with it or if I had any questions that I didn’t feel were being 
answered, that I would be able to talk to my uncle.” 
 “Yeah for 20 years already. So we were really sad when we moved 
banks but we know that the only reason that we want our loan and 
we want all our bank accounts in one place… the thing with 
Westpac, they allow you to use offset accounts. You can have all 
your money in the access account and this balance can be used as 
money they can use to calculate the interest rate and help you, or 
help us reduce to reduce the interest rate or interest expense at the 
end of the month.” 
 “Yup, so I went to CBA cause I’ve banked with them for a number 
of years and I’ve signed up with Commsec and I’ve found their 
platforms quite useful. And obviously working in the city and 
having CBA branches everywhere I find quite convenient as well.” 
 “I think the relationship that I had with the private bankers that 
I’ve always worked with at Westpac. That gave me a great deal of 
comfort that they understood the business that we own as well as 
my private um, situation so I think it was more of a comfort thing 
rather than anything to do sort of figure wise whatever the case 
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may be.” 
 “… also the comfort for me knowing that if anything would go 
wrong with it or if I had any questions that I didn’t feel were being 
answered, that I would be able to talk to my uncle. And he would be 
able to help me figure it out and sort it out.” 
Theme 11: Switching cost 
Adversity 
towards 
switching  
“... it’s so hard to change to a different bank. It’s not just, okay you 
put a form in and I’ll drop it to that rate and we’ll fix it for two 
years. If you go to another bank you’ll probably have to give them 
all sorts of information and you know, tax returns and all sorts of 
stuff, and they don’t know you and they don’t know your business 
and, it would be a lot more drama. So I figured just stay there you 
know.” 
 “It’d have to probably be about, point... three per cent cheaper. It 
gets a little more complicated because CBA gave me a thousand 
dollars first home buyer so if you take that into consideration that’s 
about a percentage cheaper already.” 
 “And I think if the interest rate would have been considerably 
different I would have definitely moved. But for 0.01% it wasn’t 
worth the hassle.” 
 “Nah, it would have had to have been a per cent cheaper at least , 
maybe one per cent cheaper it would have to have been. It depends 
on the loan and how much I had borrowed at the time and whether 
the difference per month was sufficient to change my mind. If it was 
only a few dollars a month, or fifty dollars well even a hundred 
dollars I wouldn’t change, but if it was more than a hundred 
dollars or a couple of hundred dollars a month, I’d probably 
consider changing you know.” 
 “Maybe the only reason is if it [switching] was too much dramas, it 
was too hard I’d probably not. If it was made easier I probably 
would.”  
Product 
packages 
“for us we receive a family package which can happen to reduce a 
lot of cost here like annual fee, we don’t have to pay annual fee, 
and some other fees they they they took it out as well.” 
 “I think it was like $395 per year gave me discounts on the interest 
rates which was, considerably it made it quite different, gave me 
discounts on your insurance and everything like that.” 
 “I already bank with them, I have my shares with them, my wife 
banks with them. And having CBA branches across from where I 
work just makes it easier. I find their interface system, you know 
their Commsec system tying up between my share, my bank 
accounts, my margin loans works really well.” 
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 “And then I pushed backed to CBA and got an extra point, point 
zero two off my variable loan. Then they also capped the wealth 
package, ahh sorry they didn’t charge me the wealth package for 
the first year, they gave me a thousand dollars signing for the first 
time home buyers’ grant.”  
Cost of 
dealing with 
a new lender 
“It gets a little more complicated because CBA gave me a thousand 
dollars first home buyer so if you take that into consideration that’s 
about a percentage cheaper already. And also that I had my house 
insurance, well I got house insurance through CBA in there so it 
was a further 15% discount which I probably would have applied 
to the other banks so there are some other factors..” 
 “Nah, I already knew what I got with Westpac from having my 
previous mortgage.” 
  “We were happy with our service and they are friendly people and 
they were very helpful, very supportive and we had no problem 
with them at all and we don’t see any reason why we had to move 
our current bank.” 
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Appendix N: Study 1 Data Collection Sheet and Protocol 
Pre‐collection (about to enter) 
Date:     _____________________    Site No: ________________ 
Time:  _____________________ 
Bank:    _____________________ 
Location:  _____________________ 
    _____________________ 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
On entering 
1. Locate the information section of the branch. 
2. Approach and wait. Note how busy the branch is (mentally if not on notes). 
3. As naturally as possible, approach with a broad request: 
a. Request A: “Hi was looking for some information about your home 
loans that I could take away and compare with other home loans. 
Could you help me?” 
‐ Note: What information did they ask you for?  
b. If they have not asked for the kind of loan and amount: 
‐ Request B: “I was looking for a variable loan for around 
$300,000 over 30 years. Do you have anything that sets 
out the costs of a loan like this?” 
 
c. If they still haven’t provided you with the KFS:  
‐ supply all the information they will need and ask directly 
for comparison information (you don’t need to name KFS) 
‐ Request C: “I would prefer a variable rate for as long as 
possible – maybe 30 years. Do you have anything that 
breaks down the loan costs and would allow me to 
compare like for like across loans?”. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
On exit 
1. Did the lender provide KFS?  
a. If yes: 
i. When in the process 
ii. What was the position of the person who provided it 
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iii. How specific did you have to be in your request (was it at 
point a, b, or c) 
iv. Was it appropriate for what you were after 
v. Other impressions 
b. If no: 
i. Any insights into why not provided (for instance did staff 
member say they did not have anything that could do this) 
ii. Were you directed to do anything else (e.g. visit website) 
iii. Other impressions 
c. What other information was provided? 
i. List 
ii. Classify the information 
iii. Is there any reference to KFS in the information provided? 
iv. Who did you deal with (their position if possible). 
d. Do you have any other impressions/insights from the site visit? 
 
Note: Assign site no. to any information they provided. Analyse to see if KFS is 
provided.  
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Appendix O: Study 1 Data Collection Process – General 
Information 
 
Figure O1. Data collection process in Study 1. 
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Appendix P: Types of Disclosure Provided by Borrowers 
Overall a wide variety of information was provided by lenders. These 
documents were categorised loosely into six different types of documentation, 
although overlaps between documentations made the classification process difficult. 
For example, while most borrowers presented their fees and charges in their 
brochures, two lenders presented schedules of fees and charges separately. Brochures 
also doubled up as home purchase or credit guides, while for other lenders this 
documentation was separated into two documents. Overall, six broad categories were 
established:  
1)  Brochures and booklets: The most common of the disclosure provided in 
17 of the 19 cases, these typically contain a description and advantages of 
the different products offered by the lender. The information usually 
explains the type of situation in which each loan would be suitable. These 
documents primarily focused on the features of each product although they 
set out the fees (or were accompanied by a sheet similar to the rate sheet 
which set out these fees. These documents were largely text based and took 
several different forms, including cards, booklets, leaflets or brochures of 
varying sizes. 
2) Interest rate sheets: These sheets set out the interest rates (and sometimes 
fees) for the lenders’ home loan products. Thirteen of the 19 lenders 
produced this information, with a further two lenders making reference to 
their availability online. The format, content and layout of these differed 
across lenders. In particular, where products based interest rates on on the 
amount borrowed and the LVR ratio (or the different combinations of 
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these), interest rate sheets contained several rows for the same product. 
One lender presented the same information using footnotes to state the 
discount available for loan values over a particular amount. 
3)  Home purchase guides: Provided by seven of the lenders visited, these 
guides explained the process through which the consumer would need to go 
through in order to obtain a home loan. These documents did not focus on 
the products and did not highlight the cost differences between the 
alternatives. 
4) Handwritten notes and calculations: A number of lenders made several 
markings on the disclosure documents, with three providing handwritten 
notes in addition to the documentation provided. Additionally, two lenders 
asked for information regarding the borrowing arrangement and, using an 
online calculator, provided hand written estimates of monthly repayment 
amounts. 
5)  General terms and conditions documents: These documents formed part of 
the loan contract and was structured and written accordingly. They 
contained information regarding contingency fees and where they may 
apply However, due to the general nature of these documents they provided 
no information that could be used to compare costs across the different 
types of loans the lender offered.  
6) Non-government Fact Sheets: Importantly, two borrowers provided fact 
sheets for specific loan offers. These fact sheets were designed by the bank 
and were inconsistent with one another in both content and form. Neither 
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was based on the circumstances of the borrower and as such they did not 
provide an estimated total cost or monthly repayments estimate. 
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Appendix Q: Study 2 KFS Collection Sheet and Protocol 
Pre‐collection (about to enter) 
Date:    _____________________  Site No: ________________ 
Time: _____________________ 
Bank:   _____________________ 
Location:  ________________________ 
  _______________________ 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
On entering 
1. Locate the information section of the branch. 
2. Approach and wait. Note how busy the branch is (mentally if not on notes) 
3. As naturally as possible, approach with a broad request: 
a. Request A: “Hi, I was wondering if you could help me get a key 
facts sheet for your standard variable rate home loan?“  
i. Note: What information did they ask you for?  
b. If they still haven’t provided you with the KFS: 
i. Request B: I am really looking for one of the Australian 
Government’s home loan key facts sheets, I have been able 
to receive these from a number of other lenders and was 
wondering if you are able to provide me with one?” 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
On exit 
1. Did the lender provide KFS?  
a. If yes: 
i. When in the process 
ii. What was the position of the person who provided it 
iii. How specific did you have to be in your request (was it at 
point a, b, or c) 
iv. Was it appropriate for what you were after 
v. Other impressions 
b. If no: 
Appendices 355 
 
 
i. Any insights into why not provided (for instance did staff 
member say they did not have anything that could do this) 
ii. Were you directed to do anything else (e.g. visit website) 
iii. Other impressions 
c. What other information was provided? 
i. List 
ii. Classify the information 
iii. Is there any reference to KFS in the information provided? 
iv. Who did you deal with (their position if possible). 
d. Do you have any other impressions/insights from the site visit? 
 
Note: Assign site no. to any information they provided. Analyse to see if KFS is 
provided.  
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Appendix R: Study 2 Data Collection Process: Key Facts Sheets 
 
Figure R1. Data collection process in Study 2. 
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Appendix S: Example of Additional Information Provided 
 
Figure S1. Example of additional information generated by KFS generators. Reprinted from Home 
Loan Key Fact Sheet, in Sydney Credit Union. Retrieved 15 May 2013 from: 
http://www.scu.net.au/hlkfs (emphasis added). 
